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PERSONAL STATEMENT 
During my basic surgical training, I found that in addition to some unpreventable 
complications, patients suffer various harm because of inadequate management.  
These problems are not due to the lazy healthcare professionals or complex patients, 
they occur due to problems in the system. Specifically, I realized that the root cause of 
this problem is lack of interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary communication and 
assumption by healthcare professionals that other team/individual knows. There is lot 
of communication or information transfer gaps or holes at various phases of the 
patients’ surgical journey in the hospital.  One of my patients had his leg amputated 
mainly because of communication failure. He had femoral-peroneal bypass and was 
started on heparin infusion postoperatively. His APTT ratio was less than 1 for two 
days but it was not checked. It was only realized when his graft occluded. Even after 
embolectomy, his leg could not be saved.  
This stimulated me to study the area of communication and information transfer in 
surgery. My aim of the research is to map out the surgical process and identify the 
various information transfer and communication (ITC) problems, which happen 
during the whole of the surgical care pathway. Subsequently I want to improve the 
information flow in this care pathway by developing and implementing an 
intervention. 
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ABSTRACT 
Effective Information transfer and Communication is one of the key aspects of good 
medical practice and essential for surgical safety. High reliability organisations such 
as aviation have highlighted the importance of communication for safety and 
regularly provide communication skills training to their team members via Crew 
resource management (CRM) module. This report discusses important aspects of 
communication research in high-risk environments and confers its application in 
surgery. It analyses the nature and scope of communication failures in surgical field. 
The thesis has taken bottom-up approach unlike other research in this field, which has 
taken a top-down approach. First we have mapped and analysed the communication 
failures across the entire surgical pathway. Analysis of full pathway is critical as 
communication failures are not discrete events; information loss in one phase of care 
can potentially compromise safety in a subsequent phase. After the analysis, user-
centred interventions were developed and implemented to enhance the information 
transfer and communication in the postoperative handover phase. Results show that 
information transfer and communication failures are ubiquitous and distributed across 
the continuum of surgical care. These findings indicate that there is a room for 
improvement for enhancing ITC in surgical care. There is an imminent need for 
standardizing and structuring communication through use of checklists, proformas, 
care pathways and information technology. Subsequently we have demonstrated that 
standardization of ITC process through the implementation of postoperative handover 
proforma has improved the information transfer and decreased the ITC errors. It is 
hoped that this thesis provides a first step towards understanding, assessing and 
improving information transfer and communication through entire surgical care 
pathway, which in a long run will improve surgical safety. 
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THESIS AIMS 
1. To understand the current state of information transfer and communication 
practices in surgical field. 
2. To map the surgical process and identify the communication failures through 
entire surgical care pathway. 
3. To assess the information transfer through the continuum of surgical care. 
4. To evaluate the role of information transfer and communication failures in 
causing incidents and adverse events through the surgical care. 
5. To design and implement a user-centred postoperative handover proforma to 
improve information transfer and communication during the handover. 
 
Throughout this thesis, the terms information transfer and communication are used 
together to encompass the transfer of information by any means (eg- verbal, written, 
electronic) 
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CHAPTER ONE:  UNDERSTANDING SAFETY IN 
SURGERY 
 
1.1: Introduction 
Millennia ago, Hippocrates recognized the potential for injuries that arise from the 
well-intentioned actions of healers. Greek healers in the 4th century B.C., drafted the 
Hippocratic oath and pledged “ to prescribe regimens for the good of my patients 
according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone”. Since then, 
the directive primum non nocere (“first do no harm”) has become a central tenet for 
contemporary medicine. In the mid eighteenth century, when the practice of medicine 
emerged as a professional endeavor, it had significant potential for causing harm. This 
was a time when there was tension between proponents of natural healing and heroic 
medicine. During the second half of 1800’s there was increased realisation of the 
potential harm stemming from healthcare. 
Although concept of patient safety existed over last few centuries, it has been at the 
forefront of public debate for only past 10-15 years. Patient safety refers to 
minimizing this harm to patients arising from the treatments administered to them, or 
freedom from harm due to accidental injury (Kohn 2000). This subject has received 
significant attention in lay articles(Gawande 1999) and the scientific literature 
featuring large retrospective reviews reported over the past decade (Brennan et al. 
1991; Gawande et al. 1999; Leape et al. 1991; Vincent et al. 2001; Wilson et al. 1999; 
Wilson et al. 1995). According to the 1999 Institute of Medicine Report, errors in 
health care are the eighth leading cause of death in the United States and account for 
up to 100,000 deaths annually(Kohn 2000). The Harvard Medical Practice Study 
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published in 1991 was a cornerstone of the IOM report and has been pivotal in the 
genesis of the patient safety movement.  
 
1.2: Studies of Adverse Events: Scale of Problem 
An Adverse event (AE) is usually defined as an unintended injury or complication 
resulting in prolonged hospital stay, disability at the time of discharge or death and 
caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient’s underlying disease 
process(Kohn 2000). Aside from the direct harm to the patient, AEs are a 
considerable financial burden to the healthcare system. Clearly not all adverse events 
are preventable. 
Retrospective studies of case records in the United States and Australia have revealed 
a substantial rate of adverse events in hospital practice. The Harvard Medical Practice 
Study (HMPS) identified adverse events in 3.7% of hospital admissions (Brennan et 
al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991). In 70%, the adverse event led to slight or short-lived 
disability but in 7% the disabilities were permanent and 14% they contributed to 
death. Similar rates were found in a study from Colorado and Utah (Gawande et al. 
1999). The Quality in Australian Healthcare Study (QAHCS), using different criteria, 
identified adverse events in 16.6% of admissions, of which half were considered 
preventable. In the UK National Health Service (NHS), studies (Vincent et al. 2001) 
have suggested that 10.8% of hospitalized patients experience adverse events, and 
about half of these are preventable. A systematic review on adverse events (de Vries 
et al. 2008) included eight studies from the USA(Brennan et al. 1991; Leape et al. 
1991; Thomas et al. 2000), Canada,(Baker et al. 2004) the UK(Baker et al. 2004; Sari 
et al. 2007; Vincent et al. 2001), Australia (Wilson et al. 1995)and New 
Zealand(Davis et al. 2003) revealed that the median overall incidence of adverse 
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events was 9.2%, and almost half of these events were regarded as preventable. The 
majority of events were associated with a surgical care provider. Not all surgical 
adverse events were directly related to intraoperative events. Some of these were due 
to postoperative or ward based complications. Study by Neale et al(Neale et al. 2001) 
showed that more than half of the adverse events in surgery occurred in pre and 
postoperative period. 
Country/ 
Study 
N (number 
of 
patients) 
Year AE Surgical  
AE 
Preventable 
Harvard 
(HMPS) 
30,195 1991 3.7% 50% 50% 
USA 
(UT/CO) 
15,000 2000 2.9%  50% 50% 
UK 1014 2001 10.8% 71.8% 55% 
 
Table 1A: Adverse events rate in various studies 
 
1.3: Studies of Surgical Adverse Events 
Surgical adverse events can range from intra-operative mishaps as removal of wrong 
sided organ, amputation of wrong sided limb, operation on the wrong patient to poor 
post operative ward care. They may occur at any stage of peri-operative patient care. 
A study of case record review(Neale et al. 2001) identified events such as pressure 
sores, chest infections, poor care of urethral catheters and drug errors. Many of these 
were preventable and were attributed to poor postoperative ward care. 
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In 1982, CEPOD (confidential enquiry of peri-operative deaths) was originally set up 
by surgeons and anaesthetists to review surgical and anaesthetic practice in three 
regions of the United Kingdom. In 1988, it moved to a national level and a national 
confidential enquiry of peri-operative deaths (NCEPOD) was set up by Department of 
health. It studied data from England and Wales on 30-day in-hospital mortality 
following surgery to identify remediable factors in the practice of both anaesthesia 
and surgery. In last few years NCEPOD has continued to highlight a number of 
unsafe practices and made recommendations on how to avoid these. An example is 
emphasising the problem of comparatively poor outcome from emergency surgery 
carried out by unsupervised junior surgeons during the night. This has led to the 
current policies of carrying out only life or limb saving operations after 11pm and the 
introduction of dedicated daytime theatre lists for emergency surgery(NCEPOD1997). 
In United Kingdom, complication rates for some of the major operations are 20-25% 
with an acceptable mortality of 5-10%(Gordon et al. 1993). However at least 30-50% 
of major complications occurring in patients undergoing general surgical procedures 
are thought to be avoidable(Healey et al. 2002). The wide variation in surgical 
complication rates between different centres and different surgeons would support 
this view.  
 
1.4: Understanding Surgical Outcomes 
Surgery has advanced over years. Antisepsis, antibiotics, new advances in technology, 
insight in to patients safety has allowed operations to be performed more safely and 
with minimal invasion. More understanding into cancer biology has improved the 
outcomes in surgical oncology, which means that people are living much longer. 
Minimally invasive surgery started two decades ago has taken a giant leap in its 
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development with most of the procedures being performed laparoscopically these 
days. Recent innovations in Minimally invasive surgery including Single Incision 
Laparoscopic Surgery (SILS) and NOTES (Natural Orifice Transluminal Endoscopic 
Surgery) has further improved the surgical outcomes. Furthermore the risk 
stratification including preoperative optimisation, use of DVT and antibiotic 
prophylaxis has decreased the postoperative complications thus decreasing the 
morbidity and mortality further.  
Outcomes are measured in terms of intraoperative and postoperative outcomes. 
Intraoperative includes duration of surgery, blood loss, transfusion rate. Postoperative 
outcomes include analgesia requirement, time to discharge, mobilisation, length of 
stay, ITU length of stay, postoperative complications including general (pneumonia, 
urinary tract infection, deep vein thrombosis, sepsis) and procedure-specific 
(anastomotic leak, wound infection, haemorrhage). 
Surgical success is also monitored by the process of quality measures in the form of 
audit where individual or organisation outcomes are measured against standards and 
this is carried out regularly. These are subsequently compared to national guidelines 
and constant changes are done to improve the services. Through constant monitoring 
and advances in skills, technology and training, the mortality rates of major surgical 
procedures had come down drastically. 
 
1.5: System approach in Surgery  
Traditionally surgical outcomes were thought to be dependent on patient and surgical 
factors. Patient factors included age and co morbidity. Surgical factors included 
surgeon’s experience, technical skills. . However, this approach neglects a wide range 
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of factors that have been found to be of importance in achieving safe, high-quality 
performance in other high-risk environments. This view has been changed over last 
few years (Vincent et al. 2004) and it has been realised that apart from patient and 
surgical factors a whole range of system factors such as  communication, 
organization, work environment, tasks also contributes to the surgical outcome. (Fig. 
1A) 
Organizational factors include adequate personnel and equipment, scheduling and 
timing of procedures, and substitution of usual team members with new members. 
There are more errors in an ICU during July and August, when new medical and 
nursing trainees start their rotations(Abramson et al. 1980). The odds of dying of a 
ruptured aortic aneurysm or acute epiglottitis are significantly higher on weekends 
than on weekdays, presumably because of difficulties with staffing and arranging 
complex emergent care for patients with these rapidly fatal conditions(Bell and 
Redelmeier 2001). Situational factors comprise distractions, interruptions, physical 
conditions, and equipment design, including monitors and displays. Distractions 
increase medication-dispensing errors in pharmacies(Flynn et al. 1999). Equipment 
design is a type of situational factor and an important cause of error; equipment 
malfunction causes about one-third of AEs in an ICU(Abramson et al. 1980). Team 
factors include communication, confidence in team members, and the ability to deal 
with unexpected events. Observations of procedures in the ORs revealed numerous 
errors related not to technical competence but to interpersonal aspects of the OR’s 
functioning (Lingard et al. 2002). Effective communication among medical team 
members is certainly an area where significant improvements could be made. 
Individual factors such as mental readiness, technical performance, and fatigue are 
important causes of error. Sleep-deprived surgeons have impaired concentration 
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(Bartle et al. 1988; Wesnes et al. 1997) and worse performance on a laparoscopic 
simulator (Taffinder et al. 1998). Task factors relate to the clarity of the task at hand, 
including clear protocols and accurate available information; they are important 
causes of adverse drug events. Patient factors that may contribute to surgical error 
include obesity, anatomic variation, disease severity, and co-morbidity. A patient with 
narrow pelvis and previous surgery has higher chance having operative injury during 
anterior resection. 
Clearly patient factors are the most important determinant that seeks to determine the 
influence of different components however, understanding these other factors is more 
important to reduce the morbidity and mortality. Optimizing the surgical 
environment, attention to ergonomics and equipment design, enhancing 
communication and team performance may be more important than skill when 
reaching for truly high performance.  
This systems approach is based on three principles: (1) human error is unavoidable, as 
it is an inherent aspect of human work; (2) faulty systems allow human error to cause 
harm to the patient; (3) systems can be designed that prevent or detect human error 
before a patient is harmed. These principles have been validated in numerous 
industries outside of health care, including commercial aviation and the oil industry. 
The aviation industry provides an interesting example of the utilization of systems 
theory. Use of checklist and communication protocols ensure that critical steps are not 
omitted and potential for miscommunication is minimized. Furthermore, airline 
cockpits are equipped with black boxes. These devices record plane parameters and 
cockpit conversations in the cockpit, so that when a crash occurs, experts from 
multiple fields can access and review the relevant parameters surrounding the event. 
The aviation industry has also created a culture that recognises human factors as 
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important elements in error prevention and has used information technology to 
address this issue. Flight simulators are used to prepare flight crews for adverse 
events. 
Therefore, as in field of aviation, the adoption of a systems approach to the study of 
surgical safety could improve patient care by error prevention. The establishment of 
surgical protocols and checklists has the potential to improve the standards of training 
and practice as well as enhancing theatre team communication. 
 
 
Fig. 1A: Systems approach to Surgical Outcome (Vincent 2004) 
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1.6: Communication: A key component of System Approach 
Of all the systems factors, communication is perhaps most significant, both as a skill 
in itself and because effective communication is integral to success of all other factors 
highlighted in a systems approach to surgical safety. Moreover, the exchange of 
information is a core activity for other non-technical skills such as decision-making, 
situational awareness, teamwork, leadership and stress management, which are 
essential for safe and effective performance. Communication is fundamental to 
workplace efficiency and safety, is a key activity in co-ordination between humans 
and plays a vital role in ensuring the successful completion of tasks. It provides 
knowledge, institutes relationships, establishes predictable behaviour patterns, 
maintains attention to the task, and is a management tool. The importance of 
communication for effective performance, reducing errors and improving safety 
cannot be overemphasised. 
 
1.7: Conclusion 
Patient safety gained its momentum over last two decades and the publication of US 
Institute of Medicine 1999 report To err is human further spurred the development of 
the field. Although with a long history, it is recently that sustained body of research in 
patient safety has emerged. Almost one half to two third of hospital adverse events are 
attributable to surgical care. However, system factors that underlie such errors have 
not been much studied. Surgical outcome used to be mainly dependent on patient’ and 
surgeons’ factor, but this view has begun to change over last decade. There is 
increased recognition of systems approach to surgical safety. Apart from technical 
skills, the surgical outcome is influenced by the nature of the task, the team they work 
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in, the communication they have with other team members, the working environment 
and the wider organizational context. 
 In the next chapter, I will highlight the most important system factor- 
communication. I will mention about few publicized disasters in high-reliability 
industries caused by miscommunication. I will also discuss about role and value of 
communication in surgical safety and finish off by drawing upon the evidence from 
high-risk industries on improving information transfer and communication practices.  
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CHAPTER TWO: STUDY OF COMMUNICATION 
 
2.1: Communication Errors: Culprit of Major Disasters in high-risk 
Industries 
Many accident analyses site miscommunication as being the contributory cause. 
There are some known published investigations into accidents/incidents where failure 
of communication at shift handover was held to have been a contributory causal 
factor. These were major accidents/incidents resulting in actual or potential loss of 
life, major property damage and/or environmental impact. These highly publicised 
incidents form the tip of an iceberg of numerous unpublished lost production 
incidents or near-misses caused by failures of communication. 
• Sellafield Beach Incident- In November 1983 highly radioactive waste liquor 
was accidently discharged in the sea as a result of failure of communication 
between shifts. 
• Piper Alpha Disaster- In the north sea situated 110 miles northeast of 
Aberdeen, Scotland, Piper Alpha platform had an explosion on its production 
deck on 6 July 1988. Of 266 persons on board, only 61 survived. Of many 
factors, failure of transmission of relevant information at the handover was the 
one of the main contributory factors for the accident. 
• Tenerife Air Crash- The famous accident was caused by the 
miscommunication between the air traffic control tower and the pilot. 
• Scandinavian Star Fire- This passenger ship caught fire because of lack of 
communication between rescue coordination centre and the passenger ship. 
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• These incidents demonstrate the consequences of over-reliance of one 
means of communication, failure to consider information needs of others, 
increased potential for misunderstanding present when people hold 
differing mental models. In these incidents, written communication failed 
as the intended message was misunderstood or simply not communicated. 
Series of studies(Mehrabian 1967a, b) were carried out by Mehrabian in 
late 1960s. They were based on situations in which there was ambiguity 
between spoken word and non-verbal cues such as posture, facial 
expression etc. They demonstrated that amount of attention receiver pays 
to the words is 7% while 55% and 38% of the attention is paid to non-
verbal clues and tone respectively. This implies that non-verbal signals are 
atleast as important as tone and words. 
Written- This is the most important communication used in workplace. It 
is frequently electronic and is open to misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation, so care must be taken to ensure that it is clear, precise 
and informative. 
West(West 2004) suggested that richness of transfer of information is determined by 
the medium of information exchange. (Fig. 2A) 
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Fig. 2A: Richness of information according to the mode of transfer. (West 2004) 
 
He commented that the most rich information transfer occurs during face-to-face 
conversations as this allows both verbal and non-verbal communication to take place. 
Reason(Reason 1997) suggested that organizational accidents which happen due to 
communication problems can be categorized as: 
• System failures- in which necessary channels of communication do not 
exist or are not functioning 
 32!
• Message failures- in which channels exist but information is not 
transmitted 
• Reception failures- in which channels exist and information is transmitted 
but either there is delay in arrival of information or it is misinterpreted by 
the receiver. 
 
2.2: Communication Failures & Medical Errors 
These communication problems do not just occur in industry. People have been 
pointing out the existence of poor communication in clinical practice for years. A 
report 25 years ago suggested that 15% of human error was attributable to 
communication problems(Abramson et al. 1980). Subsequently over last two decades, 
The Harvard Medical Practice Study(Brennan et al. 1991), The Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study(Wilson et al. 1995), and Institute of Medicine report(Kohn 2000) 
all revealed that ineffective communication is a significant factor in medical error. 
Researchers in family practice(Bhasale et al. 1998), emergency medicine(Adams and 
Bohan 2000; Risser et al. 1999; Williams et al. 1999), anesthesia(Runciman et al. 
1993) and the intensive care unit (ICU)(Beckmann et al. 1996) all make pleas for 
better team communication.  
In one study of all root cause analyses submitted to the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), communication was identified 
as the most common root cause of sentinel events wrong-site surgeries (1995-2004). 
The analysis of adverse events and incidents in the two phases of surgical care i.e. 
preoperative evaluation (Kluger et al. 2000) and recovery room(Kluger and Bullock 
2002) also revealed communication failures as one of the leading causes of these 
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problems. In two separate studies analyzing surgical errors(Christian et al. 2006; 
Rogers et al. 2006), communication breakdown was found to be one of the main 
factors contributed to errors. These studies highlight that underlying causes of the 
adverse events in surgery are often behavioral such as communication failures. In 
fact, they have been shown to be the leading causes of inadvertent patient harm.  
In spite of the fact that communication is the most important system factor that 
influence patient safety, regrettably there is paucity of research on what type of 
communication actually occurs between healthcare professionals. The tools used for 
assessing the communication and information transfer has been variable and various 
interventions used to improve information transfer and communication has been 
implemented without a through understanding of the process. 
 
2.3: Recommendations to improve communication  
Effective communication is crucial for most of the non-technical skills as discussed 
above. Commercial, political and humanitarian pressures have compelled high-risk 
industries like aviation, nuclear power, chemical to raise their standards and make 
sustained efforts to improve and maintain patient safety.  Although caution should be 
undertaken while drawing parallels between healthcare and these industries they are, 
for most part, quite comparable to healthcare. Therefore, we might as well also 
consider adapting specific industrial techniques to make the process safer. Drawing 
from research carried out in a range of high reliability industries, it is thereby possible 
to make a number of recommendations for improving communication. 
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• The intended communication must first be encoded and physically transmitted 
in the form of a signal, which may be written, spoken or gestured. The 
message should not be buried in irrelevant, unwanted information or “noise”. 
• The introduction of redundancy to a communication reduces the risk of 
erroneous transmission. Information should be transferred via more than one 
medium. Eg. - verbal and one other method (written, electronic) (Bellamy 
1984) 
• Feedback increases accuracy of information. Two-way communication is 
suggested with both participants taking responsibility for achieving accurate 
communication(Leavitt and Mueller 1962). 
• Effective communication can be aided by qualitative aspects of speech such as 
assessments of comprehension, confidence, competence and fluency. Verbal 
face-to-face communication is desirable(Hopkins 1980). 
• Key information needs to be specified and presented and efforts should be 
made to reduce ambiguity and to exclude irrelevant information. 
• Natural language is inherently ambiguous. A shared mental model facilitates 
successful communication. Miscommunications and misunderstanding are 
most likely to occur when mental models held by sender and receiver differ 
widely(Reddy 1979). 
• Written communication is facilitated by design, which consider the 
information needs of the user, support the communication task and demand 
inclusion of relevant categories/types of information(Miller 1984). 
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• People and organizations frequently refer to communication as unproblematic, 
implying successful communication is easy and requires little effort. Over-
confidence and complacency are common. Effort needs to be expended by 
organizations to address complacency by emphasizing the potential for 
miscommunication and its possible consequences, setting standards for 
effective communication and developing the communication skills of 
organizational members. 
The various recommendations from high-risk industries can be easily adaptable to 
healthcare and in fact should be adapted, Both the industries have stalwart and 
similar professional cultures, with positive and negative aspects. The positive 
aspects are a shared, strong motivation to do well and great pride in each 
profession. The negative aspects are training that stress the need for perfection and 
a deep perception of personal invulnerability and resistance to human failings 
such as fatigue. Although research in high-risk industries cannot be imported in its 
entirety to healthcare, certain models of communication can be emulated in 
healthcare community. 
 
2.4: Conclusion 
Communication is a vital component of systems approach and is integral to other non-
technical skills, such as teamwork, situation awareness and decision-making. This is 
the basis of this thesis. Communication failures have been uncovered as a leading 
cause of many errors. High-risk industries have appreciated the importance of 
effective communication and have undertaken various steps to enhance information 
transfer and communication. Although, effective communication is also one of the 
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key components for surgical safety and good surgical outcome, surgical community 
have failed to acknowledge the need to augment information transfer and 
communication practices in surgical care. In the next chapter, I have conducted a 
systematic review on Information transfer and Communication in Surgery to get the 
understanding of the research done so far in this area in surgical field. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INFORMATION TRANSFER AND 
COMMUNICATION IN SURGERY: A SYSTEMATIC 
REVIEW 
3.1: Introduction 
As discussed earlier, communication or lack of it has been shown to be a major 
contributor to errors in healthcare. In a retrospective study, Wilson et al (Wilson et al. 
1995) discovered that communication errors were the leading cause of adverse events 
and were associated with twice as many deaths as clinical inadequacy. Studies in 
various fields(Adams and Bohan 2000; Bhasale et al. 1998) have further confirmed 
that communication breakdown is one of the leading system factors for incidents or 
errors.  
A recent acknowledgement of system approach to patient safety(Vincent et al. 2004) 
in surgery has placed a premium on information transfer and communication (ITC) as 
effective communication is not only one of the components of system approach but it 
is integral to the success of all other factors highlighted in a systems approach to 
surgical safety. Moreover, the evolution of surgical care towards a team-based 
approach to service delivery creates an urgent need to improve interprofessional 
information transfer and communication. Although a number of research reports 
including observation studies(Christian et al. 2006) and retrospective case record 
reviews(Brennan et al. 1991; Wilson et al. 1995) have identified communication 
failures as one of the leading cause of adverse events, incidents or errors, little is 
known about the specifics of surgeon information transfer and communication. This 
chapter discusses a systematic review of the literature, which we performed to 
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synthesize the existing research on this topic in order to summarize our existing state 
of knowledge and to identify gaps in our understanding.  
 
3.2: Aims 
• To characterise the quality & quantity of interprofessional communication in 
surgical and anaesthetic fields. 
• To identify the tools used to assess ITC. 
• To identify the interventions and determine their efficacy to improve this process 
in surgical and anaesthetic care. 
• To evaluate whether there is an association of information discontinuity with 
clinical processes & outcomes. 
 
3.3: Methods 
A comprehensive, structured literature scan of published articles was performed for 
this systematic review. 
 
3.3.1: Data Sources 
The electronic databases MEDLINE (OVID) (1965- week3, March 2009), EMBASE 
(OVID) (1965- week 3, March 2009), PSCHYINFO (OVID) (1965- week 3, March 
2009) were thoroughly searched. Additional search was also done on Google scholar 
and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. We devised the search strategy by 
initially compiling keywords from key papers and broad literature searches on the 
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electronic database identified above. Search terms were refined through an iterative 
and collaborative process of reviewing outcomes of preliminary keyword searched in 
the databases. Key articles mesh terms were also identified to make the search 
comprehensive. Using the Boolean term “and”, we combined the following 3 groups 
of key words and Medical Subject Headings (MeSH)* in our search: 
(1) Operating Rooms*, Surg$*, Anesthesia*, Critical Care*, Intensive Care*, 
Operating theatre*, theatre*;  
(2) Interdisciplinary Communication*, Communication*, Communication Barriers*, 
Communication failure, Teamwork, Information transfer, Information flow;  
(3) Medical Errors*, Safety*, Errors, Quality, Adverse events 
3.3.2: Study Selection 
Electronic citations, including available abstracts were screened by the researcher 
(KN) to select reports for full-text review. Using prespecified eligibility criteria, 2 
researchers (KN, AV) then independently assessed each article for inclusion, 
resolving disagreements by consensus of input from a third researcher (NS). The 
selection criteria for inclusion and exclusion were as follows: 
3.3.2.1: Inclusion criteria: 
In order to be included in the review, studies had to: 
• Assess interprofessional communication or identify information transfer and 
communication (ITC) failures in surgical or anaesthetic fields. 
• Depict the improvement in communication or information flow among various 
healthcare professionals in these fields. 
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• Describe or develop assessment tool for evaluating ITC. 
3.2.2.2: Exclusion criteria: 
Studies were excluded from the review if: 
• They analyzed adverse events (AE), errors & subsequently identified the role 
of communication failures in causing these AE. 
• They focused primary at system factors and communication or information 
transfer was one of the factors identified. 
• They looked at patient-doctor communication, secondary to primary care 
communication, communication for improving end-of –life care in ICU, 
communication functional disorders after laryngectomy, communication as a 
medical problem, improving communication & swallowing in ITU, 
communication software like PACS (Pictured archives computerized system), 
communication networks for videos, shift handovers, discussed mainly 
teamwork with no separate results on communication. 
Articles in English pertaining to humans, which were relevant to the search, were 
retrieved. All reference lists for the included articles were also hand searched for 
additional citations. 
 
3.3.3: Data Extraction 
One author (KN) extracted data on a structured data extraction form, which was 
developed to ensure that the articles accepted for review were appraised in a 
consistent way by both investigators. We primarily focused on extracting material 
from the articles pertaining to questions guiding the review. 
All abstracted data were confirmed by a second author (AV) and discrepancies were 
resolved by consensus. 
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3.3.4: Data Synthesis 
Results of the studies were categorized according to the common themes of assessing 
communication and identifying ITC failures, development of ITC assessment tool, 
improving communication and correlation of communication with outcomes. 
Quantitative synthesis (metanalysis) was deemed not appropriate for this body of 
literature because of wide variability of research design, populations, type of 
interventions and outcomes.  
3.3.5: Quality Assessment  
There is a lack of general guidance on quality assessment criteria applicable to both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies(Mays et al. 2005). At present there is no 
extant single and simple hierarchy of the quality of evidence across disparate research 
methodologies and across all substantive topics(Mays et al. 2005). Most scales used 
for quality assessment have been developed for Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
(e.g.- JADAD scale)(Jadad et al. 1996) or cohort or case control studies (e.g.- 
Newcastle-Ottawa scale) and have not been widely used in studies with 
heterogeneous outcomes. Similarly, Moja et al(Moja et al. 2005) concluded that 
approaches to quality assessment of studies are heterogeneous which  reflects a lack 
of consensus on best practice. They also confirmed that the ideal checklist and scale 
for methodological quality does not exist.   
Therefore, we developed our own assessment criteria of the study quality. The 
checklist for the quantitative studies was developed based upon the existing 
recommendations (e.g.- MOOSE guidelines(Stroup et al. 2000), QUORUM 
statement(Moher et al. 2000)) (Appendix 3A). The assessment criteria for qualitative 
studies was developed by using the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative 
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Research (COREC) checklist(Tong et al. 2007) as a framework (Appendix 3B). The 
quality of the study was assessed on a 3-point ordinal scale in accordance with the 
Cochrane Collaborations recommendations(Higgins). It was based on the extent to 
which each paper met a variety of assessment criteria. (0= criteria not met, 1= criteria 
partially met, 2= criteria definitely met). 
Quality assessment was carried out on all papers by one investigator (KN), and a 
second investigator (BL) independently assessed the quality of 50% of the articles (19 
articles) according to the assessment criteria. The 19 articles were selected by picking 
out every second article for assessment from a randomly organized pile of articles.  
 
3.4: Results 
Of the 4027 citations identified through the initial electronic search and screened for 
possible inclusion, 110 publications were judged to warrant full review (Fig. 3A). A 
handsearch of references from relevant articles yielded an additional 4 articles for 
review. A total of 38 studies met inclusion criteria, which included 32 quantitative 
studies(Agarwal et al. 2008; Allard et al. 2007; Anwari 2002; Awad et al. 2005; 
Catchpole et al. 2007; Dodek and Raboud 2003; Elks and Riley 2009; Ellison et al. 
2004; Flin et al. 2003; Frankel et al. 2007; Friedman and Berger 2004; Greenberg et 
al. 2007; Haynes et al. 2009a; Jacques et al. 2006; Lingard et al. 2004; Lingard et al. 
2006a; Lingard et al. 2008; Maloney et al. 2007; Manojlovich and DeCicco 2007; 
Mills et al. 2008; Moss and Xiao 2004; Narasimhan et al. 2006; Nundy et al. 2008; 
Phipps and Thomas 2007; Pronovost et al. 2003; Reader et al. 2007; Soto et al. 2006; 
Thompson et al. 2004; Undre et al. 2006; Webster and Cao 2006; Williams et al. 
2007; Wright et al. 1996) and 6 qualitative studies.(Lingard et al. 2005; Lingard et al. 
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2002; Lingard et al. 2006b; Nestel and Kidd 2006; Smith et al. 2008; Yule et al. 
2006). Out of these most of them were either prospective observational studies or 
surveys (Table 3A). Fourteen studies had pre-post design.(Agarwal et al. 2008; Awad 
et al. 2005; Catchpole et al. 2007; Dodek and Raboud 2003; Friedman and Berger 
2004; Haynes et al. 2009a; Lingard et al. 2008; Maloney et al. 2007; Narasimhan et 
al. 2006; Nundy et al. 2008; Phipps and Thomas 2007; Pronovost et al. 2003; 
Thompson et al. 2004; Wright et al. 1996)  
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Databases 
! Medline (1965- Mar 2009) 
! Embase (1965- Mar 2009) 
! PschyInfo (1965- Mar 2009) 
! Cochrane 
! Google scholar 
Search Terms 
! Operating Rooms, Surg$ , 
Anesthesia, Critical Care, Intensive 
Care , Operating theatre, theatre 
! Interdisciplinary Communication, 
Communication, Communication 
Barriers, Communication failure, 
Teamwork, Information transfer, 
Information flow 
! Medical Errors, Safety, Errors, 
Quality, Adverse events 
"#$%!&'#()*!+,-'!,-!!"#$"#$%!
!
Limits – Humans  & 
English 
!
!4027 Citations identified by initial 
Electronic Searches 
Duplicates removed 
Citations identified - 3131 
!Articles reviewed -2531 
!
Excluded (based on 
review of Title & 
Abstract) 
Excluded- did not 
meet eligibility 
criteria 
Number of articles for full text 
review - 110 
Articles included-34 
38 studies included in final 
systematic review 
4 additional studies 
identified by cross-
referencing search 
Fig. 3A: Consort Diagram for Search Strategy 
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From the selected articles, information about objectives, clinical domain, 
methodology including study design, sample population, tool for assessing 
communication and key results were identified. These are next presented under 
themes that arose from the article review. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3A: Summary of Included Studies 
Authors  Year State/Country Methods/Design 
Sample 
Population 
Specialty/Place 
Moss et al 2008 Alabama, USA 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
Observation study 
Charge nurses (3 
hospitals) 
OR 
Smith et al 2008 Lancaster, UK 
QUALITATIVE- Observation and 
Interviews 
45 handovers Recovery room 
Reader et al 2007 Aberdeen, UK QUANTITATIVE- Survey  
48 ICU Doctors and 136 
nurses (4 UK hospitals) 
ICU 
Mills et al 2008 Michigan, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey 
309 Surgical staff 
members 
Surgery 
Nestel et al 2006 London, UK 
QUALITATIVE- Focus group 
interviews 
Seven OR nurses OR 
Allard et al 2007 Cornwall, UK 
QUANTITATIVE - Survey & Literature 
review on briefing  
270 OR Staff OR 
Lingard et al 2006 Toronto, Canada 
QUALITATIVE- Prospective 
Observation study 
302 Briefings OR 
Elks et al 2009 Perth, Australia QUANTITATIVE- Survey 222 Anaesthetists Anaesthesia 
Lingard et al 2002 Toronto, Canada 
QUALITATIVE- Prospective 
Observation study 
35 Procedures  OR 
Anwari et al 2002 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia QUANTITATIVE- Survey 
287 handovers were 
surveyed  
Recovery room 
Greenberg et al 2007 Boston, USA 
QUANTITATIVE-Retrospective case 
review  
60 Malpractice claims 
cases 
Surgery 
Lingard et al 2004 Toronto, Canada 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
Observational Study 
48 Surgical procedures OR 
Lingard et al 2006 Toronto, Canada 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
Observation Study 
25 procedures 
General & Vascular 
Surgery 
Frankel et al 2007 Boston, USA 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
Observation Study 
Videotaped simulated 
scenarios, 11 Operative              
procedures and 6 
interdisciplinary rounds 
Surgery 
Yule et al 2006 Aberdeen, UK QUALITATIVE- Interviews 27 Consultant Surgeons Surgery 
Flin et al 2003 Aberdeen, UK QUANTITATIVE- Survey 222 Anaesthetists Anaesthesia 
Undre et al 2006 London, UK 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
observation study 
50 general surgery 
operations 
OR 
Manojlovich et al 2007 Michigan, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey 866 Nurses ICU 
Williams et al 2007 Illinois, USA 
QUANTITATIVE- Multi-centre focus 
group interviews and a web-based 
survey 
Surgical attending 
(36), Residents (59)                                   
and nurses (42) 
Surgery 
Jaques et al 2006 Carolina, USA QUANTITATIVE-Survey 
Anaesthetists (12), 
Nurse anesthetists 
(22), Circulating (8) 
and OR nurses (6) 
OR 
Catchpole et al 2007 London, UK 
QUANTITATIVE- Prospective 
Observational Study         (pre-post) 
Fifty Postsurgery 
handovers 
Pediatric ICU 
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Authors  Year State/Country Methods/Design 
Sample 
Population 
Specialty/Place 
Lingard et al 2005 Toronto, Canada 
QUALITATIVE- Observation and 
Interviews 
18 procedures OR 
Lingard et al 2008 Toronto, Canada 
QUANTITATIVE Prospective 
Observation study                     
(pre-post) 
172 procedures (86 pre 
& 86 post) 
OR 
Maloney et al 2003 Utah, USA 
QUANTITATIVE Retrospective review 
(pre-post) 
11845 patients (5725 
pre & 6120 post) 
Pediatric Surgery 
Phipps et al 2007 Phoenix, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
Fourty critical care 
nurses 
Paediatric Intensive 
Care Unit (PICU) 
Narasimhan et al 2006 New York, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
ICU Nurses and 
physicians  
ICU 
Haynes et al 2009 Boston, USA 
QUANTITATIVE Prospective 
Observation study  (pre-post) 
7688 patients (8 
centres globally) 
OR 
Awad et al 2005 Houston, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
OR Staff (Surgeons, 
Anesthetists and 
nurses). Sample                
size not mentioned 
OR 
Ellison et al 2004 Baltimore, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (RCT) 85 Patients Urology 
Pronovost et al 2003 Baltimore, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
112 Residents and 
nurses 
Surgical oncology ICU 
Nundy et al 2008 Baltimore, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
422 participants            
(Residents, attendings 
and nurses) 
OR 
Webster et al 2006 Medford, USA 
QUANTITATIVE - Observation (RCT). 
Communication    under three 
conditions                                                        
a) no rules b) Scripted c) 
Automated 
Participants - 36 
volunteer with no 
experience in medicine 
Simulated 
environment- Box 
trainer 
Friedman et al 2004 Boston, USA 
QUANTITATIVE- Retrospective review 
(pre-post) 
14359 patients (7577 
pre, 6782 post) 
Surgery 
Soto et al 2006 New York,USA  QUANTITATIVE- Survey 
7878 Anaesthetists 
attending ASA meeting 
200 
Anesthesia 
Agarwal et al 2008 California, USA QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
806 questionnaires ( 
419 pre & 387 post) 
Paediatric Intensive 
Care 
Wright et al 1996 Sheffield, UK QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 33 nurses ICU 
Thompson et al 2004 Plymouth , UK 
QUANTITATIVE- Retrospective review 
(pre-post) 
190 case records (95 
pre and 95 post) 
Surgical Ward 
Dodek et al 2003 Vancouver, Canada QUANTITATIVE- Survey (pre-post) 
2654 Surveys by all ICU 
staff 
ICU 
3.4.1: Assessing communication & identifying communication failures (Table 3B) 
Although serious communication breakdown occur across the continuum of surgical 
care, most of the studies have assessed communication in OR (Operating room). 
Listening, clear accurate speech, courteous behaviour and acknowledging requests 
were identified as key skills for effective communication in OR in a focus group 
interview. The study by Nestel et al(Nestel and Kidd 2006) identified the absence of 
basic interpersonal skills and appreciation and respect for different professionals roles 
as a cause of compromised communication. The authors also concluded that current 
practice seems to be based on making assumptions and there appears to be little or no 
opportunity to check or clarify assumptions resulting in an unsatisfactory state of 
communication. This could be due to different perceptions of various disciplines’. In a 
qualitative study(Lingard et al. 2006b) on briefing in OR, majority of nurses reported 
an appreciation for the additional information provided to them via briefing while 
surgeons perceived the provision of information function negatively, seeing it as a 
drain on their time for the purpose of “telling people what they should already know”. 
In another observation study on postoperative handovers(Smith et al. 2008), 
anaesthetists and nurses often had different expectations of the content and timing of 
information transfer. A cross sectional survey(Reader et al. 2007) of 48 ICU doctors 
and 136 nurses, nurses reported lower level of communication openness between 
nurses and doctors. Compared with senior doctors, trainee doctors also reported lower 
level of communication openness. Furthermore the analysis revealed that open 
communication was a predictor of understanding patient care goals. Therefore 
creating a safe environment where team members feel they can speak up is essential 
in providing good quality of care to patients. Mills et al(Mills et al. 2008) used 
Medical Team Training questionnaire to study the perception of communication 
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among clinicians and nurses and observed that nurses and anesthesia providers 
perceive communication significantly different from surgeons’ perception. In 
addition, surgeons rate communication and teamwork more favorably than the other 
two groups. Although, these studies clearly show the different perceptions of 
communication among various healthcare professionals, none of the studies compared 
the subjective perception with the objective outcomes. These differences in perception 
related to communication create an opportunity for an error and highlight the need for 
improvement and standardization of communication. 
In an exploratory study(Moss and Xiao 2004) to identify communication patterns, OR 
charge nurse communication was observed, most (69.2%) of the communication 
episodes occurred face to face. Coordinating equipment followed by coordinating 
patient preparedness was the most frequently purpose of communication identified. 
The authors suggested that automating aspects of preparing patients for surgery has 
the potential to reduce information exchange. In another prospective observational 
qualitative study(Smith et al. 2008) communication was found to be largely informal 
during the postoperative handover in the recovery room. Moreover, the transfer of 
information did not automatically lead to transfer of professional responsibility for the 
patient. This unstructured, variable communication process was again highlighted in a 
survey study(Anwari 2002) on handover from theatre to the Postanaesthetic care unit 
(PACU) where only 32.6% of anaesthetists attained maximum scores for the quality 
of verbal information. Of the five required points of verbal information, 14% of 
Anaesthetists failed to give any information. Information regarding pre-operative 
status, premedication and the surgical procedure was given in 40, 36 and 21% of 
cases. 
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Lingard et al(Lingard et al. 2002) in a prospective observation study highlighted that 
patterns of communication in OR are complex and socially motivated. High-tension 
events occur during every procedure, which has a ripple effect especially on trainees. 
Similar Canadian group in their next ethnographic study(Lingard et al. 2004) 
identified that communication failures in OR occurred in 30% of the team exchanges. 
Although there was no visible effect in most deemed communication failures, a third 
of them resulted in effects, which jeopardized patient safety. Later, Greenberg et 
al(Greenberg et al. 2007) in malpractice case study summarized that communication 
breakdown are not localized to OR but happen across the continuum of care and are 
equally likely to occur during the pre- and postoperative care as during the 
intraoperative course. Most of failures identified by them were verbal and occurred 
between a single transmitter and single receiver. In most cases, information was either 
never transmitted or was communicated but inaccurately received. Status asymmetry 
and ambiguity about responsibilities were the common associated factors responsible 
for these communication breakdowns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3B: Studies assessing Communication and information transfer 
Authors Aims 
Assessment of 
Communication/IT 
Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Moss et al 
To capture communication patterns in OR management to 
characterize the information needs of OR coordination 
Data collection tool containing purpose, 
mode, duration and interacting person (face 
validity) 
Out of 2074 communication episodes, 69.24% occurred 
face to face.                                                                                    
Coordinating equipment was the most frequently 
occurring purpose of communication (38.7%) followed by 
coordinating patient preparedness (25.7%) 
Automating aspects of preparing patients for surgery and 
surgical equipment management has the potential to reduce 
information exchange 
Smith et al 
To describe how anaesthetists hand over information and 
professional responsibility to nurses in the operating 
theatre recovery room 
None 
Anaesthetists and nurses had differing expectations of the 
content and timing of information transfer.                                                           
The point at which transfer of responsibility occurred was 
variable and depended not only on patient condition but 
also on professional relationship between doctor and 
nurse. 
Handover process is largely informal, have three functions: 
provides transfer of responsibility, knowledge and acts as 
an audit point 
Reader et al 
To examine whether ICU doctors and nurses have a shared 
perception of interdisciplinary communication in the UK 
ICU 
A previously established, validated measure 
of ICU interdisciplinary collaboration 
questionnaire 
Nurses and doctors were found to have differing 
perceptions of interdisciplinary communication, with 
nurses reporting lower levels of communication openness 
between nurses and doctors.                                   
Compared with senior doctor, trainee doctors reported 
lower levels of communication openness.                                                    
Communication openness predicted the degree to which 
individuals reported understanding their patient care 
goals. 
Members of ICU team have divergent perceptions of their 
communication.                                                    
Communication openness is associated with understanding 
of patient care goals.                                                 
Response rate low.                                                       
Measures were all self-report measures, which renders the 
study susceptible to social desirability bias. 
Mills et al 
To assess the organisation culture, communication, 
teamwork using Medical Team training questionnaire 
(MTT) 
MTT questionnaire 
There was difference in perception between surgical team 
members.                                                                  
Surgeons rate communication more favorably relative to 
nurses and anesthesia providers. 
Medical Team Training questionnaire is helpful in 
identifying hidden problems with communication and in 
focusing efforts to improve communication in OR.                                     
Study limited to 6 Veteran Affairs centres.                     
Respondent mainly nurses.                                             
Cross-sectional study with neither follow-up information on 
patient outcomes nor observed staff behaviours. 
Nestel et al 
To explore communication behaviours in operating theatre 
as perceived by nurses 
 
Skills deemed necessary for good communication include 
clarity of speech, listening and being polite.                                              
Significant influences on communication included conflict 
in role perception and organisational issues. 
Although fundamental communication skills were identified 
there was confusion over clarity of nurses roles and its 
implications for teamwork 
Allard et al 
To review key literature on briefing and to analyse the 
results of a questionnaire survey on status of briefing 
after its introduction to OR teams 
Frequency of briefing 
In comparison with other OR members, surgeons reported 
differing perceptions of the meaning and value of 
briefing.                                                                       
50% perceive that briefing never happens.                              
Unstructured brief was the most common method.                           
78% OR practitioners believes that briefing improves 
teamwork and communication 
Team briefing improves communication.                      
Perception of briefing is different among various healthcare 
professionals and happens infrequently.                                         
Response rate low (118/270=44%) to generalize with a 
relatively small sample. 
Authors Aims 
Assessment of 
Communication/IT 
Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Lingard et al 
To improve the understanding of communication by 
analyzing the discourse arising from structured 
preoperative team briefings among surgeons, nurses, and 
anesthesiologists. 
Content of briefing 
Analysis of observers’ fieldnotes from 302 briefings 
yielded a two-part model of communicative ‘‘utility’’ 
(visible impact on team awareness) and  ‘‘Informational 
utility’’  (teams knowledge improved) 
The crux of the model is an elaboration of causal pathway 
(communication practice), intermediary process (enhanced 
knowledge) and care processes. 
Elks et al 
To assess the communication at surgeon/anaesthetist 
interface in the operating theatre 
Self designed questionnaire 
Anaesthetists communication skills were self-rated as very 
good by 52%.                                                                                           
Although, 57% agreed that good verbal communication 
between A & S leads to better outcomes, 39% disagreed 
that surgeons had good communication skills.                                                                        
99% believed good communication decreases stress. 
Staff should be encouraged to communicate effectively 
within OT teams in an effort to improve patient safety.                                   
Other theatre team member’s communication was not 
studied.
Lingard et al 
To explore the nature of communications among OR team 
members and to identify common communicative 
patterns, sites of tension and their impact on novices 
 
Patterns of communication are complex.                                     
Dominant themes were time, safety and sterility, 
resources, roles and situation.                                                                                         
Each procedure had one to four “higher-tension" events 
Team communications in OR follow complex pattern and are 
influenced by sites of team tension.                                                           
Hawthorne effect 
Anwari et al 
To look at the quality of handover by the Anaesthetists to 
the Postanaesthetic care unit (PACU) nurse 
Four components- Verbal information score, 
patients' condition score, Anaesthetist 
behaviour score and Nurse satisfaction score 
were assessed 
Maximum scores were obtained by 32.6% of 
anaesthetists for the quality of the verbal handover about 
the patient given to PACU nurse.                                      
Only 50% of handovers scored good scores on overall 
quality of handover 
Postoperative handover is an informal process and there 
were lot of information omissions. Important and relevant 
information should be communicated verbally to PACU 
nurse 
Greenberg et al 
To identify recurrent patterns of communication 
breakdown. To develop initiatives to prevent this 
breakdown 
Communication measured in terms of: 
location, point of care, form of 
communication, number of people involved, 
nature of communication breakdown, 
information related to, disciplines involved 
60 cases involving 81 communication breakdowns, 
occurring in preoperative (38%), intraoperative (30%), 
and postoperative periods (32%).                                                                                 
The majority of breakdowns were verbal communications 
(92%).                                                                         
Status asymmetry (74%) and ambiguity about 
responsibility (73%) were most common associated 
factors 
Communication breakdown occurs across the continuum of 
care.                                                                       
Standardization and structuring of the process is needed to 
prevent these breakdowns 
Lingard et al 
To describe the characteristics of communication failures 
in OR and to classify their effects 
Rhetoric Framework used to define the 
parameters of communication failure: 
content, audience, purpose and occasion 
Communication failures occurred in 30% of team 
exchanges and a third of these resulted in effects which 
jeopardized patient safety by increasing cognitive load 
and increasing tension on OR. 
Communication failures in OR are common and have the 
potential to cause patient harm 
 3.4.2: Tools to evaluate communication (Table 3C) 
Appropriate measures of communication are needed to assess the effectiveness of 
interventions to improve information transfer and communication. Although team 
performance measures exist, many of these measures in surgery like OTAS(Undre et al. 
2006), NOTSS(Yule et al. 2006), ORMAQ(Flin et al. 2003), CATS(Frankel et al. 2007), 
Medical Team questionnaire(Mills et al. 2008) treat communication as a one dimension in 
a global measure of team performance. The disadvantage of these tools to measure 
communication is that overall score can dilute the effect of communication if other 
components of teamwork like situational awareness, leadership are scored differently. Few 
studies have attempted to discover the instrument to measure communication as only 
domain. A noteworthy exception is Canadian study(Lingard et al. 2004) classifying 
communication failures into 4 main categories based on rhetoric theory: occasion, purpose, 
content and audience. Although usage of this tool requires considerable training and can be 
challenging, it authentically captures the complex and subtle nature of communication 
among team members in OR. 
Many studies(Agarwal et al. 2008; Narasimhan et al. 2006; Phipps and Thomas 2007; Soto 
et al. 2006; Wright et al. 1996) evaluating the improvement in information transfer and 
communication utilized self-designed questionnaire, out of which only few are validated, 
to assess communication however these measurement tools are constrained by their 
reliance on self-report. Few studies(Catchpole et al. 2007) have used non-validated 
checklist and have therefore suggested that future research should be done to examine the 
accuracy of measurement. Studies exploring and identifying communication failures have 
used validated data collection tool. Moss et al(Moss and Xiao 2004) developed and 
validated their data collection tool to capture the communication of charge nurse. This tool 
is based on purpose, mode and duration of communication. Malpractice claim study by  
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Greenberg et al(Greenberg et al. 2007) analyzing the patterns of communication 
breakdown have classified the communication based on location, point of care, form of 
communication (verbal, written or synchronous/asynchronous), number of people & 
disciplines involved, and nature of comm. breakdown (inf. transferred but not received 
etc). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3C: Studies on development of assessment tool for communication in surgical care 
 
Authors Aims Assessment of Communication/IT  Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Lingard et al 
To develop an authentic theory based on evaluation 
instrument that measures communication among 
members of the operating room team by 
documenting communication failures  
Four types of communication failures- Occasion, 
content, audience and purpose recorded by 3 
observers 
Mean inter-rater reliability was low (47.3%). 
However, interrater reliability regarding total 
number of communication failures per procedure 
was reasonable (0.72) 
Reasonably reliable tool for assessment.  It can be 
used to measure the effect of communication 
intervention.                                                       
Small sample size 
Frankel et al 
To develop a behaviour based tool based on 
principles of crisis resource management (CRM) to 
assess communication and team skills of healthcare 
providers in real and simulated settings 
CATS with a component of communication from 0-1. 
1= observed and good, 0.5= variation in quality, 0= 
expected but not observed 
CATS has been developed through rapid cycles 
improvement and piloted through simulations and 
real time observation.                                                       
Specific behaviours markers are categorised into 
four categories- communication, coordination, 
cooperation and situation awareness 
The CATS Assessment tool requires further 
validation and further study in its use in 
quantifying behaviours 
Yule et al 
To identify surgeons' non-technical skills and 
development of a skills taxonomy and behaviour 
rating system to structure observation and feedback 
in surgical training 
 
Five categories of non-technical skills to be rated on 
4-point scale were identified including 
communication and teamwork, situation 
awareness, decision-making, task management and 
leadership. This provided a structure for a prototype 
skill taxonomy 
The prototype skills taxonomy and behaviour rating 
system needs to be validated 
Flin et al 
To measure the attitudes of Anaesthetists towards 
human and organisational factors that can have an 
impact on effective team performance  
Modified version of ORMAQ (Operating Room 
Management Attitude Questionnaire) 
Although 92% believed that information sharing 
was important, only 40% of anaesthetists felt that 
briefing and debriefing was important for safety 
and teamwork 
The respondents demonstrated positive attitudes 
towards interpersonal aspects of their work and 
they recognise the importance of communication 
skills 
Undre et al 
To evaluate a framework for measuring team 
performance and report preliminary data using the 
OTAS (observational teamwork assessment for 
surgery) instrument 
OTAS with a component of communication 
Overall mean ratings of all team behaviours were 
reasonably high.                                                    
Communication was rated the lowest. 
Communication and coordination were rated higher 
in operative phase than in the pre and post phases 
The observation method of assessment of 
communication and teamwork is feasible 
3.4.3: Interventions used to improve Communication (Table 3D) 
3.4.3.1: Standardising the ITC process 
Recently a global study(Haynes et al. 2009) of 7688 patients on implementing 
surgical safety/WHO checklist in OR, which consisted of oral confirmation by 
surgical teams of the completion of basic steps for ensuring safe delivery of 
anesthesia, antibiotic prophylaxis, effective teamwork and other essential practices in 
surgery, showed an improvement in team communication. This standardization of the 
information transfer and communication practice among the OR team members 
subsequently translated into a significant reduction in morbidity and mortality rate in 
surgical patients. In another tertiary centre pre-post intervention study(Nundy et al. 
2008), there was a 19% reduction in communication breakdowns with the use of 
preoperative briefing.  After testing the feasibility of the preoperative checklist, 
Canadian group(Lingard et al. 2008) conducted a pre-post intervention study 
evaluating again the benefit of preoperative checklist and briefing. They observed that 
intervention reduced communication failures by 3-fold among OR team members, 
from a mean of 3.95 to a mean of 1.31 failures per procedure. Using the same 
principles of standardizing and structuring of the information transfer and 
communication process, many centres(Agarwal et al. 2008; Phipps and Thomas 2007; 
Pronovost et al. 2003; Thompson et al. 2004) have shown a significant improvement 
in ITC process by using daily goals form and post-take ward round proformas. Few of 
these studies(Friedman and Berger 2004; Haynes et al. 2009a; Pronovost et al. 2003) 
also managed to translate their ITC improvement to outcomes like length of stay. 
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3.4.3.2: Changing Teams 
Team transformation through modifying structure, behaviors, attitudes and beliefs 
have been shown to improve ITC practices. Moreover, it is an essential component for 
sustainability of the change. Catchpole et al(Catchpole et al. 2007) in their prospective 
intervention study on paediatric handovers demonstrated a reduction in information 
omission after the implementation of new handover protocol, which was adapted from 
aviation and formula one industry. The new team, communication between the theatre 
and Intensive care team and the organized systematic discussion among all the team 
members led to this change. The authors concluded that the development of handover 
process using expertise from high-risk industries improved information transfer with 
no penalty on handover duration. Awad et al(Awad et al. 2005) used crew resource 
management principles from aviation industry in OR to demonstrate an improvement 
in interdisciplinary communication among OR team members. Few other 
studies(Friedman and Berger 2004; Wright et al. 1996) have also demonstrated 
improved communication after changing the behaviors and structure of the teams. A 
study in ICU(Wright et al. 1996) enhanced the representation of nurses in the rounds 
by introducing the nurse presentation in the rounds and found a 26% increase in 
communication among the healthcare professionals. In another study(Friedman and 
Berger 2004), restructuring of the patient care teams for general surgery patients 
admitted to the hospital improved team communication and eventually led to a 
significant decreased length of stay for patients. Dodek et al(Dodek and Raboud 
2003) in their study again emphasized the role of team structure in enhancing 
communication. They demonstrated increased communication by introducing an 
explicit approach to ICU rounds that included a clear sequence of reporting 
assessment and plans.  
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3.4.3.3: Technology Innovations 
The search for new technology to improve information transfer and communication 
process has been extensive. In a comparative study(Jacques et al. 2006) to evaluate 
the efficacy of hands free voice over internet protocol (VOIP) in the perioperative 
environment, OR providers responded to communication queries four times faster 
when using VOIP compared to alphanumeric pagers however the authors expressed 
concern about the issue of security and confidentiality of patient data. Other examples 
of technological inventions for enhancing communication are patient tracker and 
telerounding. Patient tracker improved communication among residents, nurses and 
consultants to escalate the discharge process while telerounding made the patient 
physician communication better. Another study(Soto et al. 2006) supporting 
technology found that cellular phone use by anesthesiologists was associated with a 
reduction in the risk of medical error resulting from communication delay. Structuring 
communication via technology has also been shown to increase the team efficiency in 
OR. In a simulated environment Webster et al(Webster and Cao 2006) demonstrated 
that teams with scripted speech or automated information display interfaces 
performed significantly faster than the team with no rules. Amalgamating these 
technologies into clinical practice may represent a window into future patient care 
with increased patient and clinician satisfaction however it would be important to 
ensure secure control of patient level medical information before its application. 
 
Table 3D: Studies on improving ITC process and correlation ITC failures with outcomes 
Authors Aims 
Assessment of 
Communication/IT 
Other Outcome measures  Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Manojlovich et al 
To examine the relationship between 
nurses perception of their practice 
environment, nurse-physician 
communication and patient outcomes 
Validated ICU Nurse-physician 
questionnaire 
Complications, Adverse events and 
errors 
Practice environment accounted for 47% of the variance in nurse- 
physician communication.                                                                 
Nurse-physician communication was predictor of nurse-assessed 
medication errors. Neither was predictive of patient outcomes 
Nurse-physician communication was predictive of 
nurse assessed medication errors and was not 
related to patient outcomes.                                             
Recall bias.                                                     
Cross-sectional study, did not track the nurse-
communication process over time.               
Social desirability response effect bias 
Williams et al 
To determine the nature of surgeon 
information transfer and communication 
(ITC) errors that lead to adverse events and 
near misses 
Communication incidents categorized into 
four categories: blurred boundaries of 
responsibility, decreased surgeon 
familiarity with patients, diversion of 
surgeon attention and distorted or 
inhibited communication 
 
A total of 328 case descriptions and general comments were obtained.                                                      
Incidents fell into 4 areas: blurred boundaries of responsibility (87) 
were the most common.                                                               
Consequences of ITC lapses included delays in patient care (77%), 
wasted surgeon/staff time (48%) and serious adverse events (31%) 
Surgeon communication lapses are significant 
contributors to adverse patient consequences, 
and provider inefficiency.                                 
Re-engineering of ITC practices will require 
significant cultural changes 
Jaques et al 
To evaluate the efficiency and reliability of 
a hands-free Voice over Internet protocol 
(VOIP) communication system in the 
perioperative environment 
Communication response time User feedback survey 
OR providers responded to communication queries four times faster to 
VOIP compared to alphanumeric pagers                                               
36% of providers recommend entire hospital to use VOIP 
VOIP had quicker response time however was 
less reliable.                                                
Issues with confidentiality 
Catchpole et al 
To improve quality and safety of handover 
using analogy of Formula 1 pit stop and 
aviation 
Number of Information omissions 
Duration of handover                                            
Technical errors                                                
Teamwork (using Likert scale) 
Information handover omissions !from 2.09±1.14 to 1.07±.55.                                                               
Mean number of technical errors ! from 5.42±1.24 to 3.14±.71.                                                                 
Duration of handover ! from 10.8±1.6 mins to 9.4±1.29.                                                                
Team performance increased after this new handover  
Easily trainable handover process using 
expertise from other high-risk industries reduced 
errors and improve information transfer 
Lingard et al 
To assess the feasibility of 
the preoperative checklist and to describe 
perceived functions of the checklist 
discussions 
 
Adherence to checklist                                          
Function of checklist 
Checklist was implemented by OR team in all 18 study cases.                                                                
Perceived functions of the checklist discussions 
included provision of detailed case related information, confirmation of 
details, articulation of concerns or ambiguities, team building, 
education and decision-making.                                                             
Variations in workflow patterns across professions is a primary barrier 
to implementation 
Preoperative team checklist is a feasible and 
efficient tool that promotes information 
exchange 
Lingard et al 
To assess whether structured team briefing 
& preoperative checklist improve operating 
room communication 
Communcation was assessed in terms of 
Purpose, occasion, content, audience 
(Rhetoric framework) 
Briefing Utility (identified as 
communication that identified a 
problem, ambiguity or knowledge 
gap) Participants perception 
The mean (SD) number of communication failures per procedure ! 
from 3.95(3.20) to 1.31(1.53)(P<.001).                                                   
Thirty-four percent of briefings demonstrated utility.                              
92% of people agreed that briefing allowed the team to identify and 
resolve problems. 
Interprofessional checklist briefings reduced the 
number of communication failures. 
Improvements could have been driven by 
checklist prompts or the physical gathering of 
team members.                                                                                     
Findings not generalizable. 
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Authors Aims Assessment of 
Communication/IT 
Other Outcome measures  Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Maloney et al To develop and implement software 
application called "Patient Tracker" to 
improve communication and to improve 
discharge process 
 Procedure cancellations, Inpatient 
admissions                                            
Median Emergency Department 
Length of stay (ED LOS) 
Following implementation of the software, the number of cancelled 
surgical procedures  ! from 120 to 12 (p<0.01)                                                           
Average number of inpatient admissions increased (5725 vs. 6120)                                                                       
Median ED LOS ! (P<0.01) 
The patient tracker software is an 
interdisciplinary communication tool, which 
facilitated a decrease in cancellations of surgical 
procedures.  Six hospital beds were added in 
post-intervention phase which could have 
confounded the results 
Phipps et al To assess the impact of implementation of 
daily goals sheet upon nursing perception 
of communication 
Self designed questionnaire about nurses 
perception of communication 
 Eighty five percent of the nurses felt that daily goals sheet led to 
improved communication between physicians and nurses in PICU 
Daily goals sheet led to an improvement in 
nursing perception of communication.                                                                     
Questionnaire not validated.                                                             
Doctors were not involved in the study. Low 
response rate (52%) 
Narasimhan et al To evaluate the effect of a standardized 
worksheet on physician and nurses 
communication and understanding of goals 
Self designed questionnaire about nurses 
perception of communication 
LOS                                                                  
Perceptions about understanding of 
goals of care 
Nurses and physicians showed significant improvement in 
communication scores.                                                                         
ICU LOS ! significantly from 6.4 to 4.3 (p<0.05) 
Standardized worksheet improved 
interdisciplinary communication between nurses 
and physicians.                                                        
Single ICU study conducted for a short period 
Haynes et al To assess whether a 19-item surgical safety 
checklist designed to improve team 
communication and consistency of care 
would reduce complications and deaths 
associated with surgery 
 Complications                                                      
Mortality                                                            
Antibiotic administration Standard 
plan for intravenous access, 
monitoring with pulse oximetry  
There was a significant ! in death from 1.5% to 0.8%. (p <0.01)                                                                        
Inpatient complication ! from 11% to 7% (p <0.01) Surgical site 
infection ! from 6.2% to 3.4% (p<0.01)  
Implementation of the checklist was associated 
with concomitant reductions in the rates of death 
and complications.                            
Complications were just limited to inpatients.                               
Hawthorne effect                                                                           
Secular trend bias 
Awad et al To determine if medical team training 
improves communication  
Validated communication survey  Antibiotic & DVT Prophylaxis 
administration 
There was a significant increase in communication composite score for 
surgeons and anaesthetists.                                                              
Number of pts who received Ab & DVT Prophylaxis increased 
Medical team training using crew resource 
principles can improve communication in OR 
Ellison et al To assess the impact of introducing remote 
video conferencing during the immediate 
postoperative period (telerounds) on 
patient-reported satisfaction with their 
hospitalization. 
 Patient satisfaction Patients in the telerounding arm demonstrated statistically 
substantial improvements in ratings of examination thoroughness, 
physician communication, quality of discussions about medical 
information, postoperative care coordination, and attending physician 
availability. 
Patients in the robotic telerounding arm indicated considerably higher 
satisfaction with regard to physician availability 
Telerounding facilitate physician communication 
with patients and is associated with increased 
patient satisfaction.                                     
Small sample size with restriction to minimally 
invasive surgical procedures. 
Pronovost et al To evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of communication in ITU using daily goals 
form 
 Understanding of daily goals form by 
ICU residents and nurses                                                                
ICU LOS 
Daily goals form increased interprofessional communication. Residents 
and nurses understanding the goals for care increased from 10% to 
95%.                                                                                                      
ICU LOS ! from 2.2 to 1.1 days 
Implementation of daily goals form resulting in 
significant improvement in number of care 
providers who understood the goals of care and 
 in ICU LOS.                                                                                               
Other Confounding factors caused  ICU LOS.                                   
Limited preintervention data.                                                             
Single academic centre study limiting the 
generalisability of the findings.  
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Authors Aims Assessment of  
Communication/IT 
Other Outcome measures  Results Conclusions/Limitations 
Nundy et al Can preoperative briefings reduce 
operating room (OR) delays through 
improved 
teamwork and communication. 
Modified version of Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire (SAQ) called OR briefing 
assessment tool (ORBAT) 
OR delays A 19% reduction in communication breakdowns leading to delays was 
associated with the use of briefing.                                           
Preoperative briefings also reduced unexpected delays in the OR by 
31%.                                       
Preoperative briefing ! frequency of 
communication breakdown leading to delays.                                                                                        
Delays reported by subjects through survey and 
not objective. Not generalisable as single centre 
study.  Selection bias. Not randomised. 
Webster etal To examine the effects of a new technology 
on communication between surgeons and 
nurses in OR and to delineate safe 
practices for integrating new technology 
into the OR 
Pauses in information flow, number of 
total comments, surgeons comments and 
nurse comments 
Number of tool changes, errors, 
timing of task completion 
Significantly more nurse, relevant and total comments in no rules team 
than in scripted and automated team.                                                     
Teams in scripted and automated conditions performed significantly 
faster than no-rules team (p<.05).                                                          
Teams in automated condition made significantly more errors than 
those in scripted condition. (p<.05) 
Scripted speech facilitates team communication 
and increases efficiency in OR.                          
Real surgeons and nurses were not employed 
Simulated task used was neither physically nor 
cognitively demanding 
Friedman et al To examine whether improving team 
structure and communication can improve 
the outcomes 
 Length of stay Mean length of stay was significantly shorter post-intervention Restructuring the patient care team yielded a 
decreased mean length of stay.                                                                                                  
Patient factors were not taken into account.  
Soto et al To determine if mobile phones have a 
beneficial effect on communication and 
patient safety 
Self designed questionnaire.                
Mode of Communication & Communication 
delays 
Medical errors Sixty-five percent of surveyed anesthesiologists reported using pagers 
as their primary mode of communications, whereas only 17% used 
cellular telephones.                                                                                      
Forty-five percent of respondents who use pagers reported delays in 
communications compared with 31% of cellular telephone users.                                                               
Cellular telephone use by anesthesiologists is associated with a 
reduction in the risk of medical error resulting from communication 
delay  
The mobile phones decrease the time required to 
relay an important message and reduce the risk 
of committing an errors. Terms like medical 
errors were not defined.   
Selection bias and recall bias may have been 
present.  
Agarwal et al To determine if a pediatric intensive care 
unit (PICU) daily patient goal sheet would 
improve communication between health 
care providers and decrease LOS 
Self designed questionnaire  LOS Although there was no significant change in median LOS, daily goals 
sheet improved communication and thereby improved understanding 
of patient care goals (p<0.01) 
Using a PICU daily patient goal sheet improves 
communication between health care 
providers. Self reported data.  Volunteer bias                                                                                
Patients in postintervention may not have 
compliance with daily goals sheet 
Wright et al To improve the communication in the 
quality of patient care through nurses 
presentation on ward rounds 
Self designed questionnaire   There was a 26% improvement in communication between nursing and 
medical staff 
Communication improved after the nurses 
presentation in the ward round 
Thompson et al To assess the adequacy of documentation 
of Post Take Ward Round (PTWR) and the 
impact of introducing one page proforma 
on documentation 
Documentation was assessed for key items 
of information 
 The introduction of the proforma led to a significant improvement in 
the documentation of a diagnosis, management plan, prophylaxis for 
deep vein thrombosis, and resuscitation status (p< 0.05) 
Post-take ward round proformas improve 
communication and information transfer among 
healthcare professionals 
Dodek et al To evaluate an explicit approach to 
responsibilities and reporting during 
bedside rounds in the intensive care unit 
(ICU) 
Self designed questionnaire (face and 
content validity)  
Time taken for the round, 
Presentation by nurse and resident  
Healthcare providers reported improved satisfaction and 
communication associated with introduction of an explicit approach.                                                                                       
There was no change in mean duration of the round. 
Explicit approach to reported assessments and 
plans improves communication and satisfaction 
of health care providers 
3.4.4: Correlation of Information transfer and Communication with Outcomes 
Surgeon communication errors are known to be significant contributors to adverse patient 
consequences. A multi-institutional information transfer and communication practices (ITCP) 
project conducted by Williams et al(Williams et al. 2007) uncovered 328 communication 
incident reports through focus group sessions at 5 medical centres. They identified four main 
contributory factors for ITC failures: blurred boundaries of responsibility, decreased surgeon 
familiarity with patients, diversion of surgeon attention and distorted communication. 
Furthermore one third of these incidents led to serious adverse events. Another multi-centre 
questionnaire study(Manojlovich and DeCicco 2007) conducted in 25 ICU’s in Michigan 
state, USA revealed that nurse-physician communication was a predictor of nurse medication 
errors. Few studies(Awad et al. 2005; Haynes et al. 2009a; Pronovost et al. 2003) discussing 
the improvement of ITC process demonstrated improvement in patient or clinical processes 
and outcomes. These studies while improving the communication showed a decrease in 
number of cancelled surgical procedures(Maloney et al. 2007), decrease in length of 
stay(Pronovost et al. 2003), reduction in morbidity and mortality(Haynes et al. 2009a), delays 
in OR(Nundy et al. 2008) and increase in number of patients who received antibiotic and 
DVT prophylaxis(Awad et al. 2005). 
3.4.5: Quality Assessment 
Agreement between the two investigators (KN, BL) for the assessment of fifty percent of 
papers (18) was good (kappa score - 0.760, p <0.001). Sub analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative articles separately revealed good agreement (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient- 0.753, 
p<0.001 each). None of the quantitative or qualitative studies met all the quality assessment 
criteria. However, sixty-five percent of the quantitative studies (19/29) had ! 10/18 score, 
while seventy-seven percent of the qualitative studies (7/9) had ! 15/30. Detailed analysis of 
each of the quantitative and qualitative papers is shown in Appendix 3C & 3D. 
 63!
3.5: Discussion 
The systematic review revealed important but scattered details about the development and 
use of informational continuity of care within surgical and anaesthetic care. Most 
studies(Lingard et al. 2004; Undre et al. 2006) have looked at Information transfer and 
communication process in phases (specially in OR) however no attempt has been made to 
study the ITC through whole of the surgical care pathway despite the fact that 
communication failures are distributed equally in frequency in all the phases of surgical care- 
pre-, intra- and postoperative phase.  
Various models have reinforced the importance of communication in effective team function, 
however their multidimensionality precludes in depth attention to the individual variable of 
communication. Although an indispensible non-technical skill and an integral component for 
the success of all other factors in system approach to surgical safety, no standardized tool is 
available to assess information transfer and communication in surgical care separately. Most 
tools used in the studies were subjective(Agarwal et al. 2008; Narasimhan et al. 2006; Phipps 
and Thomas 2007; Wright et al. 1996) and have not been validated. Most of the studies 
assessing communication have looked at the perception of communication by healthcare 
professional. Although important it has the disadvantage that it relies on self-report.  Only 
two studies(Lingard et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2007) have attempted to develop taxonomy 
for classifying ITC failures.  
Most of the studies looking at either exploring, assessing or improving communication have 
revealed that information transfer and communication (ITC) practices are unstructured, 
variable and not transparent. Reasons identified varied from human to system factors.  Nearly 
everyone has suggested that there is an imminent need to standardize and structure the ITC 
process. Standardization was referred to variably by different studies as checklists(Haynes et 
al. 2009a; Lingard et al. 2008), protocols, communication sheets, briefing(Narasimhan et al. 
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2006), daily goals form(Agarwal et al. 2008; Pronovost et al. 2003) and ward round 
proforma(Thompson et al. 2004). Given the importance of having effective interdisciplinary 
communication and information transfer, attention should be given to the ways in which 
these strategies are implemented. Teams’ commitment, opinion during the development 
process, ongoing consultation process with the team, receiving and providing continous 
feedback, perceptions of teams both before and during an intervention providing critical 
insight into opportunities and obstacles which are essential for tailoring the intervention to 
the context are some of the principles to be adopted for the successful implementation of the 
change. Operationalizing of the information transfer and communication process can be 
challenging however in-depth stakeholder work to encounter cultural barriers should be 
undertaken early to overcome any hurdles. 
The primary limitations of this systematic review relate to the consistency and quality of this 
body of evidence. First, interpretation and synthesis of findings were restricted by the high 
degree of variability among the studies in their patient populations, outcomes measures and 
intervention used. Second, there was relative lack of high-quality studies, with only two 
randomized controlled trials. Non-comparability of groups at baseline and confounding 
effects of secular time trends in pre-post studies may have skewed the results. Third, although 
important, patient-patient communication, shift handovers and secondary to primary care 
communication were outside the scope of review and were not studied. Fourth, studies 
discussing about collaboration and coordination were not included as collaboration in various 
studies meant working together with shared responsibility, therefore we think that the effect 
of communication and information transfer in these studies would not have been truly 
studied. Despite these methodological limitations, we believe that this review is the only 
systematic review to summarise the current state of interprofessional information transfer and 
communication in surgical care and reflect the need for its improvement for safe patient care.  
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In the era of expanding technology, remote computer charting and order entry, increasing 
physician shift work, decreasing resident work hours and decreasing staff size, the 
importance and impact of healthcare team communication is becoming an area of significant 
research.  
 
3.6: Conclusion 
Information transfer and communication failures in surgical care lead to patient harm and 
lower the quality of hospital care. Following the literature it is clear that there are no models 
of information transfer and communication assessment that are directly applicable to surgery 
and there is an imminent need to develop a robust tool to evaluate the ITC process. 
Furthermore, standardization of the process through protocols, checklists, care pathways and 
technological innovations at each phase of surgical care pathway is needed to ensure that 
essential information in not lost in the process. Review also emphasized that the various 
interventions have been used without a detailed analysis of the problem.  
In the next two chapters as mentioned before, I have undertaken bottom-up approach and 
have mapped the surgical care pathway and identified information transfer and 
communication failures across the surgical continuum of care through the multi-modal 
methodology i.e. FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis) and Interview technique. Apart from 
identifying the ITC failures, the other aim of this thesis and one, which is more important and 
clinically relevant is to develop interventions in particular phases in an attempt to improve 
information transfer and communication.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: MAPPING OF THE SURGICAL CARE 
PROCESS & IDENTIFICATION OF COMMUNICATION AND 
INFORMATION TRANSFER ERRORS IN THE PROCESS 
USING FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
 
4.1: Introduction 
The previous chapters have described the importance of Information Transfer and 
Communication (ITC) and the need to improve it. The systematic review shed light on the 
current status of ITC process in surgery and highlighted its role in causing errors. 
Furthermore it laid the foundation for studying and analyzing this process through the entire 
continuum of surgical care. Studies in the surgical domain illustrate the prevalence of 
communication breakdowns in the peri-operative period. An observational study of general 
surgery cases found patient safety compromised by failures in communication and 
transferring of information in all cases(Christian et al. 2006). In addition, a generalized 
vulnerability of the entire peri-operative period to information loss was observed. In another 
surgical malpractice claims study(Greenberg et al. 2007), it was shown that serious 
communication breakdowns causing patient harm were distributed across the continuum of 
care and they occurred at least as often in the preoperative and postoperative phases as during 
the intra-operative phase.  
These findings suggest that it is only logical that any strategy that aims to try to improve the 
system of surgery and thus patient safety starts with communication/information transfer. 
Importantly, it is essential to look at the entire surgical process to know where to target 
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interventions. Although various studies have looked at the communication in 
surgery(Christian et al. 2006; Lingard et al. 2004), most of them(Lingard et al. 2004; Sevdalis 
et al. 2007; Undre et al. 2007) have focused on the operating theatre despite the fact that 
communication failures are distributed across all phases of surgical care – pre-, intra-, and 
post-operative. To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined information transfer and 
communication (ITC) for a patient’s entire surgical journey. This is a serious gap. If surgical 
processes that are vulnerable to communication failures can be systematically identified, 
interventions can be developed and applied to critical phases of care to reduce patient harm.   
The present study sought to fill this gap. We used a systematic, quantitative, validated 
method to assess risks in the process of information transfer across all phases of surgical care. 
The method is known as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and has been originally 
developed by engineers to accomplish proactive risk analyses. The National Center for 
Patient Safety of the US Department of Veterans Affairs adjusted FMEA for use in 
healthcare, resulting in Health care Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA)(DeRosier et 
al. 2002). HFMEA is a multi-step process, which uses a multidisciplinary team to proactively 
evaluate a healthcare process. The team uses process flow diagrams, hazard scoring, and 
decision trees to identify potential vulnerabilities and assess their potential impact on patient 
care. Importantly, the method allows capturing likelihood of risks as well as severity of 
consequences and the ease with which they might be detected and intercepted before causing 
harm. The application of HFMEA in health care has recently been driven by the need to 
reduce the risk of error and adverse outcomes in order to improve patient safety. HFMEA has 
so far been applied to medication administration (Fletcher 1997; Kunac and Reith 2005; 
McNally et al. 1997; Weir 2005), IV drug administration(Adachi and Lodolce 2005; Apkon 
et al. 2004; Wetterneck et al. 2006), blood transfusions (Burgmeier 2002) and equipment 
problems (Lenz et al. 2005; Linkin et al. 2005; Wehrli-Veit et al. 2004). To date HFMEA has 
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not been applied to communication or surgery.  
4.2: Aims 
To apply HFMEA to the information transfer and communication process in patients’ 
surgical journey by employing the knowledge and expertise of all health care professionals 
involved in the process.  
• To map the surgical care process,  
• To highlight specific areas prone to communication failures and 
• To recommend strategies to ameliorate information transfer and communication 
process in surgical care. 
 
4.3: Methods 
 4.3.1: Design  
A modified HFMEA {as used by the Veterans Association National Centre for Patient 
Safety(DeRosier et al. 2002)} was performed over 6 months between July and December 
2008.  
4.3.2: HFMEA team  
A multidisciplinary team consisting of 15 members which included surgeons (4), anesthetists 
(4), nurses (6); including ward, operating room and recovery nurses) and psychologist with 
expertise in human factors in healthcare (1) was assembled. Inclusion of a wide spectrum of 
healthcare professionals ensured representation of every phase of the surgical care pathway 
(pre-, intra-, and post-operative phases). 
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4.3.3: HFMEA procedure 
Formal HFMEA guidelines were applied to information transfer and communication 
processes throughout the surgical care pathway. An introductory session was held to explain 
the whole HFMEA process to participating experts. A team leader  (myself) supervised the 
HFMEA procedure. The HFMEA team leader created a preliminary flow diagram after initial 
discussions with the HFMEA team and identified the main processes and sub-processes. 
Communication processes were examined across three phases: pre-operative, intra-operative 
and post-operative. Initial analysis revealed 14 different steps across the three phases, which 
were subsequently grouped into six main steps in the surgical care (Fig. 4A).  
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Fig. 4A: Six main phases in Surgical care pathway of patients undergoing general surgical 
procedures 
!
Of these, pre-operative assessment and optimisation, preprocedural teamwork, post-operative 
handover and daily ward care were found to be most vulnerable to information transfer and 
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vulnerable but was not the focus of this FMEA as it was considered to have number of safety 
checks already in place and has already been studied in lot of previous studies and by our 
research group) Subsequently the final, more detailed analysis was conducted on these four 
phases only. The exploratory step of identifying failure modes was done through chaired 
brainstorming focus group sessions of the HFMEA team, as suggested within a standard 
FMEA. In addition, the modified HFMEA was reinforced through a review of literature and 
from direct observations of the surgical care pathway of patients undergoing major general 
surgical operations. This triangulated approach ensured that all potential failure modes were 
identified. 
Subsequently hazard analysis was undertaken which uses a 4-point scale to rate severity 
(minor, moderate, major catastrophic) anchored to patient outcomes and a 4-point scale for 
probability (remote, uncommon, occasional, frequent)(DeRosier et al. 2002). The product of 
these two scores creates a hazard score. Although focus group methodology (Kitzinger 1995) 
is an excellent technique to explore various failure modes and their solutions as it is 
considered to be naturalistic, creates discussion between various members and empowers 
participants, it is not a reliable technique for determining an individual’s authentic point of 
view. Social norms get in the way; some people with the leadership qualities may dominate 
the discussion thereby silencing any individual voices of dissent. Therefore, the confirmatory 
formal analysis step of prioritising of the failure modes within this HFMEA involved 
individual hazard matrix scoring by nine team members as opposed to a standard HFMEA, 
which involves hazard matrix scoring by the team within a focus group session.  
The failure modes, which scored 8 or more by more than 50% of team members, were 
classified as critical. The critical failure mode then followed a decision tree to assess 
critically, existing control measures and detectability, which measured whether, the entire 
system would fail if this part of the process fails. Failure modes with high criticality that did 
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not have effective control measures in place and are not easily detectable were prioritized for 
further action. Finally, we determined actions to be taken to eliminate or control these failure 
modes. Eventually, an anonymous satisfaction survey including involvement in the HFMEA, 
colleague participation, usefulness and increasing awareness of patient safety was conducted 
among all team members to evaluate the acceptance of HFMEA.  
 
4.4: Results 
Fig. 4B shows the processes/sub-processes and the distribution of the failure modes in each 
process and subprocess. Across these care processes that were investigated, 132 failures were 
identified. Of those, 41 (31%) were classified as “high risk” via hazard scoring. Of the 41 
high-risk failures, 26 were already sufficiently covered by protocols as determined by the 
decision tree. For the remaining 15 failures, 20 causes were identified by the analysis and 18 
recommendations were made to address them (Table 4A). The complete HFMEA is shown in 
Appendix 4. 
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Fig. 4B: FMEA flow diagram of main processes and subprocesses 
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4.4.1: Failure modes and recommendations  
4.4.1.1: Preoperative Assessment and Optimisation 
Memory loss, lack of knowledge, blurring boundaries of responsibility and hierarchical and 
power differences lead to information transfer and communication problems. Trainees do not 
want to appear incompetent in front of their senior peers and thus hesitate to communicate if 
they feel that the communication will reflect poorly on them. HFMEA team recommended 
that juniors should be free to talk to seniors and vertical hierarchical differences should be 
minimised. There should be increased continuity of care. Clarity about patient care tasks 
should be established. The team member who is responsible for a task should be made 
explicit. In fact, where possible the same team member should send and check investigations.  
A preoperative checklist should be designed to decrease memory loss and to ensure that all 
the tasks are completed and patient is adequately optimised. There should be automated alerts 
to the clinical teams about abnormal results. Consistent and reliable risk assessment is one of 
the holy grails of preoperative anaesthesia but again the responsibility is not clear. Increased 
interdisciplinary communication between surgical and anaesthetic team will facilitate and 
make the assigned responsibility of patient care more explicit. There should be redundant 
sources for important information i.e. important information should be available from a 
variety of sources to increase the likelihood that providers have access to key information 
when needed. 
4.4.1.2: Preprocedural teamwork 
Poor communication within the OR team before the start of procedure can result in problems 
that range from medication errors to wrong site surgery. A pre-operative standard briefing 
and checklist with the involvement of whole OR team should be implemented to reveal a 
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knowledge gap, to provoke a change of care plan, develop a shared model of work and to 
minimise errors. 
To reduce equipment problems, an electronic equipment checklist should be displayed in 
operating room, which will inform the OR team about the unavailability of certain 
equipment, so surgical teams can then make alternative plans or can arrange the equipment 
before proceeding. To add redundancy into the system, the surgical team should also check 
equipment availability a day prior to surgery. 
4.4.1.3: Postoperative Handover 
Post-operative handover occurs in a dynamic, rapidly changing environment where staff must 
care for patients in an ‘at risk’ state, often under considerable pressure. Anaesthetists’ 
handover are typically brief and take place amidst a range of other activities, which competes 
for receiving nurses’ attention. Often the information passed is incomplete and inaccurate. 
The type of information written as notes and communicated at handover is left to the 
discretion of the operator, and there is no standardisation of items to include in the handover. 
There should be a post-operative handover proforma to improve the information transfer 
from operating room to ward via recovery to exchange relevant clinical information. 
Handover needs to be structured, organised and more transparent to reduce the number of 
information omissions. 
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4.4.1.4: Daily Ward Care 
The typical ward round is a dyadic interaction between the patient and the physician with 
only minor contributions from nurses. This is a clear disadvantage: contrary to physicians, 
nurses see patients continuously over a prolonged period of time. Thus crucial questions 
about patients’ overnight events, drain output etc. depend on the information that nurses 
possess.  Multidisciplinary ward rounds needs to be conducted so that the team can make an 
integrated assessment of the patient by having all the necessary information from various 
professional groups including nurses. This knowledge from nurses should be fed into a 
shared decision making process for the patient. 
Table 4A: Critical Failure Modes and Recommendations 
 
Process step  Failure mode Causes Recommendations/Suggestions 
Preoperative Assessment & Optimisation 
Check Blood Investigations 
Failure to check 
Investigations 
Lack of knowledge            
Memory lapses                  
Blurring of responsibility  
Electronic Communication System 
Increased continuity of care (Same team 
should send & check the blood results) 
Check special Investigations. 
Eg-Echo, PFT 
Checked but action not 
taken 
  Checked but action delayed 
Hierarchy in the system       
Lack of knowledge            
Failure to communicate with staff 
nurse 
 
Increased communication between 
surgical team                        
Redundancy in the system 
Juniors to talk freely with seniors             
System with alerts/automated emails for 
incomplete tasks 
Clarity about responsibility for 
preoperative optimisation 
  
Make plan for medical 
comorbidities. Eg- Discontinue 
warfarin, Glucose-insulin 
regime for diabetic patients 
Failure to make plan for 
comorbidities 
Lack of protocols                    
Lack of interdisciplinary 
communication (Surgeon-
Anaesthetist)                                   
Memory lapses                       
High Workload 
  
Preoperative Checklist                   
Better communication between Surgeon 
and Anaesthetist                 
  
Check special equipment in 
theatre Failure to check equipment  
Assumption about equipment 
availability 
Competency issues among junior 
staff 
High workload                        
Lack of resources 
Prepared equipment packs                          
Electronic equipment checklist in 
theatre  
Surgical team to confirm the equipment 
availability day prior to surgery 
Anaesthetic and Surgical team 
Communicate with each other 
Failure to communicate 
with each other 
Assumption by the teams that the 
other team knows                        
Cultural factors                       
Lack of formal briefing                             
Theatre team briefing the evening 
before the operation/before the start of 
the list                                               
Web based conference of the theatre 
team 
Preprocedural Teamwork Phase 
Theatre team confirms patient 
identity, name & site of 
operation 
Failure to confirm the 
patient identity 
Cultural factors                       
Duplication of tasks  
Lack of Hierarchy, power & 
social structure   
Multiple competing tasks                  
  
  
 
  
Briefing and Checklist 
  
  
  
  
Surgeon & Anaesthetist 
discuss anticipated problems, 
expected blood loss and 
duration of surgery 
Failure to discuss 
anticipated problems, 
duration and blood loss  
Electronic equipment checklist in 
theatre to alert the team regarding the 
absence of certain equipment 
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Theatre team checks that 
antibiotic has been given 
Failure to check antibiotic 
has been given  
Theatre team checks about 
pneumatic compression, other 
equipment availability 
Failure to check pneumatic 
compression 
  
Postoperative Handover 
Handover to recovery 
Handover - 
Incomplete/Inaccurate 
Forgetfulness 
High workload 
Competing work demands 
Absence of OR personnel                            
Debriefing in theatre with presence of 
recovery nurse 
Postoperative handover proforma 
Enhanced teamwork                     
Daily Ward Care 
Assess the patient 
Failure to take the 
information from the nurse 
Unavailability of nurse due to 
shortage of staff, high workload                           
or multiple competing tasks  
  
Multidisciplinary ward round           
Implement Integrated care pathways 
(ICP) or post-operative recovery 
protocols 
 
 4.4.2: Participants’ views on HFMEA  
After the completion of HFMEA, a satisfaction survey was conducted among team 
members. HFMEA was considered to be very useful in analysing the surgical care 
process prospectively. Team members felt that it highlighted the problems in a very 
systematic approach, which would not have possible with any other methodology. 
Everybody except one participant agreed that the process would become safer after 
implementing recommendations. The participant who disagreed actually was not sure 
whether the recommendations made would improve the process. Regarding awareness 
of patient safety, all except one felt that the HFMEA has increased their awareness of 
patient safety. Also, all the participants said that if given a chance they would like to 
get involved in other HFMEA. As HFMEA increase awareness of patient safety with 
the potential to enhancing safety, all participants agreed that they would advise a 
colleague to participate.  
 
4.5: Discussion 
The HFMEA uncovered multiple system errors that had not been previously 
considered and acted upon. These errors have the potential to cause adverse events. 
Our HFMEA was one of the largest ever performed at our facility. We agree with 
other authors that the hazard analysis is tedious (albeit useful) and that, given the 
significant human resources needed to complete them, these investigations should be 
reserved for the most clinical significant problems (Burgmeier 2002). We believe that 
our investigation was worth the effort because it identified multiple, correctable 
information transfer failures in the surgical process and will serve as the basis for the 
development of interventions. A prospective approach of a system permits a more 
complete evaluation of vulnerabilities (failure modes) before adverse events occur (in  
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contrast to retrospective analyses). The face validity of such findings will also be 
helpful in gaining administrative support for proposed changes. Moreover, validity 
was strengthened by the use of triangulation methodology for data collection. 
Inadequate preoperative optimisation of patient for surgery due to failure to prescribe 
medications or checking investigations were the critical failures identified in 
preoperative assessment and optimisation phase. Assigned responsibility for patient 
care especially for particular tasks’ should be clear between surgical and anaesthetic 
team members. Increased clarity of responsibility is an objective in all of the 
professions studied by Patterson et al(Patterson et al. 2004). Failure to conduct 
briefings was identified as the critical failure in information transfer in the pre-
procedural teamwork phase. A pre-operative checklist and briefing was recommended 
as a solution by the HFMEA team. It was felt that this would reveal knowledge gaps, 
decrease medical errors and improve team communication(Lingard et al. 2008). 
Recently an international pilot study evaluating the implementation of a surgical 
safety checklist developed under the auspices of the World Health Organisation 
showed a dramatic decrease in morbidity and mortality rates globally(Haynes et al. 
2009b). 
The main goal during a patient handover is optimal patient care and safety. Improving 
team communication can be an important factor in improving patient safety. The most 
important failure mode identified in the post-operative handover phase was 
incomplete handover. There is a need for effective transfer of a patient and procedure-
specific information and post-operative management plan to ensure safety and 
continuity of care. The absence of a structured handover between operating room and 
recovery teams can lead to fragmentation of information and could potentially result 
in critical incidents or in omissions in the care being delivered. Post-operative  
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checklist/proforma was recognised to facilitate the information transfer and make the 
handover structured and organised. Catchpole et al (Catchpole et al. 2007) showed a 
reduction in information omissions and technical errors after using a structured 
handover process based on the Formula one model in a paediatric ICU. Unavailability 
of the ward nurse was the main problem noted in daily ward care which leads to 
inadequate assessment of the patient and poor information transfer of the patients’ 
management plan. As a result of these failures the decision made by the surgical team 
may not be timely or appropriate. Moreover, it may also cause delays or omissions of 
care processes potentially compromising patient safety. Multidisciplinary ward rounds 
with equal representation from nurses in decision-making process would help in 
integrated assessment of patients and reduce the errors in management of patient. 
Weber et al(Weber et al. 2007) have also highlighted this fact that utterance from 
nurses was only one-tenth of overall communication in the ward round emphasising 
the need for increased involvement of nurses. 
Based on the HFMEA, we proposed a number of principles to guide re-engineering of 
information transfer practices in the hospital environment (Table 4B). We believe that 
optimising information transfer and communication processes in surgical care is 
essential. Information standardisation in the form of checklists, electronic 
communication systems, proformas, protocols and care pathways is needed at each 
phase to improve the information flow and to reduce communication failures. 
Moreover, as in other industries, a degree of automation, like alerts, would greatly 
increase safety and bring reassurance to clinical staff. 
Our study has several limitations. A limitation of the outcome of our analysis is that 
we have not measured actual failure rates. As mentioned above communication 
failures are common but unfortunately most are not reported. To compare failure rates  
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realistically before and after HFMEA is therefore difficult. However, our study 
uncovered previously unacknowledged failures. Every team member is expected to be 
biased by his personal position and experiences in the hospital. Nevertheless, bias in 
the HFMEA is minimized by the multidisciplinary composition of the team. We 
should also recognise that the findings of this study are primarily for major general 
surgical procedures and may not be immediately applicable to other surgical 
environments for example, day case surgical procedures. However, we believe that 
the findings can be extrapolated to other surgical specialties. 
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1. Establish clarity about who is responsible for patient care tasks 
2. There should be continuity of care. Same team/team member should send and 
check investigations 
3. Electronic communication system with automated alerts to the responsible team so 
that immediate action can be taken to correct any abnormal results. 
4. Increased communication between surgical and anesthetic team 
5. Preoperative checklist as a memory aid to ensure the adequate optimization of 
patient and to reduce omission of tasks 
6. Briefing and checklist before the start of the procedure to confirm the patient 
identity, name of procedure and to discuss any anticipated problems 
7. Postoperative handover proforma to make the handover more structured and 
organized. Key information needs to be specified and presented and irrelevant 
information excluded. Communication should be clear and succinct as important 
information regarding the plan of care may be missed without effective 
communication between staff members. 
8. Multidisciplinary ward round for an integral assessment and management of patient 
Table 4B: Suggestions to Improve Communication and Information Transfer among 
healthcare professionals in Surgical care pathway 
FMEA has the ability to formalise and integrate clinical experience and observations 
provided from the view points of healthcare professionals. Its value lies in providing a 
highly structured account of errors and problems in the process as well as the potential 
impact they have on the patient. This methodology addressed an issue, which is not 
amenable to quantitative techniques: the evaluation of information transfer and  
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communication through the surgical care pathway. We found the method (DeRosier et 
al. 2002) from the Veterans Health Administration National Centre for Patient 
Safety(DeRosier et al. 2002) to be most appropriate for our project.  
 
4.6: Conclusion 
This study helped in the understanding of information transfer and communication 
process in surgical care and identified the critical ITC failures across the continuum of 
care. The findings of the HFMEA will be used to design an observational assessment 
instrument like Information transfer and Communication Assessment tool for Surgery 
(ITCAS), similar to those designed for assessment of teamwork in theatre, the 
Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS) (Undre et al. 2007) the 
feasibility of which has been discussed in chapter six. As multimodal methodology 
approach was used to identify the ITC failures, these findings will be confirmed in 
next two studies before development of interventions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERVIEW STUDY TO IDENTIFY 
INFORMATION TRANSFER AND COMMUNICATION 
(ITC) FAILURES 
 
5.1: Introduction 
“the system has not been created, it has grown organically and it needs to be looked 
at afresh to work out how the various units within a group actually communicate and 
develop better” (Consultant Anaesthetist – study participant)  
Little is known about the information transfer and communication failures and their 
causes in the hospital environment. Although some studies have explored 
communication in surgery (Healey et al. 2004; Lingard et al. 2004; Sevdalis et al. 
2008), as mentioned in previous chapter, their focus has primarily been on the 
operating theatre, which represents only one component of the care provided to the 
surgical patient during their hospital stay.  
Briefings, checklists and other techniques have been introduced and have been shown 
to improve some aspects of communication. However, these have generally not been 
preceded by an analysis of the information needs and communication vulnerabilities 
of the existing system; treatment has been prescribed without prior diagnosis. 
Analysis of the full pathway is critical as communication failures are not discrete 
events; information loss in one phase of care can potentially compromise safety in a 
subsequent phase.  
 
 
 87!
 
5.2: Aims 
To explore information transfer and communication failures (ITC) across the entire 
surgical journey of patients during their hospital stay.  Specifically, we aim to 
systematically identify:  
• ITC failures across the surgical phases 
• Causes of ITC failures 
• Impact of ITC failures 
• Interventions to reduce these failures and to improve information flow 
 
5.3: Methods 
5.3.1: Participants 
Eighteen healthcare professionals of varying levels of experience, including surgeons 
(7), anaesthetists (5) and nurses[6 {Theatre (2), Recovery (2) and Ward Nurses (2)} 
participated in the study. Participants were selected using a qualitative sampling frame 
(Marshall 1996) to ensure a broad spectrum of demographic and professional 
characteristics and were also identified by snowball sampling techniques (Miles MB 
and AM 1994). Sampling ceased when saturation was achieved. 
5.3.2: Data Collection 
Semi-structured individual interviews were carried out by a researcher with a 
background in surgery and patient safety to achieve in-depth understanding of 
information transfer and communication failures across the surgical care process, their 
causes and to find the way to reduce these errors. Surgical care process was  
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segregated into four main phases: (i) preoperative assessment and optimization phase; 
(ii) pre-procedure teamwork; (iii) postoperative handover; and (iv) daily ward care. 
Surgeons’, Anaesthetists’ and Nurses’ views on the ITC failures were explored.  
Interviews took place between June and August 2008 on the hospital site where each 
healthcare professional worked and were arranged at a time and place to suit them. A 
written consent was obtained and an interview protocol was developed and piloted in 
two initial sessions, then distilled into a topic guide by the research team (Appendix 
5A). Each interview lasted between 20 and 50 minutes. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. 
5.3.3: Data analyses 
Transcripts were cross-checked with the original recordings to ensure accuracy. After 
an initial period of familiarisation, in which transcripts were read and re-read to 
ensure full immersion in the data, the primary researcher (KN) analysed all 
interviews. Content analysis was carried out and emergent themes were identified.  
Each interview was then coded independently by one of three additional members of 
the research team (with backgrounds in surgery and psychology). Finally, emergent 
themes across the entire set of 18 interviews were reviewed to identify key emerging 
strands. Relevant themes were also discussed within the team to avoid missing of 
themes by one researcher. The level of coding agreement between researchers (inter-
coder reliability) was evaluated quantitatively (Pearson’s r correlation coefficients). 
This was done by comparing the number of themes identified by each researcher. 
5.3.4: Quality assurance of data analysis and interpretation  
The consistency (reliability) and confirmability (validity) of data analysis and 
interpretation was assessed using two techniques. Firstly, external validation of all  
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stages of coding and interpretation of all interview transcripts was performed 
independently by three experienced qualitative researchers. The results were 
compared and there were no significant inconsistencies (as assessed by Inter-rater 
reliability, pearson’s –p<0.01). Secondly, interpretation of the data was discussed with 
six randomly selected healthcare professionals who had been interviewed to compare 
our perspective with that of subjects. This process of respondent validation again 
found no significant criticisms of our interpretation. 
 
5.4: Results 
5.4.1: Participants 
Of the 18 healthcare professionals who completed the interview, seven were surgeons, 
five were consultant Anesthetists’ and six were nurses with specialty experience 
ranging from 4-25 years. This study sample was chosen to cover all phases of the 
surgical care pathway.  
5.4.2: Coding reliability 
Each Table lists the main findings for each key question of the interview protocol and 
the number of participants that mentioned each item. We examined the average 
number of items each coder identified for each question in the protocol across all 
interviews. We also examined the correlations between the coders (primary coder vs 
second coder) for the number of items that each of them identified per interview. High 
correlations imply similar coding across researchers, therefore adequate reliability of 
the coding. The correlations obtained were high for all four questions: number of ITC 
failures: Pearson’s r = 0.84, p < 0.01; causes of ITC failures: r = 0.86, p < 0.01;  
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effects of ITC failures: r = 0.74, p < 0.01; and interventions: r = 0.91, p < 0.01 (all Ns 
= 18). Thus, the background of the researcher (surgery or psychology) did not affect 
theme extraction from the transcripts.  
In the following sections, data relating to key themes is summarised and supported by 
verbatim quotations. The code letter suffixed to each quotation refers to the surgeon 
(S), anaesthetist (A), ward nurse (WN), theatre nurse (TN) and recovery nurse (RN). 
5.4.3: Information Transfer & Communication failures (Box1) 
Any ITC event involves three components: Source, transmission and receiver. So 
failure at any stage leads to an ITC failure. This is the basis of our classification for 
ITC failures(Flin R 2007). (Fig 2A in Chapter 2). Quotes from the participants are 
mentioned in Boxes. 
5.4.3.1: Preoperative assessment and optimisation phase (PAO) (Table 5A) 
Transmission failures were found to be most common in this phase and all surgeons 
acknowledged that there is a lack of intradisciplinary & interdisciplinary 
communication. Problems identified in this phase are not communicated between 
surgical and anaesthetic team leading to inadequate optimization of the patient. 
Moreover, multiple modes of information transfer (letters, personal conversations, 
telephone communications) were thought to lead to information loss. Eleven (of 18) 
mentioned source failures to be next common ITC failures. Incomplete documentation 
in the medical records, delays in recording information after a patient episode, and 
scattered information across various resources (medical records, electronic 
repositories etc) leads to failures in the flow of information. All healthcare 
professionals acknowledged that opinions are sought from specialists in the process of 
pre-operative assessment, but then they are not followed up on or the advice rendered  
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is not acted upon. This leads to operations getting cancelled as patients are 
inadequately optimized for surgery.  
5.4.3.2: Preprocedural teamwork (PPT) (Table 5B) 
Source failures, including poor handover from the ward to operating theatre, were the 
main problems identified in this phase. More often ward nurses handing over the 
patient to the operating theatre team do not possess crucial information about the 
patient. Therefore information regarding allergies, pressure scores and preoperative 
medication status (e.g., Antihypertensives, Heparin) among others is not transferred, 
with the potential to compromise patient’s safety. Eight out of 18 healthcare 
professionals felt that communication failures amongst the operating theatre team 
prior to the start of operation leads to omission of important preoperative checks, 
which can have an impact on patient outcomes. Equipment checks rarely occur as a 
result of which some important surgical equipment is not available. This leads to 
delays or surgeons work around the problem, thus potentially compromising patient 
safety. Other safety checks mentioned were lack of confirmation of availability of 
blood and blood products, failure to check allergy status and failure to confirm 
availability of level 1 or 2 beds for post-operative care. 
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Information transfer Failures  No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of 
times 
Source Failures 
• Information at different places 
• Consent/Notes/Investigations missing 
• High risk cases not flagged up 
• Documentation inadequate 
• Assumption that others possess safety 
critical information  
• Specialty referrals unclear 
11  
(S=6, A=2, N=3) 
13 
Transmission failures 
• Lack of communication between 
anaesthetic & surgical teams 
• Poor communication between 
preassessment clinic and anaesthetic team 
• Poor communication within the surgical 
team 
• Information not relayed from 
preassessment to theatre 
15 
(S=7, A=3, N=5) 
24 
Receiver Failures 
• Investigations/Specialists opinion not 
checked 
• Anaesthetic instruction not followed 
6 
(S=3, A=3, N=0) 
6 
 
Table 5A: Information transfer and communication failures in Preoperative 
assessment and optimisation phase 
S= Surgeon, A= Anaesthetist, N= Nurse 
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Information transfer Failures No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of times 
Source Failures 
• List changed multiple times 
• Incorrect/incomplete name on the list 
• Poor handover from the ward (does not 
know the patient) 
• Patient information 
fragmented/duplicated 
• Consent/Pt id/notes missing 
12 
(S=4, A=3, N=5) 
17 
Transmission failures 
• No collaborative network among 
theatre team 
• Lack of 
communication/Miscommunication 
between ward and theatre staff 
•  Failure of information transfer from 
anaesthetic staff to theatre staff 
8 
(S=3, A=2, N=3) 
8 
Receiver Failures 
• Equipment/Cross match/HDU & ITU 
bed availability not checked 
• Preoperative checklists not followed 
8 
(S=4, A=3, N=1) 
8 
 
Table 5B: Information transfer and communication failures in Preprocedural 
teamwork phase 
 
5.4.3.3: Postoperative handover (Table 5C) 
Many of the failures uncovered in this phase were due to an incomplete handover. 
Information was missing, incomplete, scattered or there was information overload. 
The post-operative handover process is informal, unstructured and inconsistent. As a  
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result, crucial information such as the patient’s comorbidities, allergies and a plan for 
post-operative pain relief is not consistently transferred. In addition, the surgical team 
is often not involved in the handover, so crucial surgical information may not be 
formally handed over. Information on intra-operative events is handed over by the 
anaesthesic team who may not be aware of surgery related issues or there may be a 
failure to perceive the relevance of an event that may potentially impact on the 
patient’s recovery. Participants felt that that the lack of structured handover also leads 
to an information overload on the recovery and ward nurses and combined with their 
inability to prioritise information, crucial information gets buried. Moreover, the 
absence of a single repository of information means that information is difficult to 
access when needed.  
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Information transfer Failures No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of 
times 
Source Failures 
• No formal structured process 
• Postoperative handover not 
done/incomplete 
• Poor/illegible written handover 
• Too much information, difficult to 
differentiate important from unimportant 
• Information scattered 
• No consistent team for handover 
15 
(S=6, A=4, N=5) 
24 
Transmission failures 
• Debriefing does not happen 
• Operation notes not transferred 
3 
(S=1, A=1, N=1) 
3 
Receiver Failures 
• Nurse multitasking, not receiving 
complete information 
2 
(S=0, A=1, N=1) 
2 
 
Table 5C: Information transfer and communication failures in Postoperative 
Handover phase 
5.4.3.4: Daily Ward care (Table 5D)  
The most common ITC failures reported by healthcare professionals in this phase 
were source failures followed by transmission failures. Staff shortages, multiple teams 
doing rounds simultaneously, conflicts with patient tasks and doing ad-hoc rounds 
lead to medical and nursing staff handing over at different times and information not 
being passed across professional groups and within clinical teams. Another sources 
failure was missing information due to missing patient charts, incomplete hand-over 
and documentation from personnel involved in the care of the patient from an earlier 
shift. Participants mentioned that information is often fragmented. Some of it is 
recorded in the patient’s medical notes, or in the drug charts, some of it is formally 
handed over across professional groups and some are passed on as verbal instructions, 
which makes it difficult to access. Healthcare  
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professionals also acknowledged that there is a poor communication within the 
surgical team, which may lead to errors. 
 
 
Table 5D: Information transfer and communication failures in Daily Ward Care 
 
 
 
 
Information transfer Failures No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of 
times 
Source Failures 
• Information not available from the nurse 
(not on the rounds) 
• Notes/observation, fluid charts missing 
• Lack of documentation/Poor documentation 
• Decisions/instructions from person leading 
the ward round unclear 
• Information fragmented, not all tied 
together 
• Different specialties have conflicting plans 
12 
(S=6, A=4, N=2) 
20 
Transmission failures 
• Lack of communication between doctors 
and nurses 
• Poor communication within the surgical 
team 
• Poor communication between different 
teams like nursing, physiotherapists, 
dietician 
• Lack of organized process of handing over 
information 
8 
(S=4, A=3, N=1) 
12 
Receiver Failures 
• Care pathways not followed 
3 
(S=3, A=0, N=0) 
3 
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Box 5H | Information transfer & Communication Failures (Interview Quotes) 
 
5.4.4: Causes  (Table 5E)  
We classified causes of these ITC failures in accordance with the seven level 
framework classification of contributory factors proposed by Vincent et al(Vincent 
2003).  
 
Preoperative assessment and optimization phase (PAO) 
“…. lots of problems are picked up…but then that is not communicated 
…..between the pre-operative assessment team and the surgical team. 
Similarly there's a very poor communication between the pre-operative 
assessment team and the anaesthetist ” (S1) 
“Some of the information is available electronically, some of it is on paper, 
some of it is verbal from the patient or their relatives, some of it is verbal from 
other medical groups so I think all of the information in one place would 
prevent errors occurring” (S6).  
 
Preprocedural Teamwork 
“when the patient comes to theatre we take everything off the heparin, we 
don’t sort of handover to say the patient was on heparin when they were in the 
ward” (WN1) 
 
Postoperative handover 
“I think that the problem in post-operative handover is most likely to be 
forgetting to tell somebody… I think there is scope for more formality and 
recording of handover and handover protocols such that you don’t forget to 
mention the low blood pressure or to give steroids” (A4). 
 
Daily Ward care 
“The main problem here is we don't always have the nurse following us when 
we go around.  So it's difficult to make an integrated assessment of the patient.  
It's difficult for us to get to find out what has happened”(S4) 
“another classic example that we see is that patients who’ve had a low 
anterior resection, may have an anastomosis and no one should be digitating 
them, or giving them anything PR, and you know a house officer or a junior 
member of the staff gives them a rectal suppository ……there are issues with 
communicating post operative management to everyone involved” (S5). 
 
 
!
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Work environment factors were the most common reported causes followed by task, 
individual, organization and team factors. Rapid turnover of staff members, staff 
shortages, high workload, stress at work and lack of administrative support were felt 
to be the common environmental factors leading to ITC failures. Task factors 
suggested by healthcare professionals included lack of protocols, informal ways of 
communication, absence of task clarity or structure. Individual factors were 
mentioned by most of the participants. There was a feeling that memory lapses and 
lack of confidence or awareness, and knowledge can cause disruptions in the flow of 
information. Variability and inconsistencies in various organizational processes were 
mentioned by eleven out of eighteen healthcare professionals. Too many layers in the 
system were felt to hinder the flow of information. Participants accepted that 
healthcare professionals are incredibly able and hard working and appreciate the 
importance of multi-disciplinary communication, however it is the absence of a 
teamwork culture that leads to failures in communication. Also, some of the 
interviewees said that there was a blurring of responsibility between the surgeons and 
anaesthetists in the preoperative and postoperative phases, which often leads to ITC 
failures (Box 5I). 
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Contributory factors/Causes No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of times 
Task and Technology factors  
• Primitive forms of information 
transfer 
• Inadequate mode of 
communication  
• Tasks are not routine, they are 
add on 
• Lack of structure  
• Lack of protocols 
13 
(S=6, A=3, N=4) 
16 
Team factors  
• Hierarchical obstruction to flow 
of information 
• Poor leadership 
• People afraid of exchanging 
information 
6 
(S=3, A=2, N=1) 
6 
Individual factors 
• Some healthcare professionals 
don’t like checklist  
• Memory lapses 
• Inexperienced staff  
• Lack of confidence  
• Lack of awareness of a problem 
• Personal differences 
• Nurses not assertive  
• Nurses not empowered to play 
an active role 
• Different competencies between 
junior doctors 
13 
(S=5, A=3, N=5) 
17 
Work Environmental factors  
• High workload 
• Inadequate staff 
• Lack of administrative support  
14 
(S=6, A=4, N=4) 
17 
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• Rapid turnover of healthcare 
professionals. eg- shift change, 
job rotation 
• Ward rounds quick  
• Work under stress 
• Four different teams doing ward 
round at the same  
Organizational factors  
• Lack of specialist nurses 
• Lack of training 
• Too many layers in the system 
• Preassessment process 
inconsistent 
• Hierarchical issues 
• No consistency   between patient 
booking and theatre list 
11 
(S=4, A=4, N=3) 
17 
Others 
• Blurring of responsibility 
• Lack of continuity of care 
• Lack of structure and efficiency 
• Anaesthetist are not peri-
operative physicians 
6 
(S=3, A=2, N=1) 
10 
 
Table 5E: Contributory factors of ITC failures 
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5.4.5: Effects (Table 5F) 
All the participants of the study said that ITC failures can directly or indirectly lead to 
patient harm. Fifteen out of the eighteen participants agreed that it can be catastrophic 
and may lead to mortality. Some participants went to the extent to say that nearly all 
surgical disasters can find their origins in ITC failures. 
Beyond patient’s harm, ITC failures are also thought to destroy team dynamics and 
lead to stress and increased workload (Box 5I). Healthcare professionals identified 
that ITC failures also have an impact on the organization through unnecessary 
investigations, wastage of resources and theatre lists cancellations, which can all 
potentially result in increased healthcare costs. 
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Effects of Information transfer 
Failures  
No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of times 
Impact on Patient 
• Mortality 
• Major Complications 
• Suboptimal care 
• Prolonged Surgery 
• Operation cancellations/delays 
• Increased length of stay 
• Quality of life compromised 
 Eg- Pain not controlled 
 
 18 
(S=7, A=5, N=6) 
 
46 
Impact on Team 
• Staff stressed, unhappy 
• Low morale of team  
• Team dysfunctional  
• Service efficiency declines  
• Team camaraderie destroyed 
• Wrong decisions 
• Training declines 
16 
(S=7, A=4, N=5) 
22 
Impact on Organisation (n= 5) 
• Wastage of resources  
• Cost implications  
• Theatre Time wastage 
• Unnecessary investigations  
 
5 
(S=2, A=0, N=3) 
8 
 
Table 5F: Consequences of ITC failures 
 
 103!
  
Box 5I | Causes, Impact of ITC Failures & Interventions to improve information flow 
(Interview Quotes) 
 
 
Causes 
“I think for things to happen the right way it's got to be made easy for them to 
happen the right way.  And it has to be part of the way you do things.  If it's an 
add-on, it gets dropped…..design ways of making sure that things…..are easy 
to follow by everybody” (S3). 
“Consistent and reliable risk assessment is one of the holy grails of pre-
operative anaesthesia….but it’s not clear whose responsibility it is” (s6) 
 
Impact 
“I think what people don’t appreciate is that information transfer problems 
can make a difference between life and death. Communication is seen as a 
very soft issue and people think that it can't have much of a bearing on 
outcomes and I completely disagree with that.  The sooner you speak to 
somebody about a certain problem the sooner the action is taken, the sooner 
the problem is sorted out.  The patient will obviously have a better outcome.  
And all the sooner, sooner, sooner, depends upon how the information is 
transferred”(S1). 
“…more stress for the Nurses stress for the patient, stress for everyone, 
because there’s no proper communication” (WN2). 
“the cost effectiveness of theatre time, if the operation is cancelled because 
the notes are not there or the wrong patient has been booked so its all that 
theatre time that’s been wasted and being paid for.” (RN2)  
 
Interventions 
“let’s imagine a smart card that the patient carries with them and you put into 
a machine and you add to it, well at this phase I want you to give a litre of 
saline ….so all the information is there and the Recovery Nurse doesn’t have 
to say ‘what did he say’, they can look and say well actually this is the 
information that we need to acquire for this patient, this is the management 
for that patient” (A4). 
“so you cannot change the fact that complications will occur in surgery, but 
you can definitely change what the outcome of the complications with good 
communication and good information transfer.  And good teamwork between 
the various people such as surgeons, anaesthetists, the nurses and doctors, if 
you improve that then you can definitely reduce the post operative mortality.” 
(S1).  
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5.4.6: Interventions (Table 5G)  
There is a widely shared view about the need for interventions to improve information 
flow and reduce ITC failures across the whole continuum of care.  Structured, 
organized, transparent and efficient information transfer and communication was 
described as the basis for all interventions. Regarding the content of interventions, 
participants mentioned checklists, smart card, cultural and system changes. Almost all 
participants emphasized the need for the development of tools for standardization of 
information transfer. They were referred to variably by different participants as 
checklists, protocols, communication sheets or care pathways. All these were 
suggested as interventions to help prevent lapses in memory, improve multi-
disciplinary communication and decrease medical errors. A few participants, who 
were against such interventions felt that although such implementation could lead to 
the automation of care and consequent deskilling of clinicians, introduction of these 
tools could provide structure and formalise information transfer. 
Participants were of a strong opinion that information technology was of fundamental 
importance in the storage and transfer of patient related information. Healthcare 
professionals felt that there should be a central information repository, which should 
have all the relevant patient information, with the advantage that healthcare 
professionals could access the information when required. Few of them were of the 
view that there should be an electronic smart card for each patient (Box 5I). Use of 
such a smart card would allow access to unlimited patient medical information.  
Apart from technological interventions, a need for cultural and system changes 
emerged through the interviews. It was felt that through improved communication and 
better teamwork even mortality and morbidity could be reduced. 
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Table 5G: Interventions to reduce ITC failures 
Interventions No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of 
times 
Memory-aids 
• Checklists 
• Protocols/proformas 
• Care bundle/Pathways 
• Postoperative handover sheet 
 15 
(S=6, A=4, N=5) 
 
21 
Technology Interventions 
• Electronic information and 
communication record 
• Information transfer system which flags 
up problems 
• Smart card containing updated patients’ 
information 
• Central information platform with 
peripheral units 
8 
(S=3, A=4, N=1) 
9 
System Changes 
• System with continuity of care 
• Email from preassessment to surgical 
team 
• Risk assessment unit to be established  
(a joint decision unit for patient, 
Anaesthetist and Surgeon) 
• More nursing staff 
• Training sessions for nurses 
9 
(S=5, A=2, N=2) 
15 
Cultural Changes 
• Increased interdisciplinary 
communication 
• People to be more conscientious and 
hardworking 
• Good documentation 
• Patient should be part of 
communication pathway 
• Juniors feel free to call seniors 
11 
(S=5, A=3, N=3) 
17 
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5.5: Discussion 
This study has identified systematic information transfer and communication failures 
across the entire surgical care pathway and suggested ways of overcoming them. The. 
The utility of this study is enhanced by both, rigorous application of qualitative 
sampling techniques which ensured a broad range of opinions and its ability to 
provoke readers to compare the findings against their own experience. 
The study confirms earlier findings (in previous chapter) that ITC failures are 
common in surgical care, are equally distributed along the whole continuum of patient 
surgical care(Greenberg et al. 2007) and can cause patient harm(Christian et al. 2006). 
Checklists, system changes and technological interventions can improve 
communication and information transfer(Catchpole et al. 2007; Lingard et al. 2008; 
Van Eaton et al. 2005). While the focus of inter-professional communication in 
surgery has been largely restricted to the operating theatre, there is a paucity of 
studies that draw attention to ITC failures across the whole of the surgical care 
pathway(Williams et al. 2007). 
The most common ITC failures across all phases of care were either source or 
transmission failures. There was a lack of communication between different teams, 
information transfer was incomplete; in cases where information was available, it was 
either difficult to access or fragmented. Coeira et al(Coiera and Tombs 1998) in their 
observational study on communication in British Hospitals also showed that 
inefficiency in the work place occurs due to communication behaviours among 
Hospital based healthcare professionals. The causes and effects of these failures 
identified in this study echo the findings of previous work done by William et 
al(Williams et al. 2007). Apart from patient harm, the healthcare system seems to  
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suffer enormous inefficiencies because of poor information transfer and 
communication practices. One estimate suggested that the American health system 
could save 30 billion dollars a year with improved telecommunications(Little 1992).  
Healthcare professionals did have a clear view about the interventions to improve 
process of information transfer. There was strong emphasis that this process needs to 
be structured, systematic and thorough.  In particular, checklists were thought to have 
great potential perhaps reflecting the success of the checklist in other 
industries(Boorman 2001) and other medical fields(Harrahill and Bartkus 1990; Hart 
and Owen 2005; Myburgh et al. 2005; Runciman et al. 2005; Walsh et al. 2004; Wolff 
et al. 2004). Communication failures amongst the operating theatre team prior to the 
start of operation as revealed in our study was also the basis of a recent global strategy 
(Haynes et al. 2009) which emphasized the role of a checklist in improving 
communication among team members. In the study funded by WHO (Haynes et al. 
2009), implementation of a surgical safety checklist was associated with a significant 
improvement in patient safety practices that subsequently translated in reduced 
morbidity and mortality. This was a pre-post intervention study done on 7688 patients 
which showed a decline in mortality and morbidity from 1.5% and 11% to 0.8% and 
7% respectively. Salter et al (Salter et al. 1998) have highlighted a similar concern 
about the failure of clinicians to transfer information to subsequent practitioners 
within primary care and have suggested investment in information technology for 
improvement. 
These conclusions should be evaluated against the limitations of the study. An 
obvious limitation of our study was the fact that we interviewed a small sample of 
surgeons, anesthetists and nurses and there is a possibility that their views may not 
have captured all of the relevant concepts. However, our sampling strategy and  
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methodology provided rich information from a range of healthcare professionals and 
the fact that we reached saturation, i.e. no new themes emerged and all segments of 
the data were accounted for, supports the conceptual framework that we present. We 
also accept that important communication failures occur across the primary/secondary 
care boundary both before admission and on discharge; these need to be addressed in 
subsequent studies.  The study will also contribute to the development of measures to 
evaluate ITC failures and in understanding the interventions required to improve 
information transfer. 
   
5.6: Conclusion 
Current perceptions of information transfer and communication failures among 
different healthcare professionals were demonstrated through this qualitative study. 
Both FMEA and Interview study have identified the ITC failures and they provided 
first step towards development of assessment tool to evaluate Information transfer and 
communication process in surgical care. 
 
 109!
 
CHAPTER SIX: AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION 
TRANSFER THROUGH THE CONTINUUM OF 
SURGICAL CARE: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 
 
6.1: Introduction 
The systematic review, FMEA and interview study have all highlighted the 
importance of ITC in continuum of surgical care. FMEA identified the critical phases 
and critical failures, the interview study shed light on the ITC failures, their causes 
and effects and interventions needed to improve this process. However, there are no 
measures of information transfer and communication to assess the impact of ITC on 
outcomes or to evaluate interventions that aim to improve ITC and thus surgical 
safety. Although measures of team performance exist in healthcare, many of these 
treat communication as a fairly simple construct representing just one dimension in a 
global measurement tool(Young et al. 1997; Yule et al. 2006). Other measures of 
healthcare team performance are constrained by reliance on self-report(Flin et al. 
2003; Pinto 1990; Shortell et al. 1991). Effective measures have been developed in 
other domains such as aviation; however, their context sensitivity renders them 
difficult to transfer to surgical care(Helmreich RL 1998). To date, surgery research in 
inter-professional communication has focused mainly on the operating theatre(Healey 
et al. 2004; Lingard et al. 2004; Sevdalis et al. 2008) despite the fact that 
communication failures are distributed across the surgical care (as shown in previous 
chapters). Development of a method of evaluation of ITC across the entire continuum 
of surgical care would serve a number of purposes. It would enable us to study where  
 110!
 
ITC failures are maximally prevalent in order to direct efforts to improve surgical 
safety. Moreover, it would also facilitate a study of the impact of ITC failures in one 
phase on adverse events and ITC failures in a phase downstream. 
 
6.2: Aims  
• To develop the framework followed by a tool (Information transfer and 
Communication Assessment in Surgery- ITCAS) development to evaluate ITC 
failures across the whole surgical pathway 
• Establish the feasibility of using the tool to study information transfer 
processes in patients undergoing major surgery 
• To study the extent, nature and the cause of information transfer errors.  
 
6.3: Methods 
Since we decided to assess the ITC process, I will mention that tasks and their 
management form the basis of many observational assessments (for example, the 
TARGETS(Fowlkes JE 1994), OTAS (Undre et al. 2007)). Tasks need to be 
considered in context and to be organized with respect to the context, not least for 
practicality of data collection.  
6.3.1: Developing Measures of Information transfer and Communication in 
Surgery 
The Information transfer and Communication assessment was developed over 9 
months. The work followed on from Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(HFMEA) and preliminary interviews which have been discussed in last two chapters.  
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ITCAS was subsequently constructed for each phase of the surgical care pathway 
through the process mapping of HFMEA discussed in the above chapter. Interviews 
conducted in the previous chapter also identified information needs in the four phases 
across the surgical care process (Table 6). The consistency (reliability) and 
confirmability (validity) of data analysis and interpretation was assessed using similar 
techniques as described in the above chapter. It revealed almost similar tasks as 
identified in task analysis of HFMEA, thereby validating the items on the task 
checklist.  
 
Information Needs 
(Preoperative Assessment and 
Optimisation) 
Total 
healthcare 
professionals 
(n) 
Surgeons 
(n) 
Anaesthetists 
(n) 
Nurses 
(n) 
Patient specific information 
• Past medical surgical/Drug 
History 
• Weight of patient  
• Any allergies  
• Bloods & Radiological 
Investigations including 
cross match 
• Imaging and endoscopy 
• Special investigations. Eg- 
pulmonary function test, 
Echo, pre-op ABGs(s4) 
• Histology  
• Patient consented 
• Need for Bowel prep 
• Availability of HDU/ITU 
bed 
 
18 7 5 6 
Procedure related 
information  
Operative Information 
• Name of procedure  
• Indication  
• Date of operation  
• Duration of surgery   
• Risk-benefit  ratio 
• Anything that can either 
delay or cancel or 
compromise patient safety  
15 7 4 4 
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Anaesthetic Information 
• Any specific Anaesthetic 
issues 
• Anaesthetic history  
• Suitability of the patient for 
surgery 
• Anaesthetic informed in case 
of complex operation 
• Plan for pain control like 
need for epidural  
• Plan for fluid management  
• Drugs to be administered 
during anaesthesia  
• Use of b-blockers 
• Antihypertensive 
medications  
11 6 5 0 
Personnel 
• Speed of surgeon  
• Name of surgeon  
• Any special 
assistant/competency of 
assistant 
• Presence of competent nurse 
on the day of surgery 
6 3 2 1 
Equipment information 
• Availability of equipment 
6 3  3 
 
Table 6A: Information needs by healthcare professionals in Preoperative Assessment 
and Optimisation Phase 
 
Information Needs 
(Postoperative handover) 
No. of 
healthcare 
professionals 
No. of 
surgeons 
No. of 
Anaesthetists 
No. of 
Nurses 
General details 
• Patient details 
• Medical history 
• Allergy status 
9 2 3 4 
Anaesthetic details 
• Type of anaesthesia/local 
anaesthesia 
• Intraop Anaesthetic course 
and any complications 
• Need/had blood transfusion 
• Medications given in theatre 
• Current status of the patient 
14 3 5 6 
Surgical details 
• Name of operation  
• Intraop Surgical course and 
any complications 
• Blood loss  
• Fluids used for irrigation 
• Type of wound closure 
• Wound dressings 
16 7 3 6 
Post op plan 
• Define range of physiological 
18 7 5 6 
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parameters to be monitored 
• Blood Investigations needed 
• Radiological investigations 
needed  
• Any special investigations 
needed  
• Plan for pain relief  
• IVfluid plan 
• Plan for drains  
• Feeding plan 
• Plan for antibiotics 
• Plan for DVT 
prophylaxis.eg.- TEDS, 
flowtron boot 
• Final destinations  
 
Table 6B: Information needs by healthcare professionals in Postoperative  Handover 
!
Information Needs (Daily 
Ward Care) 
Total 
Healthcare 
professionals 
(n) 
Surgeons 
(n) 
Anaesthetists 
(n) 
Nurses 
(n) 
Assessment needs 
• Previous night events   
• Patients’ progression and 
concerns Examination 
findings  
• Input/output  
• Pain relief 
• Drain amount  
• Recent blood tests   
• Radiological Investigations , 
if any  
• Anything outside the norm of 
recovery of the patient. eg- 
high CRP, distended 
abdomen, excessive pain, 
temperature 
• Any postop complications  
• Any special requirements by 
the patient. eg- certain type 
of pain relief  
• Any medications needs to be 
restarted 
12 7 3 2 
Plan 
• Plan for tubes/drains 
• Antibiotic plan 
• DVT prophylaxis 
• Feeding plan 
• Plan for medications to 
restart, check medications 
• Need of further blood tests 
 
10 3 2 5 
 
Table 6C: Information needs by healthcare professionals in Daily Ward Care 
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Recommendations and guidelines from the Royal College of Anaesthesia, existing 
theatre policies and protocols of our hospital were also reviewed to consolidate the 
checklist. The criteria for items on the checklist were marked yes or no depending on 
the nature of the task. For example, under the category of blood investigations, it was 
scored positive if they were checked by the team prior to operation. Likewise in daily 
ward care, fluid chart or drug chart was deemed checked if the surgical team was 
observed running through the charts. 
The preliminary task list was piloted over a period of two weeks and further modified 
till it reached a workable prototype. Experts advise from consultant surgeons, 
anesthetists, ward, theatre and recovery nurses was taken regarding the content of the 
prototype checklist. The final checklist is shown in Appendix 6A-6D. 
After development of the ITCAS, data was collected from 20 patients undergoing 
major gastrointestinal surgical operations to test the feasibility of collecting data on 
ITC processes using the tool. Triangulation approach using observation, case record 
review and informal interviews with healthcare professionals was used for data 
collection. The patient was tracked from the preoperative phase in the ward via 
intraoperative to postoperative phase in the ward for the first fourty-eight post-
operative hours. On the day before/of surgery researcher interviewed the surgical, 
anesthetic and nursing team about the information they have for the patient 
undergoing surgery. The tasks in the preoperative phase on the checklist were also 
checked in terms of their completeness. During the day of surgery, the researcher 
followed the patient and observed the handover from the ward team to theatre team. 
During the operative phase, the researcher was not present therefore to get the 
intraoperative data, another researcher doing research on equipment failures was 
interviewed to get the information about any major intraoperative events.  
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Subsequently at the end of procedure, the researcher followed the patient in the 
recovery room (Post Anesthetic Care Unit) and observed handover between the OR 
team and recovery team. During the postoperative handover phase the researcher also 
interviewed the recovery nurse after 45 -60 minutes of the handover to assess the 
information she/he had retained from the handover. The next two days (first 48 hrs), 
the researcher accompanied the surgical team on the morning rounds and observed the 
information exchanged among the surgical and nursing team. All the information 
transfer and communication events were recorded through whole the surgical care 
pathway using the ITCAS checklist.   
6.3.2: Data on the impact of information transfer failures 
We also collected data on clinical incidents and adverse events in the process of care 
resulting from information transfer failures. An Adverse event (AE) is usually defined 
as an unintended injury or complication resulting in prolonged hospital stay, disability 
at the time of discharge or death and caused by healthcare management rather than by 
the patient’s underlying disease process. Clinical incidents are described as an 
undesirable event in the management of the patient that need not lead to harm 
nevertheless could have caused harm or actually did cause harm but not enough to 
satisfy the criteria of an adverse event. 
 
6.4: Results 
 There were 12 males and 8 females with a mean age of 57.2 yrs. All the patients 
underwent major gastrointestinal surgery (Total Gastrectomy-5, Subtotal 
Gastrectomy-8. Right Hemicolectomy- 4, Anterior Resection- 1, Limited Ileo-cacel 
resection- 1, Laparoscopic Sigmoid Colectomy-1) 
 116!
 
Information transfer failures were distributed through whole of the continuum of 
surgical care (PAO-29.6%, Preprocedural teamwork- 61.7%, postoperative handover-
52.7% and daily ward care -33.7%) (Fig. 6A) 
 
Fig 6A: Distribution of information transfer failures in four phases of surgical care 
6.4.1: Preoperative Assessment and Optimisation (PAO) 
PAO information consisted of mainly patient specific information, which is needed 
for optimisation and preparation for surgery. Surgical team had 82.9% of patient and 
procedure specific information gathered from 7 different sources (Fig 6B). 
Anaesthetic team had 86.6% of the information while nursing team (i.e. scrub nurse) 
had only one-fourth of the total information. As either one or more member of the 
team acted as a repository of the information, collectively the whole team had all the 
necessary information to undertake the surgery. However, only 27% of the total 
information was known to all the primary team members (surgeon, anaesthetist, 
surgical assistant, scrub and circulating nurse). 
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Fig 6B: Information received by the surgical team by different sources. 
PAS- Computer, S/N- Staff Nurse 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6C: Information possesed by the three disciplines of the theatre team (n=20) 
H/O-History. Sp Ix- Special Investigations. Sp Ref- Specialty Referral 
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Figure 6C and Fig 6D shows the distribution of information among the theatre team 
and information tasks completed by the team respectively. Figure 6D is a spider plot 
(called because of its appearance) plots the value along a separate axis that starts in 
the centre of the chart and ends on the outer ring. The area covered denotes the data 
series  
 
 
Fig 6D: Information tasks in PAP phase A 
 
6.4.2: Preprocedural Teamwork (Fig 6E) 
Preprocedural teamwork involves transfer of patient and patient records from ward to 
theatre and checking patient and procedure related information. Verbal handover from 
ward to theatre was only done in 45% of patients. In 10% of cases there was no 
communication between the ward nurse and theatre team receiving the patient. 
Although, briefing benefits clinical work by revealing knowledge gaps or provoking a 
change in care plan, it was only done in 38.3% cases with each of the components 
such as oral confirmation by surgical team of patient identity, prophylaxis against  
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infection, prophylaxis against deep vein thrombosis (DVT) discussed in less than 50% 
of patients. 
 
Fig 6E: Handover (Ward to Theatre) and Preprocedural Teamwork. TT- Theatre team 
 
6.4.3: Postoperative handover (Fig 6F) 
In interview study discussed in Chapter five, sixteen out of eighteen healthcare 
professionals said that postoperative handover should be verbal and that information 
should come from the three main professional groups in the operating room- surgical, 
anesthetic and nursing. In another survey of 50 healthcare professionals (including 
consultant surgeons, consultant anaesthetists and nurses) by our group, 85% of 
participants agreed that surgical handover should be verbal. Furthermore, a study by 
Patterson et al in which they described 21 handoff strategies in high-risk industries, all 
of them employed interactive face-to-face approach. Thus data collection for this  
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phase was based on the rule that in the absence of any other technology for 
information transfer, a verbal handover should be the gold standard for information 
transferred for safe post-operative recovery and care. Handover process from theatre 
to the postoperative care facility via recovery was observed. During this handover, 
only anesthetist and surgeon were involved in the handover process, in no case, 
theatre nurse was involved in the handover process. 
We classified postoperative handover in three components- Patient specific 
information (PaI), Procedure specific information (surgical)- PrIS and Procedure 
specific information (anaesthetic)- PrIA: 
Patient specific information (PaI)- Only 66% of the patient specific information was 
passed on during the verbal handover. From fig 5, it can be seen that essential 
information such as allergies and comorbidities was not transferred in 45% and 70% 
of the cases respectively. 
Procedure specific information- anaesthetic (PrIA)- 67% of the anaesthetic 
information regarding the intraoperative course and postoperative plan was 
transferred during the handover process. Information about major anesthetic 
complications like intraoperative hypotension and monitoring plan was frequently 
omitted during handover.  
Procedure specific information- Surgical (PrIS) - Surgical handover was mainly 
written and only 30% of the information was transferred verbally, and even this was 
most of the times was relayed to the recovery nurse by the anaesthetists. Information 
regarding intraoperative surgical events and blood loss was transferred only in 15% & 
20% cases respectively. The written handover only relayed 68% of the essential 
information. 
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To confirm whether the written or the verbal mode of information transfer was 
superior we interviewed recovery nurses 45-60 minutes after the handover. We found 
that they possessed only 42% of PrIS compared to 73% of PrIA and 73% of PaI 
suggesting that the verbal mode of transfer was superior to the written mode. We also 
analysed the accuracy of the information possessed by the recovery team and found 
that if the information had not been verbally handed over, the recovery nurse made 
more assumptions. This was 19% in case of PrIS compared to 15% in case of PrIA 
and 8% in case of PaI thus confirming the role of the verbal mode of information 
transfer. 
Overall the handover information degraded from theatre to recovery and subsequently 
from recovery to the ward. While only 55.8% of the essential information was 
transferred from theatre to recovery suite, only 43.9% of that reached the post-
operative care facility or ward. 
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Fig 6F: Postoperative verbal handover including recovery (theatre to recovery) and 
ward handover (recovery to ward) 
 
6.4.4: Daily Ward Care 
Surgical team gathered information from various sources for an integrated assessment 
of the patient (Fig 6G). However, the information was not taken consistently from 
these sources. Ward nurses who are a major source of information were present on the 
morning rounds in 41.7% cases. Although, daily plan was discussed among surgical 
team in all the cases, it was incomplete (Fig 6H). Plan about fluids, drains and 
physiotherapy was not discussed in 40%, 45% and 40% respectively. The 
consequences of these information transfer errors are described below. 
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Fig 6G: Information sources used by the surgical team in decision making 
 
 
Fig 6H: Frequency of the plan made and communicated to whole of the surgical team 
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6.4.5: Clinical Incidents/Adverse events & the role of information transfer 
failures 
There was an evidence that clinically significant steps in information transfer process 
were missed, which at the very least eroded safety margins. For instance in PAO 
phase, blood investigations and allergy status, were not checked by any team member 
in one and two patients respectively. There was a failure to check equipment in 10 
patients in preprocedural teamwork phase.  Also, medication errors were found in ten 
patients in various phases. Anti-hypertensive medication was not prescribed in PAO 
phase in couple of patients and thereby patient did not receive it. Although nine 
patients did not receive DVT prophylaxis preoperatively, only three were due to ITC 
failure. In preprocedural teamwork phase, there was failure to confirm antibiotic 
prophylaxis, which led to delayed administration in two patients. In postoperative 
handover phase, there was a failure to handover the plan for DVT prophylaxis, which 
led to omission of anticoagulant administration on first postoperative day on two 
occasions. During daily ward care, one patient received antibiotics for a prolonged 
period because of failure of team to check the information on the drug chart. Also, 
there was failure to get information from various sources during this phase. In one 
instance as bloods were not checked and hypokalemia was not noticed, this led to 
transient arrhythmia in one patient. There were instances of delayed removal of 
nasogastric tube and abdominal drains in one patient each because of failure to 
communicate the plan to the ward nurse. Two patients did not receive physiotherapy 
and one of them later developed pneumonia. Although it is difficult to suggest that 
lack of physiotherapy led to pneumonia, it was definitely a major contributory factor.  
So overall, information transfer failures associated with 75% of clinical incidents and 
adverse events. 
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6.5: Discussion 
ITCAS serves as a framework for the analysis of information transfer within the 
surgical system. This study has shown that using ITCAS it is possible to study 
different aspects of ITC. The content and face validity of ITCAS can be argued to be 
fairly high as it has been developed with a high level of user involvement. This pilot 
feasibility study has highlighted some of the problems in ITC failures, their 
frequency, their causes to a small extent and their impact on patient safety and quality 
of care. 
The completion of information transfer and communication tasks was some way 
below best-practice guidelines and certainly below the standard of performance 
expected of high-reliability teams. There is no central repository of information for 
the teams in operating room. Although all the information was available to either one 
of the team members in all cases, there is an argument whether every team member 
should have all the information to decrease the information gaps within the team and 
to enhance patient safety. Moreover, absence of information to all the team members 
could create opportunity of potential harm to the patient in the absence of imperative 
solitary information repository. Again there is lack of central information source in 
the postoperative handover phase. Anaesthetists handover the information verbally 
which is largely relevant to them- anaesthetic and patient specific and as surgeons are 
not involved in the handover process, surgical information is poorly handed over. 
Sometimes surgeons’ handover the surgical information or a sign-out is used to 
transfer the information to the anaesthetists who then relay it to the recovery nurses. 
However this is variable and it may not also be ideal as information degrades thus 
verbal may be what we need but even this is not infallible. Thus the solution is a paper  
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or electronic version of postoperative information proforma to prevent the information 
degradation where everybody contributes to in addition to a handover in which 
surgeons also come especially for major/high risk cases. During the ward round 
phase, nurses were absent in more than half of the rounds, thus the decision making 
process was compromised on few occasions. Furthermore this led to lack of 
information transfer to the nurses leading to delay or lack of implementation of the 
daily plan.  
During the observation and interviews with the theatre and recovery team, it appeared 
that information belongs to certain work groups and not others- theatre nurses do not 
possess a large amount of patient and procedure specific information. Recovery 
nurses don’t possess and large amount of PrI-S because of the assumption that its not 
required by them. There is a heavy reliance solely on verbal transfer of information in 
PAO and in post-operative handover and while currently it is the gold standard for 
inter-professional communication there are a number of problems. Verbal handover 
although important leads to decay of information as it crosses various levels as shown 
by our study in postoperative handover phase. Information transfer should be done via 
more than one medium eg verbal and other method (for example written, 
diagrammatic, electronic) as recommended by high—risk industries. Our study also 
highlighted that there is a lack of standardization of information required at different 
phases, for eg. postoperative care information/ instructions on different aspects of care 
are not always transferred.  
This study has remarked upon the importance of understanding the information 
transfer and communication process more fully in order to provide explicit models of 
ITC practices against which teams can be compared. It is necessary to emphasize, 
fears may be expressed by members of surgical teams that observation may be used  
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for ‘surveillance’, checking up and, possibly, as a basis for disciplinary 
action(Vincent et al. 2004). We have stressed to the teams that our data will only be 
used as a research tool and the purpose of such observations is not to study 
individuals, but processes. Moreover, we expect that providing quantifiable, objective 
feedback to clinicians and their organization from a series of observations will assist 
teams in identifying and targeting behaviors for improvement and training and will 
facilitate optimal medical error prevention and promote a culture of safety. 
Our study has certain limitations. The completion of tasks, while necessary, does not 
completely capture the quality and efficacy of the communication. Communication 
measures in other areas have also sought to capture the other parameters of 
communication like clarity, content, efficacy, acknowledgement and other aspects 
characteristic of highly performing teams. In any observational study, the question of 
authencity of data is of central concern. In addition to mechanisms employed to 
minimize the hawthorne effect, the observer recorded evidence of possible effect in 
the field notes. Furthermore, informal interviews with randomly selected participants 
following each observation period contributed to our sense of the data’s 
representativeness. Also, working group members commented on whether data 
seemed representative or not; on no occasion expert question the data. Daily ward 
care was just observed for two days and not for whole of the hospital stay because we 
believe that it is the most critical period of the postoperative phase and ITC practices 
during this phase should reflect the whole of the ward care. In our study, we did not 
look at significant relationships between task completion and complications. Although 
essential, outcome data should be studied with caution, as appropriate risk 
stratification must be applied including technical skills for proper analysis. 
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6.6: Conclusion 
At the end of this extensive development we had a fully comprehensive Information 
Transfer and Communication Assessment tool for Surgery (ITCAS), which was 
feasible to use. It allowed us to quantify the distribution of ITC failures in whole of 
the surgical journey of the patient. Albeit, further assessment of reliability and validity 
is required, ITCAS may serve as a useful measure of evaluating and validating 
methods of improving communication in simulation and in operating theatre. 
This assessment showed that most of the ITC failures occur in preprocedural 
teamwork and postoperative handover phase. Preprocedural teamwork phase has 
already been looked upon and WHO surgical safety checklist developed has shown a 
tremendous improvement in ITC in this phase, thereby also causing a significant 
reduction in morbidity and mortality. Subsequently incorporation of the checklist in 
this phase has become mandatory.  
Postoperative handover phase as demonstrated also has huge information gap causing 
information transfer and communication failure. This phase between the OR and 
recovery, is a critical phase in the surgical care pathway. Kluger et al(Kluger and 
Bullock 2002) reported that 14% of 419 adverse events in the recovery were due to 
communication failures in the handover process. Another descriptive study(Anwari 
2002) highlighted that 67% of anaesthetists failed to transfer all the essential 
information in the handover. Despite this, current postoperative handover processes 
are highly unreliable, complex and variable and little data exists on how providers 
exchange information and the nature of these failures during this process. Much focus 
has been given to safety-compromising factors in the operating room(Christian et al. 
2006) and as discussed above recently by the WHO (World Health Organisation) on 
preoperative checklist and briefing(Haynes et al. 2009a). The postoperative phase has  
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largely been ignored despite the fact that is a common area for communication failure 
in surgical care.  Therefore we chose to study this phase further and planned to 
improve the information transfer in this phase by implementing an intervention. 
So next three chapters are on Postoperative handover phase. First chapter is to identify 
the information transfer failures in this phase and also to find out from the clinicians 
the solutions to improve the ITC. In the next chapter, an assessment tool was 
developed to quantify these failures and also to evaluate the efficacy of interventions 
developed to improve them. In the final chapter we have done a pre-post intervention 
design study to assess the efficacy of standardizing postoperative handover through a 
new postoperative handover protocol.  
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CHAPTER 7: POSTOPERATIVE HANDOVER- A 
SYSTEMATIC EXPLORATION OF PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS: INTERVIEW & DELPHI OF 
POSTOPERATIVE CHECKLIST 
 
7.1: Introduction 
 
Handover is defined as “the transfer of professional responsibility and accountability 
for some or all aspects of care for a patient or group of patients to another person or 
professional group on a temporary or permanent basis”(Vincent et al. 2004). Good 
quality handover is central to an effective heath care system. The primary intention of 
any handover is the accurate
 
transfer of information about a patient’s state and care
 
plan, to ensure the safety and continuity of patient care(Sherlock 1995). System 
approach to surgery(Vincent et al. 2004) highlights communication or information 
transfer as one of the important components to influence outcomes. This is made even 
more important with the new shift systems(Lee et al. 2003) and new working hours 
regulation for doctors(Fernandez and Williams 2009; Nasmyth et al. 1991; West et al. 
2007). 
When this information is lost or miscommunicated, errors are likely to occur. Not 
surprisingly therefore, handover failures have been identified as a significant source 
of medical failures and account for 20% of malpractice claims in the USA(Singh et al. 
2007). The Joint Commission reported that “communication failures” were the root 
cause in 70% of sentinel events(1995-2004), of which at least half were due to 
communication breakdowns during handovers. Furthermore, inaccurate handover of  
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patient details results in wasted time and resources as nurses attempt to acquire 
correct information from various sources (Ye et al. 2007).   
The surgical patient is more vulnerable to handover errors than patients in other 
clinical specialties because of the prodigious number of checkpoints and transitions 
that occur throughout the preoperative, intraoperative and postoperative phases of 
care. Transitions between these phases are prone to risk. Many of the problems 
regarding inconsistent and poor quality handovers have been attributed to the lack of a 
supporting framework or predetermined format for clinicians trying to transfer 
information(Hughes and Clancy 2007). This is in contrast to other high reliability 
industries who have developed formal handover protocols(Lardner 1996). Although 
caution should be undertaken when drawing parallels between healthcare and these 
industries they are for the most part quite comparable to healthcare.  Therefore it 
would be appropriate to adapt specific industrial practices to make the process 
safer(Patterson 2007). Checklists and other techniques have been adopted and have 
been introduced and shown to improve handover(Catchpole et al. 2007; Volpp and 
Grande 2003; Young et al. 2000). However, these studies(Miller 1998) have taken a 
top-down approach without any real understanding of the problems. They have not 
been generally preceded by an analysis of the vulnerabilities within the existing 
system; treatment has been prescribed without prior diagnosis. Moreover, checklists 
introduced have not been validated(Alvarado et al. 2006). Also the WHO Surgical 
Safety checklist (Haynes et al. 2009a) introduced recently only covers the 
preoperative phase. 
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7.2: Aims 
This study was undertaken 
• To determine the key ITC (Information transfer and communication) 
failures/problems in postoperative handover process (phase 1) 
• To define responsibilities for information exchange (phase 1) 
• To develop a solution which is evidence and user-based (phase 1) 
• To validate that solution (phase 2) 
 
7.3: Methods 
Study was done in two phases  
Phase 1- Identification of ITC failures in postoperative handover and development of 
postoperative handover protocol (POP) using semi-structured interviews 
Phase 2- Validation of POP using Delphi Technique 
 
7.3.1: Phase 1  
7.3.1.1: Participants 
Same eighteen healthcare professionals of varying levels of experience, including 
surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses (Theatre, Recovery and Ward Nurses) who 
participated in the previous interview study (Chapter 5) were interviewed for the 
following after the end of questions mentioned in chapter five. This data although was 
collected initially, it was not analysed. After deciding to study postoperative handover 
phase, I reexplored and reanalyzed the data. Surgeons’, Anaesthetists’ and Nurses’ 
views on the following topics were explored: 
1. ITC failures across the postoperative handover phase. 
2. Who should handover? 
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3. What can be done to reduce the communication and information transfer 
errors in postoperative handover? 
4. Key components of postoperative handover protocol. 
Data collection, analysis, interpretation and quality assurance of the data was done via 
same methodology as described earlier in the interview study (Chapter 5). 
7.3.2: Phase 2- Validation 
Delphi method was used to validate the list of information identified from the 
interviews and identify the most relevant. Fifty healthcare professionals including 10 
consultant vascular surgeons, 10 consultant gastrointestinal surgeons, 15 consultant 
anaesthetists and 15 recovery nurses from three hospital sites were asked to rate the 
importance of the information. A Likert Scale from Not Important (1) to Very 
Important (5) was used. After this first round, the mean scores and standard deviations 
were calculated. In the subsequent rounds, an anonymous summary of the experts’ 
forecasts of the means and standard deviation from the scores of the previous round 
was provided. The iterations were repeated until consensus among the expert panel 
was achieved by statistical analysis. Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient was 
calculated using SPSS (SPSS, Chicago,III) after each round to measure consensus 
within panelist group. This test estimates the internal reliability for a group of 
multiple covariates that have been ranked in a scale fashion(Cronbach 1951). A 
Cronbach's ! of .8 was considered to have good internal reliability. In subsequent 
rounds, the increased value of the Cronbach's ! indicated consensus. Literature on the 
Delphi technique does not stipulate at what level consensus can be deemed to have 
been reached, therefore a 80% cut off value was selected which correlated to a mean 
score of 4.0. The information which was rated above this value was selected to be 
included in the postoperative handover proforma. A third round was not required as  
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pre-determined criteria for consensus of all items was achieved and data saturation 
was reached.  
 
7.4: Results 
7.4.1: Phase 1 
7.4.1.1: Participants 
Same participants as in interview study (Chapter 5) 
7.4.1.2: Coding reliability 
Similar correlations were done as mentioned in Chapter 5. The correlations obtained 
were high: Postoperative ITC failures: Pearson’s r = 0.75, p < 0.01; key components 
of postoperative handover proforma: r = 0.85, p < 0.01 (all Ns = 18). Thus, the 
background of the researcher (surgery or psychology) did not affect theme extraction 
from the transcripts.  
In the following sections, data relating to key themes is summarised and supported by 
verbatim quotations. The code letter suffixed to each quotation refers to the surgeon 
(S), anaesthetist (A), ward nurse (WN), theatre nurse (TN) and recovery nurse (RN). 
7.4.1.3: Postoperative handover Failures  
Postoperative handover failures were classified as per classification used earlier in 
interview study (Source, Transmission and Receiver) (Table 7A). Many of the failures 
uncovered in this phase were due to an incomplete handover. Healthcare professionals 
suggested that information was missing, incomplete, scattered or there was an 
information overload. The post-operative handover process is informal, unstructured 
and inconsistent. “I think that the problem in post-operative handover is most likely to  
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be forgetting to tell somebody… I think there is scope for more formality and 
recording of handover and handover protocols such that you don’t forget to mention 
the low blood pressure or to give steroids” (A4).  As a result, crucial information such 
as the patient’s comorbidities, allergies and a plan for post-operative pain relief is not  
consistently transferred. In addition, the surgical team is often not involved in the 
handover, so crucial surgical information may not be formally handed over. 
Information on intra-operative events is handed over by the anaesthesic team who 
may not be aware of surgery related issues or there may be a failure to perceive the 
relevance of an event that may potentially impact on the patient’s recovery. 
Participants felt that that the lack of structured handover also leads to an information 
overload on the recovery and ward nurses and combined with difficulty in to 
prioritizing information, crucial information gets buried. Moreover, the absence of a 
single repository of information means that information is difficult to access when 
needed.  
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Table 7A: Information transfer and communication failures in 
Postoperative handover 
 
Information transfer Failures  No. of healthcare 
professionals 
No. of times 
Source Failures 
• No formal structured process 
• Postoperative handover not 
done/incomplete 
• Poor/illegible written handover 
• Too much information, difficult to 
differentiate important from 
unimportant 
• Information scattered 
• No consistent team for handover 
 
15 
(S=6, A=4, N=5) 
24 
Transmission failures 
• Debriefing does not happen 
• Operation notes not transferred 
3 
(S=1, A=1, N=1) 
3 
Receiver Failures 
• Nurse multitasking, not receiving 
complete information 
 
2 
(S=0, A=1, N=1) 
2 
!
7.4.1.4: Who should be part of the handover process? 
All except one participant said that both surgeon and Anaesthetist should be present 
during the handover process. Twelve out of eighteen interviewee also mentioned that 
theatre nurse should also be involved in the handover process. 
7.4.1.5: What can be done to reduce the communication and information transfer 
errors in the handover process? 
All the healthcare professionals agreed that postoperative handover should be 
structured and there should be a standardised handover protocol or electronic 
checklist. One of the opponents of the checklist also suggested that there is a need to 
standardise this process by some means; “!"# # $# %&'%()!*+# !*# +,#-'#.*'/0# !+# *&,.)/#-'#
.*'/#$*#$#1'&!%)'#+,#/'"!2'#*+3.%+.3'#$2/#%&$24'#%.)+.3'0#3$+&'3#+&$2#$#%&'%()!*+#+,#
-'#.*'/#+,#!563,1'#6$+!'2+#*$"'+78#"#$%&!
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7.4.1.6: Postoperative handover protocol   
Based upon interview the initial 27-item checklist was identified which is shown in 
Table 7B. This was subsequently validated by Delphi method. 
 
7.4.2: Phase 2 
7.4.2.1: Delphi 
Based upon the results of phase 1, key components of the postoperative handover 
protocol were subsequently collated under the section headings: Patient specific 
information, surgical information and anaesthetic information. Cronbachs alpha for 
the first round was 0.963. Although there was internal consistency, there were many 
criteria that were not clearly determined as unimportant or important. These findings 
suggested a second round would strengthen the importance ranking of the criteria. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the second round increased to 0.976 and the importance of the 
items appeared to be more clearly delineated. A total of 22 items had a mean 
importance score greater than 4.0 and were included in the final postoperative 
handover proforma. Table 7B & Figure 7A shows the results of Delphi and final 
postoperative handover proforma respectively. 
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Table 7B: Delphi Criteria for a Postoperative Handover Proforma 
 
1
st
 iteration 2
nd
 iteration  
Mean ± SD Mean ± SD 
Medical Handover 
1. Patient details 4.8 ± 0.75 4.9 ± 0.4 
2. Comorbidities 4.5 ± 0.8 4.6 ± 0.57 
3. Allergies Status 4.8 ± 0.78 4.9 ± 0.46 
4. Surgical procedure 4.8 ± 0.71 4.9 ± 0.24 
Anaesthetic Handover 
5. Position of patient in 
theatre 2.9 ± 1.05 2.9 ± 1.01 
6. Current status of the 
patient 4.7 ± 0.74 4.8 ± 0.43 
7. Any intraoperative 
anaesthetic complications 4.6 ± 0.82 4.7 ± 0.58 
8. Type of Anaesthesia 4.5 ± 0.94 4.6 ± 0.78 
9. Monitoring & Range for 
Physiological 
parameters.eg-BP,Urine 
output 4.5 ± 0.84 4.6 ± 0.63 
10. Plan for IV fluids 4.5 ± 0.83 4.6 ± 0.6 
11. Anticipated Postoperative 
problems specially 
bleeding, pain and airway 
problems 4.8 ± 0.72 4.9 ± 0.32 
12. Analgesia plan 4.7 ± 0.74 4.8 ± 0.41 
13. Destination of patient 3.8 ± 1.05 3.9 ± 1 
14. Contact number of person 
in case of problems 4.3 ± 1.08 4.3 ± 0.97 
Surgical Handover 
15. Plan for chest physio 3.3 ± 1.04 3.3 ± 0.99 
16. Duration 3.4 ± 1.12 3.5 ± 1.06 
17. Blood loss 4.3 ± 0.87 4.4 ± 0.7 
18. Intraoperative  surgical 
course & complications 4.5 ± 0.8 4.6 ± 0.56 
19. Wound closure 3 ± 1.07 3 ± 1.02 
20. Dressing 3.1 ± 1.09 3.2 ± 1.04 
21. Plan for Antibiotic 3.9 ± 0.97 4 ± 0.85 
22. Medication plans- Drugs to 
be restarted 3.9 ± 1 4 ± 0.91 
23. Feeding plan 3.5 ± 1.16 3.6 ± 1.1 
24. Postop Investigations 4 ± 0.99 4 ± 0.89 
25. DVT prophylaxis 3.9 ± 1.03 4 ± 0.95 
26. Handover to oncall person 3.9 ± 1.05 4 ± 0.98 
27. Plan for tubes and drains 3.9 ± 0.93 4 ± 0.82 
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7.5: Discussion 
In this study, we have made an attempt to identify the problems in Postoperative 
handover, defined roles of various team members and importantly developed and 
validated a user-based potential solution. Our study demonstrated that handover 
presently is characterised by fragmented information being transferred by an 
incomplete team. The effectiveness of the handover is highly variable. This is in 
concordance with previous studies findings(Smith et al. 2008) where incomplete 
information transfer has compromised patient safety in the recovery room(Kluger and 
Bullock 2002). However, the majority of these studies(Anwari 2002; Smith et al. 
2008) that have investigated the handover process have been primarily descriptive in 
outlining problems. Our study apart from identifying the problems took the important 
next step of identifying and validating a strategy for improvement. Firstly we found 
that surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses agreed that all members of the multi-
disciplinary team should be part of the handover process so as to ensure that accurate 
information on all aspects of patient care is correctly transferred. Secondly, all 
participants agreed that there was a need for a structured protocol so as to prevent 
omissions of any critical information. This is the first study to describe a 
communication protocol for the postoperative phase. Other potential methods of 
improving handover have included a six-sigma approach adapted from the automotive 
industry(Mistry 2009), and applying a Formula-one pit stop strategy to improve the 
handover to the Intensive care unit(Catchpole et al. 2007). Our protocol has 
similarities to these methods but importantly is based upon the needs of the end-users 
– a factor which is likely to make it more acceptable to the surgical community. The 
bottom-up approach employed in this study has been known to be particularly useful 
when implementing organizational change(Bate et al. 2004).  
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In addition, we have also employed careful qualitative methodology including 
sampling until saturation, multiple coders and member-checking to achieve rigour in 
our research. Furthermore we validated our solution with 50 healthcare professionals 
(significantly more than the 10-20 participants usually recruited for a Delphi 
approach) from 3 hospital sites making our results more generalisable.  
There were some limitations. In the first instance, we interviewed only 18 healthcare 
professionals. Although we did achieve saturation, all interviews were conducted in 
one hospital site so the problems encountered in handover may be specific to that site. 
We did however overcome this by validating our protocol across 3 hospital sites 
ensuring its utility and applicability to a wider audience.  
A POP has significant potential implications for improving patient safety across the 
continuum of care. We envisage that this will empower health care professionals so 
that they can raise concerns regarding incomplete information.  
 
7.6: Conclusion 
The present study identified that the postoperative handover is informal, unstructured 
and variable and the information transfer is incomplete. There is an imminent need for 
standardisation of postoperative handover. A handover protocol was developed and 
validated to ensure the standardisation. This handover protocol will be used to 
develop a new handover protocol to improve the postoperative handover process. But 
before the implementation of the new handover protocol we need to develop an 
assessment tool, which can assess the efficacy of the protocol. Therefore, in the next 
chapter we will discuss the development of postoperative handover assessment tool 
and will also evaluate its feasibility, reliability and validity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EVALUATION OF POST-
OPERATIVE HANDOVER USING A TOOL TO ASSESS 
INFORMATION TRANSFER AND TEAMWORK 
8.1: Introduction 
Although surveys(Anwari 2002; Horn et al. 2004) have been conducted to assess 
handover, very few studies(Anwari 2002; Catchpole et al. 2007) have been able to 
accurately measure the scale of the problem. Some tools exist to measure teamwork 
processes in preoperative(Haynes et al. 2009a) and intra-operative phases(Lingard et 
al. 2004; Undre et al. 2006) but not in the post-operative period. There are very few 
tools for the latter and those that exist have not been adequately validated(Anwari 
2002; Catchpole et al. 2007). A thorough literature review failed to reveal a method 
for studying post-operative handover that was feasible to use and one that has been 
shown to possess adequate validity and reliability. Thus there is a need to develop and 
test a postoperative handover assessment tool to help clinicians systematically assess 
the quality and efficiency of handovers. Moreover, measures are also needed to 
evaluate the efficacy of interventions developed to improve them. 
  
8.2: Aims 
The aim of this study was  
• To develop and assess the feasibility and validity of a postoperative handover 
assessment tool (PoHAT) for major general surgical procedures and gain a 
better understanding of handover practices at two large European hospitals. 
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8.3: Methods 
In the development of the tool, we sought to establish the following key 
features(Aggarwal et al. 2007; Sevdalis et al. 2009): 
• Feasibility- PoHAT should be reasonably easy to use in a Postoperative care 
unit (PACU). 
• Reliability- PoHAT should consistently and reliably measure the postoperative 
handover process. 
• Validity- PoHAT should capture what it purports to capture. 
 
8.3.1: Development of postoperative handover assessment tool 
A pilot study was done to understand and identify the main component of handover. 
After the observation of five postoperative handovers, we identified three main 
components that an assessment tool should capture: 
• Information- It should include the essential information that should be 
transferred from theatre team to PACU team. 
• Tasks- It should evaluate the tasks which need to be performed during the 
handover such as setting up monitors and alarms, placing the drains and 
urinary bag etc safely and appropriately. 
• Teamwork- it should measure teamwork. Teamwork is an essential component 
for the handover which impacts on information transfer and task performance. 
A triangulation of research methodologies including Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA), interviews and literature review was used to develop a 
comprehensive assessment tool.  
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The information component of the tool was developed through FMEA and interviews 
with clinicians and nurses. Information transfer and communication process 
throughout the postoperative handover was initially mapped using Failure Modes and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) discussed earlier. Also, the information needs of this phase 
were subsequently identified using semi-structured interviews described earlier. 
8.3.1.1: Literature review(Anwari 2002; Catchpole et al. 2007) and Royal College of 
Anaesthetists guidelines  
A list of tasks were identified and collated under the section headings: equipment, 
patient-specific and nurse-specific tasks.  
The teamwork component of assessment tool was adapted from the postoperative 
component of OTAS (Sevdalis et al. 2009; Undre et al. 2006; Undre et al. 2007) 
(Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery), an observational tool developed 
by our research unit to assess teamwork in the operating theatre.  
An initial list of essential information items and tasks was developed and 
subsequently validated. 
8.3.2: Validation and Reliability of  PoHAT tool 
8.3.2.1: The Delphi method 
A random sample of 50 healthcare professionals including 10 staff vascular surgeons, 
10 staff gastrointestinal surgeons, 15 consultant anaesthetists and 15 recovery nurses, 
from 3 hospital sites were asked to answer a questionnaire. To ensure that the experts 
had sufficient knowledge and experience of the topic, consultants (attending 
physicians) with minimum 2 years experience and nurses with minimum 5 years  
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experience were included in the study. The questionnaire included a list of the 
essential items of information and tasks derived from interviews, FMEA and literature 
review. For each component on the list, each participant indicated whether that 
parameter should be incorporated in the final postoperative handover assessment tool 
(yes/no). Items that gained over 90% agreement in Round 1 were included and were 
not resubmitted to Round 2.  In round 2, items on which no consensus was reached 
were resubmitted to the same healthcare professionals with a summary of the results 
of Round 1. A third round was not required as the predetermined criteria for 
consensus was achieved and data saturation was reached. Consensus was defined a 
priori as greater than 90% of panelists being in agreement with an item. The 
methodology used for the Delphi approach has been described in the previous chapter. 
Table 8A shows the results of 2 rounds of Delphi technique and Table 8B shows the 
final assessment tool. Round 1 resulted in inclusion of 18 items. In Round 2, 14 items 
were assessed. This resulted in further inclusion of 11 items on the assessment tool. In 
total, 29 items were included after two rounds.  
Data was collected for a total of 100 (n=50 at each site) handovers of patients across 
two sites at London and Basel (Switzerland). Data from the 50 post-operative 
handovers observed in the London site was used to establish validity and reliability of 
PoHAT, as teamwork assessment could only be done at this site. Assessment of 
teamwork requires prior extensive training experience for behavior ratings to be 
robust and valid (Sevdalis et al. 2009); only the London observer was trained to use 
the teamwork component of the assessment tool.  
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8.3.3: Evaluation of postoperative handover 
The tool was tested in the Post Anaesthetic Care Units (PACU) of two large acute 
teaching hospitals in London, United Kingdom and in Basel, Switzerland.  
8.3.3.1: Sample population: Data was collected for a total of 100 (n=50 at each site) 
handovers of patients undergoing major vascular and gastrointestinal surgical 
procedures.  
8.3.3.2: Procedure: A trained researcher observed the handovers using PoHAT at 
each centre. The data collector at Basel received training and supervision from the 
primary investigator (KN) at London. Twenty per cent of the handovers were 
observed by a second observer to test inter-rater reliability. A single observer 
examined the three components of handover: information items, task performance and 
teamwork using the final assessment tool.  The observers tried to ensure that they did 
not influence the handover process in any way. The observers did not prompt the team 
or provide feedback unless patient safety was being directly compromised. (Although 
there was no occasion where observer had to intervene)  
8.3.3.3: Outcome measures: 
The primary outcome measures were information omissions, task errors (in the 
measurement tool) and a teamwork score. Secondary outcomes included duration of 
handover and distractions during the handover. 
• Information omissions- the quality of the information was assessed using 21-
point checklist (Table 2). These were subdivided into patient specific 
information (PSI), anaesthetic information (AI) and surgical information (SI). 
Information was recorded as an omission when it was not mentioned during 
the handover.  
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• Task errors- Task error checklist (Table 2) consisted of eight tasks. The eight 
tasks to be performed were identified from the literature. Task errors were 
classified as errors when either they were not performed or performed 
erroneously. For example, if drains were not visible and hidden under the bed 
sheet or patient did not have oxygen mask, these were classed as an error. 
• Teamwork score was calculated using a modified version of the Observational 
Teamwork Assessment for Surgery (OTAS, a validated tool for assessing 
teamwork in surgery (Sevdalis et al. 2009; Undre et al. 2007) (Table 2). This 
included five behavioral components: communication, coordination, 
cooperation, team monitoring/situational awareness and leadership. As 
previously mentioned, it was possible to measure this only at the London site. 
• Duration- Overall duration of the handover was measured from the point the 
patient entered PACU to the point theatre staff left PACU. 
• Distractions- The presence or absence of distractions was recorded for each 
handover. Distraction was defined as per a pre-specified list of 
categories(Healey et al. 2006) i.e. phone, bleep, case irrelevant 
communication(Sevdalis et al. 2007) (any conversation irrelevant to the case), 
external staff (anyone not part of the postoperative handover team – except the 
observer).   
 
8.3.4: Statistical Analysis 
Data analyses were carried out using SPSS v 16.0 (SPSS Inc, Chicago IL). We carried 
out inter-rater reliability analyses between observers using Spearman correlation 
coefficients. In addition, Spearman rho correlation coefficients between different  
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components of the handover as rated by the trained observer were carried out, and 
chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests were used where appropriate. 
 
8.4: Results 
FMEA and interviews identified 24 information items. These were subdivided into 
patient specific information (PSI), anesthetic information (AI) and surgical 
information (SI). The eight tasks to be performed were identified from the literature. 
Teamwork components were derived from OTAS and included five behavioral 
components: communication, coordination, cooperation, situational awareness and 
leadership.  
8.4.1: Delphi 
Table 8A shows the results of 2 rounds of Delphi technique and Table 8B shows the 
final assessment tool. Round 1 resulted in inclusion of 18 items. In Round 2, 14 items 
were assessed. This resulted in further inclusion of 11 items on the assessment tool. In 
total, 29 items were included after two rounds.  
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Table 8A: Results of Delphi Procedure!
First Round 
 
Second Round Consensus Round 
 
Inclusion 
 
 
Exclusion 
 
 
Result Inclusion 
 
 
Exclusion 
 
 
Result 
 
 
Result 
I. Patient Specific Information 
1. Patient name  47 3 I - - - I 
2. Age 37 13 E 46 4 I I 
3. Weight 20 30 E 11 39 E E 
4. Medical History 46 4 I - - - I 
5. Previous relevant 
surgery 
40 10 E 42 8 E E 
6. Allergy Status 45 5 I - - - I 
7. Diagnosis 42 8 E 46 4 I I 
8. Name of procedure 46 4 I - - - I 
9.   Patient current 
condition and vitals 
45 5 I - - - I 
II. Anaesthetic Information 
10. Intraop 
anaesthetic course & 
any complications 
47 3 I - - - I 
11. Blood transfusion 
(had/needs) 
46 4 I - - - I 
12. Relevant 
medications patient 
received in theatre 
45 5 I - - - I 
13. Plan for 
monitoring (Vitals 
parameter range) 
47 3 I - - - I 
14. Plan for 
Intravenous fluids 
45 5 I - - - I 
15. Plan for pain 
relief 
48 2 I - - - I 
16. Plan for lines. Eg- 
central venous, 
arterial 
38 12 E 45 5 I I 
17. Postoperative 
investigations. Eg- 
Hb, Cxray 
39 11 E 46 4 I I 
III. Surgical  Information 
18. Intraoperative 
surgical course & any 
complications 
47 3 I - - - I 
19. Blood loss 45 5 I - - - I 
20. Number of drains 
& plan 
35 15 E 46 4 I I 
21. Plan for 
nasogastric 
tube/feeding 
43 7 E 46 4 I I 
22.  DVT prophylaxis 
plan 
42 8 E 48 2 I I 
23.  Antibiotic Plan 39 11 E 45 5 I I 
24. Final destination 
of patient  
36 14 E 44 6 E E 
IV. Tasks 
26. Monitors and 
alarms set up before 
36 14 E 46 4 I I 
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handover 
27. Pump ready 
before handover 
46 4 I - - - I 
28. Lines arranged 
and set up before 
anaesthetist leaves 
36 14 E 45 5 I I 
29. Urine bag located 
appropriately 
33 17 E 46 4 I I 
30. Drains located 
safely 
45 5 I - - - I 
32. Patent should 
have oxygen mask 
48 2 I - - - I 
33. Patient should be 
well covered 
49 1 I - - - I 
34. Patient should 
have good pain relief 
46 4 I - - - I 
!
I= Item included in the assessment tool when there it was answered, “yes” by > 45 of participants. E= Excluded when it was 
answered, “yes” by < 45 participants.!
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Teamwork 
1) Leadership Very bad             Very Good 
  0                  1  2  3  4  5  6 
2) Communication    Very bad             Very Good 
0                  1  2  3  4  5  6 
3) CoordinationVery bad               Very Good 
0                  1  2  3  4  5  6 
4) Cooperation Very bad                                                                                                      Very Good 
0                  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Assessment tool 
Information 
! !
Patient Information  Yes No 
1. Patient Name   
2. Age   
3. Medical History   
4. Allergy Status   
5. Diagnosis   
6. Name of procedure   
7. Patient current condition and vitals   
Anaesthetic Information   
8. Intraoperative anaesthetic course & any complications   
9. Blood transfusion (had/needs), location of blood bags   
10. Relevant medications patient received in theatre   
11. Plan for monitoring (Vitals parameter range and action)   
12. Plan for intravenous fluids   
13. Plan for pain relief   
14. Plan for lines. Eg- central venous, arterial   
15. Postoperative investigations. Eg- Hb, Cxray   
Surgical Information    
16. Intra operative surgical course & any complications   
17. Blood loss   
18. Number of drains & plan   
19. DVT prophylaxis plan   
20. Antibiotic Plan   
21. Feeding Plan   
Tasks   
Equipment Tasks Yes No 
1. Monitors and alarms set up before handover   
2. Pump ready before the handover   
3. Lines arranged and set up    
4. Urine bag located appropriately    
5. Drains located safely    
Patient-Specific Tasks   
6. Patient having oxygen    
7. Patient well covered                 
8. Patient having good pain relief   
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5) Situational Awareness           Very bad                                  Very Good                   
0                  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Table 8B: Final Assessment Tool 
8.4.2: Validity and reliability of PoHAT 
The high user involvement in the interviews and the Delphi technique is testimony to 
the content validity of PoHAT. Inter-rater reliability was excellent for all the three 
components assessed (Table 8C). There were no significant correlations between 
information omissions and overall task errors (Spearman rho=0.21, p=0.14) and 
teamwork (rho=0.17, p=0.33). There was also no correlation between overall task 
errors and teamwork (rho=0.27, p=0.11). 
 Spearman Correlation 
(r) 
P value 
Information 0.866 < 0.001 
Tasks 0.914 < 0.001 
Teamwork 0.829 < 0.001 
Overall 0.964 < 0.001 
 
Table 8C:  Inter rater reliability as calculated by Spearman Correlation Coefficient 
8.4.3: Evaluation of handover 
8.4.3.1: Demographics 
Handovers of one hundred major gastrointestinal and vascular procedures were 
observed. The median age (IQR) and sex ratio of the patients at London and Basel 
sites was 64 yrs (48.8-71) and 5:3 and 63.5 yrs (58.8-75.5) and 4:3, respectively. 
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8.4.3.2: Information Omissions 
Overall information omissions across both the sites were 9.1 median omissions per 
handover with PSI, AI and SI being 2.6, 3.5 and 2.9 information omissions per 
handover respectively. Comparison between individual centres revealed no significant 
difference in overall information omissions (9.1 Vs 9, "
2
 = 0.06, p=0.807). 
Information omissions for PSI were not significantly different between sites (2.6 Vs 
2.7, "
2
= 0.05, p= 0.823), however there was significantly more information omissions 
per handover of AI at the Basel site compared to the London site (3.4 Vs 2.8, "
2
= 
5.65, p<0.05). Conversely, there were fewer SI omissions at the Basel site as 
compared to the London site (2.8 Vs 3.7, "
2
= 18.46, p<0.001). Twelve patients (24%) 
at the Basel site had more than ten overall information omissions compared to 18 
patients (36%) at the London site.   
8.4.3.3: Task Errors 
Overall number of task errors in the 100 handovers was 2.9 median errors per 
handover with equipment and patient specific tasks errors being 2.5 and 0.4 errors per 
handover respectively. Comparison between centres showed significantly more 
overall task errors at the London site (3.5 Vs 2.5 "
2 
= 12.67,
 
p<0.001). Although there 
was no significant difference for the patient-specific task errors between the two sites 
(0.5 Vs 0.3, "
2 
= 1.48, p=0.22), equipment task errors were significantly higher at 
London compared to Basel (3.1 Vs 2.2, "
2
= 13.14, p<0.001). 13 patients (26%) had 
more than three overall tasks errors per handover at each of the sites.  
8.4.3.4: Duration & Distractions 
The median duration of the postoperative handover was significantly longer at 
London site by 3 minutes compared to Basel site,  (8min Vs 5 mins; Mann-Whitney  
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Z= 2.20, p= 0.02). Distractions were common during the handover at both the sites 
(35%) however it occurred in half of the handovers in Basel, compared to a fifth of 
handovers in London. (25 vs 10, "
2 
= 10.98,
 
p<0.001). Although there were no 
significant correlations between distractions and task errors (rho=0.002 p=0.99) and 
distractions and teamwork (rho=0.81, p=0.664), there was a moderate sized 
correlation between distractions and information omissions (rho=0.33, p=0.03).  
 
8.5: Discussion 
We have described the development of a tool, which can be used to objectively 
evaluate postoperative handover and provide data for actionable feedback and 
learning. It can also be used to evaluate various improvement initiatives.  
In this study, we combined empirical evidence with expert opinion for the 
development of the tool. The tool consisted of all the parameters that emerged via 
independent observation, and were subsequently validated (i.e., considered essential) 
by healthcare providers. By doing this we believe that we have established its face 
and content validity.  The PoHAT demonstrated excellent inter-observer reliability 
and addresses the likelihood of bias by a single observer. The low correlations 
between the three components of PoHAT suggest that they evaluate different aspects 
of the handover process. Thus a thorough evaluation will have to involve all three 
components. The present study has also furnished preliminary evidence that the tool 
can be used by a trained observer in the context of training (i.e., it is feasible), internal 
consistency (i.e. reliable) and that it satisfies aspects of content validity. 
The Delphi method used has three key elements: (1) anonymity of participants, (2) 
controlled feedback to the participants, and (3) statistical group response(Dalkey 
1963). This is a research technique aimed at achieving consensus among a panel of  
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experts on a specific issue and has been successfully adapted in areas including 
medicine, psychology and nursing(Graham et al. 2003; Murphy et al. 1998; Pill 1971; 
Powell 2003).  It has advantages over other consensus-establishing methods. It is 
swift, inexpensive and allows combining the knowledge and abilities of an expert 
group anonymously. Alternative methods of reaching consensus have been criticized 
for producing results, which are biased towards the views of the most vocal member 
of the group, are recognized to be prone to domination by powerful individuals, their 
personally traits and seniority(Milholland et al. 1973). In addition, the study had a 
large panel size for Delphi and it has been shown that reliability of the method 
increases with the size of the panel(Dalkey). The other advantage is that the tool can 
be used by an observer from a variety of backgrounds, with a small provision of 
training.  
This study has also shown that there is considerable scope for improvement in the 
quality of post-operative handover. Forty-eight percent of the overall essential 
information was omitted during the handover at both study sites. Although there were 
some differences in the omissions of patient-specific, anesthetic-specific and surgeon-
specific information, overall information omission was almost similar across both the 
sites with a median of nine information omissions per handover. In addition, overall 
tasks errors were also high at both the sites. Distractions occurred in one-third of the 
handovers at both the sites which caused interference with the handover process and 
could have contributed to the failures in information transfer. 
Our results echo the findings of poor quality handover from theatre to the PACU by 
Anwari et al(Anwari 2002). They demonstrated that the information during the 
postoperative handover is not transferred in 40-60% of cases. Another qualitative 
observation study on postoperative handover revealed that the fragmented nature of  
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handovers is explained by competing demands on recovery nurse, including setting up 
equipment and coping with other patients(Smith et al. 2008).   
Our study has revealed the factors that contribute to handover failure are poor 
preparation of the recovery team for the handovers, the prevailing distractions, 
differences in workflow patterns of various healthcare professionals and competing 
work demands. For example, on one occasion, the anesthetist handed over the 
patient’s relevant information to the recovery nurse. At the same time other nurses 
were asking the recovery nurse for information regarding previous patients. This not 
only diverted the nurse’s attention, but also created confusion. As a result, the 
handover was prolonged and the anaesthetist was forced to repeat information.  
Although the study was only conducted at two centres in Europe, it cannot be 
excluded that the results are reflective of postoperative handover in most hospitals. 
Even though, there were some differences between the two centres, the fundamental 
system problems leading to poor handover were quite similar. At both sites, in 
addition to all the factors mentioned earlier, the reason the quality of handover was so 
variable is because of the lack of a formal protocol. The anesthetist’s responsibilities 
during recovery room handovers are the subject of guidance from professional 
organizations . These stipulate that anesthetists should formally hand over the patient. 
However, these guidelines do not address the content of the spoken handover, which 
seem, like other aspects of communication, is informally learnt as part of the ‘tacit 
knowledge’ of professional practice(Smith et al. 2005). This emphasizes the need of 
standardized communication through the use of postoperative handover 
proforma/checklist similar to WHO surgical safety checklist(Haynes et al. 2009) 
which has been recently developed for the pre- and intra-operative phases. 
Implementation of the surgical safety checklist was associated with a reduction in  
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mortality and morbidity and we believe a similar handover checklist could potentially 
have the same effect. Strategies used by high-risk industries for handover can be also 
be adopted to raise the quality of the handover(Patterson 2007; Patterson et al. 2004). 
Catchpole et al(Catchpole et al. 2007) demonstrated an improvement in information 
transfer after implementation of a Formula-1 inspired handover in the paediatric 
intensive care unit.  
As the study was conducted at two sites and two observers evaluated the quality of the 
handover, there is a potential for different observational techniques being used. In 
addition, all observational studies have an element of the Hawthorne effect. However, 
in addition to employing recommended mechanisms to minimize the Hawthorne 
effect(Franke 1978), the primary investigator trained and supervised the observer at 
Basel site to ensure the consistency and uniformity of the data collection. 
Furthermore, informal interviews with randomly selected healthcare professionals 
involved in the handovers added to data accuracy. The study was conducted at 
teaching hospitals only so the results may not apply to other settings, such as 
community hospitals without house staff, where communication and collaboration 
between physicians and nurses may be different. However, using similar principles, 
the tool could be adapted to suit the information needs of the handover in these 
settings. Also, these results may be different depending on the training and 
composition of the nursing staff.  
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8.6: Conclusion 
PoHAT is a tool aimed to facilitate systematic, transparent assessment of 
postoperative handover. Using PoHAT, this study has demonstrated that postoperative 
handover is largely informal and is characterized by a lot of information omissions 
and tasks errors. The problems identified were similar at both the European centres 
suggesting a need for a standardized solution that may be applicable across healthcare 
organizations.  
After uncovering the postoperative handover problems, getting a solution from the 
user in the previous chapter, we had a proforma to improve the handover process. 
With the development of this new handover tool, it became easy to evaluate the 
handover process. Therefore, as a result of previous two studies, we sought to enhance 
the information transfer during this phase by standardizing the handover via new 
handover protocol.  
 
 
 CHAPTER NINE: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF 
POSTOPERATIVE HANDOVER STUDY: PRE-POST 
INTERVENTION STUDY 
 
9.1: Introduction 
Handover is one of the Action on Patient Safety: High 5s improvement initiatives of 
the WHO Patient Safety Alliance (2006). The United States accrediting body for 
hospitals drew further attention to the issue in 2006 by including the requirement in its 
National Patient Safety Goals “to implement a standardized approach to hand off 
communications, including an opportunity to ask and respond to questions” ( 2006). 
The Joint Commission explained the need for the information to be accurately 
communicated in order to meet patient safety goals (2008).  
In a previous study we have shown that post-operative handover is characterised by a 
high number of information omissions and that distractions during the handover 
compromise the transfer of information.  
 
9.2: Aims 
Using the postoperative handover proforma as a part of new handover protocol, the 
aim of this study is to develop a simple, easily trainable new handover protocol to 
improve the quality of handover of patients undergoing major general surgical 
operations.  
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9.3: Methods 
9.3.1: Design 
This was a prospective pre-post intervention study with direct observation of 
handover conducted in the PACU of an acute teaching hospital in London.  
9.3.2: Study sample 
A total of 90 handovers were evaluated by a trained researcher, 50 before and 40 after 
the introduction of a new handover protocol. These 50 patients were the same patients 
which were observed in London in previous chapter for development of PoHAT.  
9.3.3: Procedure 
A trained researcher observed the handovers using an assessment tool (described in 
the previous chapter) to assess the quality of the handover before and after the 
implementation of the new handover protocol. Twenty percent of the handovers were 
observed by a second observer to assess for inter-rater reliability.  
9.3.4: Outcome measures 
• Information omissions- Omissions were documented when the information 
was not transferred verbally. Information items were categorised as patient-
specific information, anaesthesia information and surgical information. 
• Tasks errors- Errors were classed when patient-specific tasks and equipment 
tasks were not completed appropriately. For example, if monitors and alarms 
were not set up before the verbal handover, this was classed as an error.  
• Teamwork- This was assessed using the behavioral postoperative component 
of the Observational Teamwork Assessment Tool for Surgery (OTAS) (Undre 
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et al. 2007). It consists of 5 domains; Leadership, Communication, 
Coordination, Cooperation, and Situational Awareness, which were rated on 7-
point Likert scales (0-7). 
• Nurse Satisfaction- Recovery nurses rated their overall satisfaction with the 
handover on a five-point Likert Scale (1-5). 
• Duration- Measured from the time the patient and operating theatre team 
enters PACU, until theatre staff leave PACU. 
9.3.5: Development of a new handover protocol 
This consisted of a postoperative handover proforma and standardisation of the 
handover process: 
1. Proforma- The development of the proforma has been described earlier in 
Chapter seven. Figure 9A summarises the steps involved in the development 
of the proforma and the post-operative handover proforma is shown in chapter 
seven. 
2. Standardisation of the handover process was achieved by: 
 -  Surgeon participating in the handover, in order to transfer the 
patient’s surgical information. 
- Task sequence- Equipment and patient-specific tasks were 
completed first followed by information transfer from the 
anaesthetist and then the surgeon. 
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- Distractions- No information was handed over until tasks were 
completed. Verbal handover of information occurred in a sterile 
environment with limited interruptions and distractions. 
9.3.6: Statistical Analysis 
Statistical methods included Mann Whitney U test for continuous variables, Chi-
Squared test for categorical variables and Spearman Rank Correlation to assess 
relationships using SPSS v. 16.0. 
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Figure 9A: Diagram illustrating the development and subsequent validation of 
the postoperative handover proforma (Adapted from Jones J and Hunter D, 
1995). 
Definition of problem 
Selection of experts 
First iteration of Delphi 
Second iteration of 
Delphi 
Panel of 50 experts practicing in 3 hospital sites in London 
selected;  
• 10 consultant vascular surgeons 
• 10 consultant gastrointestinalI surgeons   
• 15 consultant anaesthetists  
• 15 recovery nurses  
!
How important is the information identified from 
interviews in the postoperative handover? 
18 healthcare professionals interviewed to develop an initial list of essential information required 
in the postoperative handover. 
27 items of information identified were categorised to patient-specific, anaesthetic and surgical 
information (identified by the research team prior to beginning this project)&!
Results analysed for agreement and arbitrary value of 80% chosen for consensus, 
correlating to a mean rank of 4.5. 
Information rated above this value was included in postoperative handover 
proforma 
Panel re-rank the information’s importance in light of 
others opinions. 
Postoperative handover proforma developed 
Panel rated the importance of 27 items of information on a 
5 point Likert Scale from Not Important (1) to Very 
Important (5).  
Responses analysed for agreement and consensus. 
Panel’s means and standard deviations provided in the 
repeat version of the questionnaire, to encourage experts to 
reassess their initial judgements 
!
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9.4: Results 
9.4.1: Demographics 
Handovers of patients who had undergone major vascular (n=41) and major 
gastrointestinal (n=49) surgical procedures were observed. Operative patients 
included 55 males and 35 females, with a median age of 64 (IQR 52.7-74.0). 
9.4.2: Inter-rater reliability 
The inter-rater reliability calculated by Spearman Correlation was found to be 
significant (rho=0.964, p<0.001) 
9.4.3: Information Omissions (Figure 9B) 
After the new handover protocol there was a significant reduction in number of 
information omissions per handover from 9 to 3 (p<0.001). The largest reduction in 
information omissions per handover was observed for surgical information, which 
decreased from 4.2 to 0.8 (p<0.001). Information omissions per handover of both 
patient-specific information 2.6 to 1.3 (p<0.001) and anaesthetic information fell from 
3.4 to 1.5 (p<0.001). 
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Figure 9B: Information omissions per handover before and after the new 
handover protocol!
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9.4.4: Task Errors (Figure 9C) 
Overall number of task errors reduced significantly from 2.8 to 0.8 task errors per 
handover (p<0.001). The number of patient-specific task errors reduced significantly 
(p<0.05) from 0.3 to 0.06 errors per handover. Finally, there was a significant 
reduction in the number of equipment task errors from 2.5 to 0.7 errors per handover 
(p<0.001) 
Figure 9C: Tasks errors before and after new handover protocol!
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9.4.5: Teamwork  (Figure 9D) 
Teamwork (all five components) improved significantly with an overall improvement 
of median teamwork score from 3 to 4 (p<0.001).  
!
Figure 9D: Median teamwork score per handover, before and after the new 
handover protocol 
!
!
!
!
!
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9.4.6: Nurse Satisfaction & Duration 
The overall nurse’s satisfaction improved significantly after the new handover, from a 
median of 4 to 5 (P<0.001, Mann-Whitney test). After the new handover protocol, 
58% of the handovers were awarded a score of 5/5 by the recovery nurse compared to 
only 8% before the new protocol. Duration of the postoperative handover reduced 
from a median of 8 (IQR 5-12) to 7 (IQR 5-9) minutes after the new handover 
protocol, however the reduction was not significant (p=0.376, Mann-Whitney). 
9.4.7: Correlations 
Spearman rank correlation identified a significant correlation between the number of 
information omissions and number of task errors per handover before and after the 
handover protocol (rho=0.548 p<0.001). Thus information omissions were more 
likely compounded by the task errors. The communication component of the 
teamwork score was negatively correlated with the number of task errors (rho=-0.625, 
p<0.001) demonstrating that poor communication during the handover is associated 
with more task errors. 
The two-tailed Spearman rank correlation demonstrated a negative correlation 
between the number of information omissions and teamwork score (rho= - 0.663, 
p<0.001), thereby highlighting the importance of teamwork as a vital component in 
good quality handover information transfer.  
 
9.5: Discussion 
The new handover protocol produced a marked improvement in the quality of 
handover. Information omissions and task errors were significantly reduced and there 
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was a considerable improvement in teamwork and nurse satisfaction scores. In fact, 
improvements were found across almost the entire process following its introduction. 
The structured approach to the transfer of information from operating theatre staff to 
recovery staff and coordination of tasks performed contributed to the improved 
teamwork score. Although there was no significant reduction in the duration after the 
new protocol, the nurse’s were more satisfied with the overall handover.  
The protocol focused on surgeon’s participation in the handover process, 
communication, task sequence and leadership. Most significant is the finding that 
team members working in a hectic and high-pressure clinical environment can 
successfully implement a change in their handover practice. Several factors 
contributed to the success of the new handover protocol implementation in the study. 
The surgical, anaesthetic and recovery team included a consistent group of people 
who were supportive of research. The surgeons’ commitment was particularly critical 
for the successful implementation, which can be seen by the largest improvement in 
surgical information omissions. Consistent with quality improvement initiatives that 
involve healthcare professions, we engaged in a continuous process with the 
participants, receiving and providing continuous feedback. The feedback of theatre 
and recovery staff both before and during the development of proforma provided a 
critical insight into the implementation process. Engagement with the professionals 
may also have conferred a sense of ownership to participants, which is essential to the 
success of quality improvement initiatives that seek to change the behaviour. 
Before the intervention, the handover process was negatively affected by the lack of 
surgical information provided, distractions during the handover and lack of a 
formalised structure. The new protocol ensured the presence of at least one member of 
the surgical team and adequate transfer of all the information, especially surgical 
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information, in a standardised format. Furthermore, the correlation between 
information omissions and teamwork emphasised the value of teamwork in achieving 
the lowest rate of errors. 
Our study also demonstrated that 48% of anaesthetic information was not transferred. 
In the study conducted by Anwari (Anwari 2002), nurses awarded highest marks to 
almost half the anaesthetists, however this figure was only exceeded from 7% to 60% 
after the introduction of the new protocol. Very few studies have attempted to 
improve the postoperative handover. A noteworthy exception is a study by Catchpole 
et al (Catchpole et al. 2007), which used Formula-one concepts to improve the 
handover process in paediatric ICU. They demonstrated a significant reduction in 
information omissions and technical errors after standardising their handover process. 
As evident in other high-reliability industries, standardisation of the handover has 
been effective through teamwork, communication techniques, flattening of hierarchy, 
mutual respect within and across disciplines and situational awareness, which are key 
components of a culture of safety (Patterson et al. 2004). Furthermore, improving 
coordination of care through a structured communication process is particularly 
important in environments in which interruptions and multitasking are common, such 
as the PACU setting. This coordination of care helps to create a “shared mental 
model” of a patient’s status and the expected clinical course (McLeod and Chaffee 
1973). As a result, any digression from the anticipated postoperative course is more 
promptly identified.   
There was evidence that clinically significant steps in information transfer process 
were missed, which at the very least eroded safety margins. The potential of adverse 
events occurring during the patient’s care became evident in the pre-intervention 
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phase. Two patients did not receive DVT prophylaxis on their first postoperative day 
because of information omission during the handover process. Introduction of the 
proforma was effective in ensuring pertinent information was not overlooked during 
the handover. Additionally, the proforma served as a reminder to the surgeon to write 
instructions regarding DVT prophylaxis on the drug chart on four occasions, which 
otherwise would not have been written and potentially not administered to the patient, 
affecting the patient’s safety. Formalizing and producing a more standardized 
handover was accomplished and the study can be seen as a step in meeting the Joint 
Commission’s National Patient Safety Goals for a standardized approach to handoff 
communication(2008).  
There were several limitations to the study. In any observational study, the question of 
authenticity of data is of central concern. In addition to the observer recording 
evidence of this possible effect in the field notes, informal interviews with randomly 
selected participants following each observation period contributed to our sense of the 
data’s representativeness. Moreover, working group members commented on whether 
data seemed representative or not; on no occasion did experts question the data. 
Second limitation was the small sample size and the fact that the study was conducted 
on a single site; each institution has its own barriers to changing culture, therefore the 
results may not be broadly generalisable. Also because of the small sample size, 
patient outcomes were not measured. Finally, this study suffers from the traditional 
biases of a pre-post design, specifically that we are unable to control for all potential 
confounding influences. However, a randomised controlled trial of this intervention 
within one institution would be impossible due to the risk of contamination between 
study groups and feasibility issues. Despite these limitations, we believe that 
implementation of the new handover protocol indeed standardises and facilitates 
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communication between healthcare providers in PACU. This study did not set out to 
determine if this new handover protocol improved patient outcomes. Nevertheless, it 
is important that the likelihood of multiple errors with individual patients was 
reduced, as the avoidance of compounding errors is a fundamentally important 
component of safety (Catchpole et al. 2006) and has been shown in other studies to 
affect outcome (Hofer and Hayward 2002). A further limitation is that while the 
proforma is effective in ensuring the necessary information is handed over, it does not 
ensure that the information is understood by the receiving nurse. In the present study 
the improved nurse’s satisfaction for the overall handover could indicate that their 
level of understanding of the information communicated during the handover 
improved.  
We also observed that the researcher had to facilitate the process by asking the 
anaesthetist and a member of the surgical team to use the proforma for the handover 
on four occasions. This and the high level of engagement with the clinical team 
during the study highlights the fact that the successful implementation of the protocol 
was influenced to a large extent by the motivation of the clinical team and that there 
was a certain amount of selection bias in our study. As the protocol is more widely 
implemented we will have to be aware of the need for a strategy for engagement with 
clinical teams.  This also raises the question of sustainability of the protocol when 
someone is not present to drive the use of the protocol.  
Nevertheless, despite these potential failings, implementation of the new handover 
protocol significantly improved the quality of the postoperative handover through 
enhancing information transfer, teamwork and reducing task errors. The new protocol 
focused on leadership, task allocation, standardization processes and   
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communication. It was simple to understand, was easily trainable and following its 
introduction, handover process became more structured, organized, multidisciplinary 
with improved communication, teamwork and no competing work demands. Initially 
there was some resistance by the theatre team for change and use of handover 
proforma but after few handovers they were motivated to continue this new handover 
protocol. Besides increasing the nurses satisfaction, it also empowered nurses. In most 
healthcare settings the handover in the PACU is the conduit to information 
‘downstream’ when patients are transferred to their final recovery facility. By 
improving post-operative handover in the PACU, we can ensure that information 
transferred downstream is made more accurate, comprehensive and robust. This could 
potentially ensure a heightened state of vigilance for post-operative complications, 
improve post-operative care by ensuring that key processes are undertaken and thus 
potentially improve post-operative outcomes. Although, this study was not powered to 
study the patient outcomes, it is nonetheless important that likelihood of multiple 
errors with individual patients was reduced, as the avoidance of  compounding errors 
is a fundamentally important component of safety and has been shown to affect 
outcomes. 
 
9.6: Conclusions 
This study demonstrated that standardisation of postoperative handover through new 
handover protocol improved communication and teamwork and reduced information 
omissions and task errors. There was an improvement in the quality of the handover 
after the introduction of new the handover protocol, which was easy and simple to 
use. 
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In the next chapter, I will summarise the findings of all the empirical studies and will 
discuss about the future research. !
 
 175!
CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY OF RESULTS, 
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
10.1: Introduction 
There has been a lack of evaluation of ITC process across whole of the surgical care. 
Various interventions have been developed to improve the ITC process without a 
detailed analysis of communication problems in the system. Technological 
applications have the capability to change system processes to improve 
communication, thus enhancing patient safety. Nevertheless, technology introduced to 
enhance communication may have a negative impact on care processes. The 
successful design and use of technological applications relies on an understanding of 
information needs and communication vulnerabilities among healthcare professionals 
in the existing system, which has been lacking in most of the studies. 
This thesis aimed to identify information transfer and communication (ITC) failures 
across surgical care pathway, develop a measurement tool to quantify, to identify the 
phases vulnerable to these errors and subsequently to improve information transfer 
across the postoperative phase by implementing an intervention. Through a 
multimodal methodology i.e. literature review, Failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA) and interview, information transfer and communication failures were 
identified. This also led to the development of Information transfer and 
Communication Assessment Tool for surgery (ITCAS). A prospective observation 
study demonstrated the feasibility of using this tool and found that ITC failures are 
distributed across the continuum of care.  Ultimately, standardization of information 
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transfer process was done in the postoperative phase was done which found a 
significant improvement in this process. 
The introductory chapters drew on research to help understand the various 
communication models and the vital role of communication and information transfer 
in other industries. Subsequently it also depicted its applicability in healthcare and the 
role of ITC on surgical outcomes. The systematic review, interview study and FMEA 
laid the foundation for the development of the assessment tool to measure information 
transfer and communication. It also confirmed the findings from other studies that 
ITC failures are ubiquitous and are distributed across the continuum of care. 
The main aim of the thesis was to develop an assessment tool to measure information 
transfer and communication process and to enhance this process by developing an 
intervention. The tool was developed and its reliability and feasibility was assessed. 
Also, improvement in information transfer in the postoperative handover phase was 
demonstrated by standardization via proforma and team training. In this chapter I will 
outline the key results from the empirical studies, methodological issues and future 
studies that will emerge from this work. 
 
10.2: Summary of Findings 
10.2.1: Key findings of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
We believe that if communication is to be optimized we must first map 
communication failures and vulnerabilities across the entire surgical care pathway. 
This allows a full understanding of the nature and scope of the problem and precise 
selection and targeting of interventions. 
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Failure mode and effect analysis was used to map the surgical care pathway and to 
identify the critical ITC failures and recommendations were made subsequently to 
prevent these critical failures. Whole of the surgical care process was divided into 
four phases- Preoperative assessment and optimisation, Preprocedural teamwork, 
Postoperative handover and Daily ward care. One hundred and thirty two failures 
were identified and around thirty percent of these failures were found to be critical. 
The methodology used highlighted the failure modes that most likely result in adverse 
events, uncovered multiple causes of the potential ways in which the system could 
fail, as well as determined actions to prevent these latent system errors. The flow 
diagram and hazard analysis provided blueprint for development of interventions as 
well as assist healthcare organisations and surgical teams in improving this process. 
Although it is difficult to verify the utility of these resource-intensive qualitative 
investigations, the HFMEA methodology is complementary to quantitative 
investigations and is useful in identifying latent failures in complex surgical care. 
10.2.2: Key findings of Interview Study 
Using another methodology i.e. semi-structured interviews of various OT healthcare 
professionals, ITC failures, their causes and consequences were identified in various 
phases of the surgical care pathway. Results showed that they are common and are 
distributed across the continuum of surgical care. Most of the participants agreed that 
they can directly or indirectly have a major impact on patient outcomes. Everybody 
agreed that standardization and systematisation was essential to enhance ITC and to 
reduce errors. This study provided a valuable insight into the ITC failures through the 
various phases of surgical care pathway. 
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Qualitative approach in the above two studies enabled these issues to be explored in a 
way that would not have been possible with quantitative methods.    
10.2.3: Key findings of Observational Study 
Based on multimodal methodology i.e. interview, FMEA along with various sources, 
information transfer and communication assessment tool for surgery (ITCAS) was 
developed and tool was used to assess its feasibility and reliability. Twenty patients 
undergoing major gastrointestinal procedures were followed through their entire 
surgical care and information transfer and communication process was assessed using 
ITCAS. ITCAS consisted of four checklists for four phases of the surgical care. ITC 
failures are distributed across the entire surgical continuum of care. Preprocedural 
teamwork and postoperative handover phases has the maximum number of ITC 
failures (61.7% & 52.4% respectively). Moreover, it was found that information 
degrades as it crosses from one phase to another. Seventy-five percent of patients had 
clinical incidents or adverse events due to ITC failures. The study demonstrated that 
ITC failures are ubiquitous across surgical care pathway and there is an imminent 
need to modify current ITC practices. Standardization of ITC through use of 
checklists, protocols or information technology is essential to reduce these 
communication failures. It also showed that ITCAS was feasible and reliable to use. 
10.2.4: Key findings of Postoperative handover pitfalls 
Handover is a vital part of clinical care and is practiced in all healthcare settings, and 
across all stages of the patient’s journey. Increased shift-working and the changing 
nature of the delivery of surgical services has placed an increasing reliance on 
handover to provide safe continuity of care. Consequently this process should be 
comprehensive, clear and transparent minimizing the potential for error. It is now 
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clearly emerging that the transfer of information during a handover is of critical 
importance to a patient’s safety in hospital(Kluger and Bullock 2002; Lingard et al. 
2004). Handover failures can lead to the institution of incorrect treatment plans, 
diagnostic delays, adverse events, patient complaints, increased length of stay and 
potentially result in mortality (Kluger and Bullock 2002). Effective handovers in 
surgery ensure continuity in patient care, from the point of admission, through to the 
operating theatre, recovery room and back to the wards up to discharge from hospital. 
Information transferred between healthcare professionals should include all relevant 
data, be accurate, unambiguous and occur in a timely manner. The information 
enables actions to be taken to provide the care that patients need. The post operative 
phase between the OR and recovery is one such critical example in surgery. 
Chapter seven, eight and nine mainly focused on the postoperative handover phase. 
The reason for selection of this phase was because of the second highest number of 
the ITC failures found in this phase. Preprocedural phase with the highest number of 
failures was not chosen because of the recent launch of WHO preprocedural checklist 
in this phase. A thorough understanding of the problem is vital to develop 
standardized protocols. Therefore the aim of the study was to identify the information 
transfer and communication problems in postoperative handover and to develop and 
validate a novel protocol for standardising communication. Qualitative semi-
structured interview study was conducted with eighteen healthcare professionals to 
uncover the problems and to identify the solutions. Interviews were recorded, 
transcribed verbatim, and submitted to emergent theme analysis. Multiple blind 
coders were used to ensure triangulation and reliability. Delphi method was used to 
validate the handover protocol. Many of the failures involved in the postoperative 
handover found were due to an incomplete handover. The present study identified that 
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the postoperative handover is informal, unstructured, inconsistent and the information 
transfer is incomplete. Twenty-two point postoperative handover protocol was 
developed and validated to standardise the process. This was subsequently used to 
enhance the information flow in this phase.  
10.2.5: Key findings of Postoperative handover Assessment tool 
After identifying the problem and solution of the problem, the next step was to 
develop a tool to assess the quality of the handover to evaluate the improvement in 
this process with the implementation of the postoperative handover proforma. This 
study was carried out to assess the feasibility, validity and reliability of a 
postoperative handover assessment tool (PoHAT) and to evaluate the current practices 
of the postoperative handover at two large European hospitals. Postoperative 
Handover Assessment tool (PoHAT) was developed through task analysis, semi-
structured interviews, literature review and learned society guidelines. Subsequent 
validation was done by the Delphi technique. Feasibility and reliability and were then 
evaluated by direct observation of handovers at two large European hospitals. 
Outcomes measures included information omissions, task errors, teamwork 
evaluation, duration of handover and number of distractions. The tool was feasible to 
use and inter-rater reliability was excellent (r=0.96, p<0.001). Evaluation of handover 
at the two study sites revealed a median of eight information omissions per handover 
at both the centres (IQR 7-10). There were a median of 3 task errors per handover 
(IQR 2-4). Thirty-five percent of handovers had distractions, which included 
competing demands for nurse attention, bleeps and case-irrelevant communication. 
This study established the feasibility, validity and reliability of a tool for evaluating 
postoperative handover. In addition to serving as an objective measure of post-
operative handover, the tool can also be used to evaluate the efficacy of any 
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intervention developed to improve this process. The study has also shown that 
postoperative handover is characterized by incomplete transfer of information and 
failures in the performance of key tasks.  
10.2.6: Key findings of Pre-post intervention study 
This study had pre-post intervention design. The aim of the study was to improve 
postoperative handover through the implementation of a new handover protocol, 
which involved a handover proforma and standardisation of the handover process, 
thereby improving patient safety. This was a prospective pre-post study in which 90 
postoperative handovers were observed. The quality of the handover was measured 
before and after the implementation of the new handover protocol. Outcome measures 
included information omissions, errors in task performance, duration of the handover, 
teamwork and nurse satisfaction (scored from 1-5). There was a significant reduction 
in overall information omissions from 9 ± 2.31 to 3 ± 1.71(p<0.001) omissions per 
handover and task errors from 2.8 ± 1.03 to 0.8 ± 0.72(
 
p<0.001) with the new 
handover protocol. Duration of handover decreased from a median of 8 ± 7.83  to 7 ± 
3.30 minutes (p<0.376) while the nurse’s satisfaction and teamwork score 
significantly improved from a median of 4 ± 0.96 to 5 ± 0.60 (p<0.001) and median of 
3 to 4 (p<0.001). The study demonstrated that standardisation of postoperative 
handover improved communication and teamwork and reduced information omissions 
and task errors. There was an improvement in the quality of the handover after the 
introduction of new the handover protocol, which was easy and simple to use. 
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10.3:  Methodological Issues 
Most of the staff members were quite comfortable and open to discuss about the 
communication problems. In terms of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, there was an 
initial difficulty in getting whole of the team together at one place and one point of 
time. This is due to the fact of clinical commitment of various healthcare 
professionals and few of the participants being not very optimistic about the outcome. 
Later after couple of sessions, everybody enjoyed it and got motivated; in fact, the 
participants wanted to get involved in future FMEA.  
The observation study including postoperative handover study initially posed some 
resistance. Although most of the staff members were quite comfortable being 
observed, some (approximately 10%) were quite against the study being conducted. It 
is known that people fear surveillance or checking up on personal skills and the 
possibility of disciplinary action if errors occur. However, if staff can be reassured 
and if they overcome their anxiety, this would be an excellent and non intrusive way 
of collecting data. Another challenge was the implementation of checklist. Few of the 
healthcare professionals believe that checklist is another piece of paperwork, it s a 
hindrance rather than an aid. They were of the opinion that it may impede the quality 
and speed of service delivery. Moreover it can also interfere both with the 
professional judgment and the objectivity of the decision-making process. Also due to 
competing work demands, surgical team was reluctant to handover and they opined 
that the recovery nurse is not supposed to know surgical information.  
In the middle and towards the end of the study, these healthcare professionals got 
involved and liked the concept. There need to be local surgical champions to change 
the culture in surgical community. 
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10.4: Clinical Implications 
Information transfer and communication failures are rampant in surgical practice. We 
have shown these can lead to adverse outcomes. We recommend following to enhance 
interprofessional information transfer and communication and avoid any adverse 
events: 
• Establishing clarity about who is responsible and assign specific patient care 
tasks to providers in a clear and unambiguous manner. Clearly defined roles 
and a clear plan will lead to increased vigilance, remove variability in post-
operative care processes, potentially reduce morbidity and may ultimately lead 
to reduced hospital stay. 
• Minimizing over-reliance on one means of communication, introduction of 
redundancy to information transfer and communication i.e. information 
transfer via more than one medium.  
• Standardization using care pathways, protocols, proformas and checklists for 
preoperative (WHO/ Surgical safety checklist), postoperative and daily ward 
care.  
• Electronic information transfer system with automated alerts to the responsible 
team should be installed to notify the teams of any abnormal results.  
• Configuration of central information repository through use of information 
technology. 
• Change in teams, cultural change, enhancing team camaraderie, system 
changes including recruitment of more skilled staff, restructuring of certain 
systems are also needed to improve ITC. 
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• Simulation scenarios should be performed to train the teams for the handover 
protocol and to assess the information transfer and communication process.  
We believe this can improve the information transfer process and ultimately patient 
outcomes, although it remains to be tested.  
 
10.5: Future directions for Research  
This thesis has made us understand the information transfer and communication 
failures in surgical care pathway. It has been realized that ITC is not a trivial issue; it 
can lead to significant morbidity in patients. ITC problems are distributed across the 
continuum of surgical care. Failure mode and effect analysis was a good technique, 
which helped in development of ITCAS for ITC assessment. The ITC assessment 
using ITCAS has demonstrated that preprocedural teamwork and postoperative 
handover phase have higher ITC failures. Same assessment tool can be tailored and 
used in other specialties. This assessment tool can be used as an electronic version. 
The tool can be used to assess, quantify the ITC failures at other centres. In fact, this 
can be used as one of the quality indicator of the services provided in the hospital. 
This can also be used to evaluate an intervention developed to improve the 
information flow.!
Development of postoperative proforma has filled the gap of information loss at this 
phase. This is similar to the WHO surgical safety checklist, which has been developed 
to fill the information gap at preprocedural phase. This study has shown that 
implementation of WHO Surgical safety checklist resulted in significant reduction in 
morbidity and mortality. Although it has been demonstrated that the implementation 
of standardized postoperative handover including postoperative handover proforma 
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has improved the processes outcomes, a similar multicentre study is needed to prove 
the efficacy of the postoperative handover proforma in reducing adverse events and 
improving patient outcomes.  
Other research should also seek to compare different potential solutions such as 
electronic versus paper protocols for example. We chose the latter so as to make it 
easily available and cost effective. However, in this era of rapidly increasing 
information technology, future solutions could seek to integrate such a protocol on 
patient electronic records(Shachak and Reis 2009). A POP could also be added to 
enhanced recovery protocols(Nygren et al. 2009) to determine if it further increases 
their value and clinical outcome.  
Researcher presence drove the new postoperative handover protocol, therefore 
sustainability of the protocol when someone is not present also needs to be looked at 
in future studies. 
 
10.6: Conclusion 
The main aim for this research was to develop an assessment tool for ITC and to 
identify the phases vulnerable to ITC phases. Therefore ITCAS was developed via 
multimodal methodology i.e. FMEA and interview process. The next aim was to 
quantify these failures and to identify the phases vulnerable to ITC failures. This was 
done via prospective observational study. After identifying the postoperative 
handover phase as one of the critical phases for ITC failures, this phase was 
subsequently studied to identify the ITC failures. The postoperative handover 
assessment tool was developed and its feasibility and reliability was established, 
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failures were quantified. Subsequently a new postoperative handover protocol was 
developed and its impact on information transfer was assessed via prospective 
observational pre-post intervention study. This thesis provides a first step towards 
understanding information transfer and communication in a surgical care pathway. 
We hope this would also enable us to quantify information transfer failures. The 
postoperative handover proforma would prevent the information loss at this phase and 
thereby would hopefully reduce the adverse events. Moreover, we hope the 
assessment tool can be used as one of the quality indicators. 
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4/6)L1*-J!*-!*-e)4F!10!6)4J*.,L!3,1*/-16&'!R!@D!90LL!#)4J!;IB"B%<P]]APBI&!
 191!
N,44,2*LL:!Z&!,-+![&!G,41?)6&!XYYI&!'84/3,4*-J!12/!14,)D,!3,1*/-1!704!14,-67/4&'!R!
[D/4J!S)46!XQ"X%<;PA;T&!
!
N,41:![&!Z&!,-+!N&!O>/-&!;IIP&!'[44046!,-+!0D*66*0-6!*-!,-/612/6*,<!,!3*L01!61)+F!
)6*-J!,!3*L01a6!.2/.?L*61&'!@-/612!@-,LJ!XIX"X%<;BQA;PI&!
!
N,F-/6:!@&!G&:!_&!(&!M/*6/4:!M&!E&!G/44F:!#&!E&!H*36*1`:!@&!N&!G4/*`,1:![&!8&!V/LL*-J/4:!
_&!N/4K06,:!#&! R06/32:!8&!H&!U*K,1,L,:!Z&!9&!H,3*1,-:!@&!^&!Z/44F:!U&!Z00412F:!E&!U&!
E/`-*.?:!G&!_,FL04!,-+!@&!@&!(,>,-+/&!;IIY&!'@!6)4J*.,L!6,7/1F!.2/.?L*61!10!4/+)./!
D04K*+*1F!,-+!D041,L*1F!*-!,!JL0K,L!303)L,1*0-&'!S![-JL!R!Z/+!]QI"P%<BYXABYY&!
!
N/,L/F:! @&! S&:! S&! #/5+,L*6! ,-+! 9&! @&! W*-./-1&! ;IIQ&! 'Z/,6)4*-J! *-14,A03/4,1*5/!
*-1/47/4/-./! 740D! +*614,.1*0-! ,-+! *-1/44)31*0-! 0K6/45/+! *-! 12/! 03/4,1*-J!
12/,14/&'![4J0-0D*.6!BY"PAQ%<PTYAQIB&!
!
N/,L/F:! @&! S&:! #&! \-+4/! ,-+! 9&! @&! W*-./-1&! ;IIB&! 'V/5/L03*-J! 0K6/45,1*0-,L!
D/,6)4/6!07!3/4704D,-./!*-!6)4J*.,L!1/,D6&'!c),L!#,7!N/,L12!9,4/!X]!#)33L!X<*]]A
BI&!
!
N/,L/F:! Z&! @&:! #&! E&! #2,.?704+:! _&! Z&! O6L/4:! ^&! G&! E0J/46! ,-+! [&! G)4-6&! ;II;&!
'90D3L*.,1*0-6!*-!6)4J*.,L!3,1*/-16&'!@4.2!#)4J!X]$"P%<QXXAQX$i!+*6.)66*0-!QX$A
QXT&!
!
N/LD4/*.2! EH:! Z/44*11! @9&! XYYT&! 9)L1)4/! ,1! >04?<! -,1*0-,L:! 04J,-*6,1*0-,L! ,-+!
3407/66*0-,L!*-7L)/-./6&!@L+/46201<!@62J,1/&!
!
N*JJ*-6:! R8_&:! (4//-:! #&! '90.24,-/! N,-+K00?! 704! #F61/D,1*.! E/5*/>6! 07!
C-1/45/-1*0-6! W/46*0-! P&I&X! j)3+,1/+! #/31/DK/4! ;IITk&! _2/! 90.24,-/!
90LL,K04,1*0-:!;IIT&!@5,*L,KL/!740D!>>>&.0.24,-/A2,-+K0?&04J&'!
!
N07/4:! _&! 8&! ,-+! E&! @&! N,F>,4+&! ;II;&! '@4/! K,+! 0)1.0D/6! 740D! f)/61*0-,KL/!
.L*-*.,L! +/.*6*0-6! 34/5/-1,KL/!D/+*.,L! /44046b! @! .,6/! 07! .,6.,+/! *,140J/-/6*6&'!
@--!C-1/4-!Z/+!X]$"P!8,41!X%<];$A]]]&!
!
N03?*-6:!V&W&! XYTI&! ''_2/!D/,6)4/D/-1!07! 12/!@*4!_4,77*.!90-140LL/4'! '!N)D,-!
^,.1046!;;"P%<PB$APQI&!
!
N04-:! R&:! Z&! V&! G/LL! ,-+! [&! Z066&! ;IIB&! 'N,-+05/4! 07! 4/630-6*K*L*1F! 704! 12/!
,-,/612/1*6/+!3,1*/-1!A!03*-*0-!,-+!34,.1*./&'!@-,/612/6*,!PY"$%<QPTAQQ]&!
!
N)J2/6:! E&! (&! ,-+! 9&! Z&! 9L,-.F&! ;II$&! 'CD3405*-J! 12/! .0D3L/d! -,1)4/! 07! .,4/!
14,-6*1*0-6&'!R!S)46!9,4/!c),L!;;"B%<;TYA;Y;&!
!
R,.f)/6:!8&!#&:!V&!R&!^4,-./:!Z&!8*LL,:![&!H,*!,-+!Z&!#&!N*JJ*-6&!;IIQ&!'[5,L),1*0-!07!,!
2,-+6A74//! >*4/L/66! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! +/5*./! *-! 12/! 3/4*03/4,1*5/! /-5*40-D/-1&'!
_/L/D/+!R![!N/,L12!X;"X%<B;ABY&!
!
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R,+,+:!@&!E&:!E&!@&!Z004/:!V&!9,440LL:!9&!R/-?*-60-:!V&!R&!E/F-0L+6:!V&!R&!(,5,J2,-!,-+!
N&!R&!Z.c),F&!XYYQ&!'@66/66*-J!12/!f),L*1F!07!4/30416!07!4,-+0D*`/+!.L*-*.,L!14*,L6<!
*6!KL*-+*-J!-/./66,4Fb'!90-140L!9L*-!_4*,L6!X$"X%<XAX;&!
!
U*1`*-J/4:! R&! XYYP&! 'c),L*1,1*5/! 4/6/,4.2&! C-140+).*-J! 70.)6! J40)36&'! GZR!
]XX"$III%<;YYA]I;&!
!
UL)J/4:!Z&!_&!,-+!Z&!^&!G)LL0.?&!;II;&!'E/.05/4F!400D!*-.*+/-16<!,!4/5*/>!07!BXY!
4/30416! 740D! 12/! @-,/612/1*.! C-.*+/-1! Z0-*104*-J! #1)+F! "@CZ#%&'! @-,/612/6*,!
P$"XX%<XIQIAXIQQ&!
!
UL)J/4:!Z&!_&:![&!R&!_2,D:!S&!@&!90L/D,-:!M&!G&!E)-.*D,-!,-+!Z&!^&!G)LL0.?&!;III&!
'C-,+/f),1/!34/A03/4,1*5/!/5,L),1*0-!,-+!34/3,4,1*0-<!,!4/5*/>!07!XY$!4/30416!
740D!12/!@)614,L*,-!*-.*+/-1!D0-*104*-J!61)+F&'!@-,/612/6*,!PP"X;%<XX$]AXX$T&!
!
U02-:! H&! ;III&! '_0! /44! *6! 2)D,-<! ,-! *-1/45*/>!>*12! 12/! C-61*1)1/! 07!Z/+*.*-/a6!
H*-+,!U02-&'!R1!90DD!R!c),L!CD3405!;Q"B%<;;$A;]B&!
!
U)-,.:! V&! H&! ,-+! V&! Z&! E/*12&! ;IIP&! 'C+/-1*7*.,1*0-! 07! 34*04*1*/6! 704! D/+*.,1*0-!
6,7/1F!*-!-/0-,1,L!*-1/-6*5/!.,4/&'!V4)J!#,7!;T"]%<;PXA;QX&!
!
H,4+-/4:! E&! XYYQ&! 'O77! 6204/! _/.2-0L0JF! E/3041&! [77/.1*5/! #2*71! N,-+05/4A! @!
H*1/4,1)4/!4/5*/>&!>>>&26/&J05&)?=4/6/,4.2=0103+7&'!
!
H/,3/:!H&!H&:!_&!@&!G4/--,-:!S&!H,*4+:!@&!(&!H,>12/46:!@&!E&!H0.,L*0:!G&!@&!G,4-/6:!H&!
N/K/41:! R&!8&!S/>20)6/:!8&!9&!M/*L/4!,-+!N&!N*,11&!XYYX&! '_2/!-,1)4/!07! ,+5/46/!
/5/-16!*-!2063*1,L*`/+!3,1*/-16&!E/6)L16!07!12/!N,45,4+!Z/+*.,L!84,.1*./!#1)+F!CC&'!
S![-JL!R!Z/+!];B"Q%<]$$A]TB&!
!
H/,5*11:!N&R&!!,-+!E!Z)/LL/4&!XYQ;&!''#0D/!/77/.16!07!7//+K,.?!0-!.0DD)-*.,1*0-'!
*-! N,4/:! @&8&i! G04J,11,:! [&^&i! G,L/6:! E&^&! "/+6&%! #D,LL! (40)36! <! #1)+*/6! *-! #0.*,L!
C-1/4,.1*0-!S/>!h04?!<!U-037&'!
!
H//:!V&!_&:!#&!M&!92,-!,-+!#&!8&!U>0?&!;II]&!'C-140+).1*0-!07!-*J21!62*71!.,LL!6F61/D!
704! 6)4J*.,L! 14,*-//6<! ,! 34063/.1*5/! 6/L7A.0-140LL/+! 14*,L&'! Z/+! [+).! ]$"Q%<BYPA
BYY&!
!
H/-`:!E&:!^&!G)/66/.?/4:!N&!N/4L076/-:!^&!N*-4*.26:!_&!g/*L/4!,-+!U&!@&!U)2-&!;IIP&!
'V/D,-+A+4*5/-! /50L)1*0-! 07! C_! 6F61/D6! *-! 2/,L12.,4/AA,! .,6/! 61)+F! 704!
*D3405*-J!*-1/4+*6.*3L*-,4F!340./66/6&'!Z/120+6!C-7!Z/+!BB"X%<BAXI&!
!
H*-J,4+:!H&:!#&![63*-:!G&!E)K*-:!#&!M2F1/:!Z&!90LD/-,4/6:!(&!E&!G,?/4:!V&!V04,-:![&!
(40K/4:! G&! O46/4:! R&! G02-/-! ,-+! E&! E/`-*.?&! ;IIP&! '(/11*-J! 1/,D6! 10! 1,L?<!
+/5/L03D/-1! ,-+! 3*L01! *D3L/D/-1,1*0-! 07! ,! .2/.?L*61! 10! 340D01/!
*-1/43407/66*0-,L! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! 12/! OE&'! c),L! #,7! N/,L12! 9,4/! XB"P%<]BIA
]BQ&!
!
H*-J,4+:! H&:! #&! [63*-:! #&!M2F1/:! (&! E/J/24:! (&! E&! G,?/4:! E&! E/`-*.?:! R&! G02-/-:! G&!
O46/4:!V&!V04,-!,-+![&!(40K/4&!;IIB&! '90DD)-*.,1*0-! 7,*L)4/6! *-! 12/!03/4,1*-J!
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400D<! ,-! 0K6/45,1*0-,L! .L,66*7*.,1*0-! 07! 4/.)44/-1! 1F3/6! ,-+! /77/.16&'! c),L! #,7!
N/,L12!9,4/!X]"P%<]]IA]]B&!
!
H*-J,4+:!H&:!(&!E/J/24:!#&![63*-!,-+!#&!M2F1/&!;IIQ,&!'@!12/04FAK,6/+!*-614)D/-1!
10!/5,L),1/!1/,D!.0DD)-*.,1*0-!*-!12/!03/4,1*-J!400D<!K,L,-.*-J!D/,6)4/D/-1!
,)12/-1*.*1F!,-+!4/L*,K*L*1F&'!c),L!#,7!N/,L12!9,4/!XP"Q%<B;;AB;Q&!
!
H*-J,4+:! H&:! (&! E/J/24:! G&! O46/4:! E&! E/`-*.?:! (&! E&! G,?/4:! V&! V04,-:! #&! [63*-:! R&!
G02-/-! ,-+! #&!M2F1/&! ;IIT&! '[5,L),1*0-! 07! ,! 34/03/4,1*5/! .2/.?L*61! ,-+! 1/,D!
K4*/7*-J! ,D0-J! 6)4J/0-6:! -)46/6:! ,-+! ,-/612/6*0L0J*616! 10! 4/+)./! 7,*L)4/6! *-!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-&'!@4.2!#)4J!XB]"X%<X;AX$i!+*6.)66*0-!XT&!
!
H*-J,4+:! H&:! E&! E/`-*.?:! #&! [63*-:! (&! E/J/24! ,-+! C&! V/W*10&! ;II;&! '_/,D!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-6! *-! 12/! 03/4,1*-J! 400D<! 1,L?! 3,11/4-6:! 6*1/6! 07! 1/-6*0-:! ,-+!
*D3L*.,1*0-6!704!-05*./6&'!@.,+!Z/+!$$"]%<;];A;]$&!
!
H*-J,4+:! H&:! #&! M2F1/:! #&! [63*-:! (&! E&! G,?/4:! G&! O46/4! ,-+! V&! V04,-&! ;IIQK&!
'_0>,4+6! 6,7/4! *-1/43407/66*0-,L! .0DD)-*.,1*0-<! .0-614).1*-J! ,! D0+/L! 07!
')1*L*1F'!740D!34/03/4,1*5/!1/,D!K4*/7*-J6&'!R!C-1/43407!9,4/!;I"P%<B$XABT]&!
!
H*-?*-:!V&! E&:! 9&! #,)6D,-:! H&! #,-106:! 9&! HF0-6:! 9&! ^0d:! H&! @)D*LL/4:! R&! [61/42,*:! G&!
8*11D,-!,-+![&!H,)1/-K,.2&!;IIP&!'@33L*.,K*L*1F!07!N/,L12.,4/!^,*L)4/!Z0+/!,-+!
[77/.16!@-,LF6*6! 10! 2/,L12.,4/! /3*+/D*0L0JF<! /5,L),1*0-! 07! 12/! 61/4*L*`,1*0-! ,-+!
)6/!07!6)4J*.,L!*-614)D/-16&'!9L*-!C-7/.1!V*6!BX"$%<XIXBAXIXY&!
!
H*11L/:! @V&! XYY;&! _/L/.0DD-*.,1*0-6<! .,-! *1! 2/L3! 60L5/! @D/4*.,a6! 2/,L12! .,4/!
340KL/D6b!9,DK4*+J/:!Z@&!
!
Z,L0-/F:!9&!(&:!V&!M0L7/:!8&!N&!(/61/L,-+:!R&!M&!N,L/6!,-+!^&!H&!S?0F&!;II$&!'@!100L!
704! *D3405*-J!3,1*/-1!+*6.2,4J/!340./66!,-+!2063*1,L!.0DD)-*.,1*0-!34,.1*./6<!
12/!'8,1*/-1!_4,.?/4'&'!@ZC@!@--)!#FD3!840.<BY]ABY$&!
!
Z,-0eL05*.2:! Z&! ,-+! G&! V/9*..0&! ;II$&! 'N/,L12F! >04?! /-5*40-D/-16:! -)46/A
32F6*.*,-! .0DD)-*.,1*0-:! ,-+! 3,1*/-16a! 0)1.0D/6&'! @D! R! 94*1! 9,4/! XQ"Q%<P]QA
PB]&!
!
Z,462,LL:!Z&!S&!XYYQ&!'#,D3L*-J!704!f),L*1,1*5/!4/6/,4.2&'!^,D!84,.1!X]"Q%<P;;A
P;P&!
!
Z,F6:!S&:! 9&!803/!,-+! R&! 803,F&!;IIP&! '#F61/D,1*.,LLF! 4/5*/>*-J!f),L*1,1*5/!,-+!
f),-1*1,1*5/! /5*+/-./! 10! *-704D!D,-,J/D/-1! ,-+! 30L*.FAD,?*-J! *-! 12/! 2/,L12!
7*/L+&'!R!N/,L12!#/45!E/6!80L*.F!XI!#)33L!X<QA;I&!
!
Z.H/0+:!RZ!,-+!#N!92,77//&!XY$]&!'C-1/43/460-,L!,3340,.2/6!10!.0DD)-*.,1*0-!
4/6/,4.2&'!@D!G/2,5!#.*!XQ<BQYABYY&!
!
Z.S,LLF:!U&!Z&:!Z&!@&!8,J/!,-+!W&!G&!#)-+/4L,-+&!XYY$&!'^,*L)4/AD0+/!,-+!/77/.16!
,-,LF6*6! *-! *D3405*-J! ,! +4)J! +*614*K)1*0-! 6F61/D&'! @D! R! N/,L12! #F61! 82,4D!
PB";%<X$XAX$$&!
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Z/24,K*,-:! @&:! ^/44*6&! XYQ$,&! 'C-7/4/-./! 07! ,11*1)+/6! 740D! -0-5/4K,L!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-!*-!1>0!.2,--/L6&'!R0)4-,L!07!90-6)L1*-J!86.2F0L0JF!]X<;BTA;P;&!
Z/24,K*,-:! @&:! M*/-/4:! Z&! XYQ$K&! 'V/.0+*-J! 07! *-.0-6*61/-1! .0DD)-*.,1*0-6&'!
R0)4-,L!07!8/460-,L*1F!,-+!#0.*,L!86F.20L0JF!Q<XIYAXXB&!
!
Z*L/6!ZG!,-+!N)K/44-,-!@Z&!XYYB&!'c),L*1,1*5/!+,1,!,-,LF6*6&'!/+&!9@!_20)6,-+!
O,?6<!#,J/&!
!
Z*L20LL,-+:!@&!W&:!#&!(&!M2//L/4!,-+!R&! R&!N/*/.?&!XY$]&!'Z/+*.,L!,66/66D/-1!KF!,!
V/L32*!J40)3!03*-*0-!1/.2-*.&'!S![-JL!R!Z/+!;TT";B%<X;$;AX;$P&!
!
Z*LL/4:!9&!XYYT&!'[-6)4*-J!.0-1*-)*-J!.,4/<!61FL/6!,-+!/77*.*/-.F!07!12/!2,-+05/4!
340./66&'!@)61!R!@+5!S)46!XQ"X%<;]A;$&!
!
Z*LL/4:!E&G&!XYTB&!'_4,-6,.1*0-!614).1)4/6!,-+!704D,1!*-!704D!+/6*J-'!92*.2/61/4<!
R02-!M*L/F&!
!
Z*LL6:!8&:! R&!S/*LF!,-+![&!V)--&!;IIT&!'_/,D>04?!,-+!.0DD)-*.,1*0-! *-!6)4J*.,L!
1/,D6<!*D3L*.,1*0-6!704!3,1*/-1!6,7/1F&'!R!@D!90LL!#)4J!;IQ"X%<XI$AXX;&!
!
Z*614F:!U8&!:!R,JJ/46:!R&:!@-+4/>:!RH&:!Z*.2,/L!@&:!Z/4*/L/!RZ&:!^4)62!U#&!'\6*-J!#*d!
#*D,! Z/120+0L0JF! 10! CD3405/! N,-+*77! 90DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! N*J2AE*6?! 8,1*/-16&!
>>>&,24f&J05=+0>-L0,+6=3)K=,+5,-./6;=50L]=,65,-./6AD*614F!XXB&3+7&'!
!
Z02/4:! V&:! V&! R&! 900?:! #&! [,61>00+:! C&! OL?*-:! V&! E/--*/! ,-+! V&! ^&! #140)3&! ;III&!
'CD3405*-J! 12/!c),L*1F! 07! E/30416! 07!Z/1,A@-,LF6/6! 07! E,-+0D*6/+! 90-140LL/+!
_4*,L6<!_2/!c\OEOZ!#1,1/D/-1&'!O-?0L0J*/!;]"Q%<PY$AQI;&!
!
Z0e,:! H&! 8&:! [&! _/L,40:! E&! Va@D*.0:! C&! Z06.2/11*:! H&! 90/! ,-+! @&! H*K/4,1*&! ;IIP&!
'@66/66D/-1!07!D/120+0L0J*.,L!f),L*1F!07!34*D,4F!61)+*/6!KF!6F61/D,1*.!4/5*/>6<!
4/6)L16!07!12/!D/1,f),L*1F!.4066!6/.1*0-,L!61)+F&'!GZR!]]I"$BYY%<XIP]&!
!
Z066:! R&! ,-+! h&! l*,0&! ;IIB&! 'CD3405*-J! 03/4,1*-J! 400D! .004+*-,1*0-<!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-!3,11/4-!,66/66D/-1&'!R!S)46!@+D!]B";%<Y]AXII&!
!
Z)432F:!Z&!U&:!S&!@&!GL,.?:!V&!H&!H,D3*-J:!9&!Z&!Z.U//:!9&!^&!#,-+/460-:!R&!@6?2,D!
,-+!_&!Z,41/,)&!XYYT&!'90-6/-6)6!+/5/L03D/-1!D/120+6:!,-+!12/*4!)6/!*-!.L*-*.,L!
J)*+/L*-/!+/5/L03D/-1&'!N/,L12!_/.2-0L!@66/66!;"]%<*A*5:!XATT&!
!
ZFK)4J2:! R&! @&:! Z&! R&! 92,3D,-:! #&! Z&! #`/?/LF! ,-+! (&! @&! O6K04-/&! ;IIP&! '94*6*6!
D,-,J/D/-1!+)4*-J!,-,/612/6*,<!6/36*6&'!c),L!#,7!N/,L12!9,4/!XB"]%</;;&!
!
S,4,6*D2,-:!Z&:! H&! @&! [*6/-:! 9&!V&!Z,20-/F:! ^&! H&! @./44,! ,-+!Z&! R&! E06/-&! ;IIQ&!
'CD3405*-J! -)46/A32F6*.*,-! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! ,-+! 6,1*67,.1*0-! *-! 12/! *-1/-6*5/!
.,4/!)-*1!>*12!,!+,*LF!J0,L6!>04?62//1&'!@D!R!94*1!9,4/!XP";%<;X$A;;;&!
!
S,6DF12:!V&!(&:!@&!8*.?/46J*LL!,-+!Z&!N0J,412&!XYYX&!'E/+).*-J!20)46!07!>04?!07!
34/4/J*614,1*0-!20)6/!077*./46<!4/3041!0-!,!62*71!6F61/D&'!GZR!]I;"Q$QT%<Y]AYB&!
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S9[8OVXYY$&!':_2/!XYY$!E[8OE_!O^!_N[!S@_COS@H!9OS^CV[S_C@H![Sc\CEh!
CS_O! 8[ECO8[E@_CW[! V[@_N#A! M20! 03/4,1/6! >2/-:! S,1*0-,L! 90-7*+/-1*,L!
[-f)*4F!*-10!8/4*A03/4,1*5/!V/,126&'!
!
S/,L/:! (&:! Z&! M0L062F-0>F.2! ,-+! 9&! W*-./-1&! ;IIX&! '[d3L04*-J! 12/! .,)6/6! 07!
,+5/46/!/5/-16!*-!SN#!2063*1,L!34,.1*./&'!R!E!#0.!Z/+!YB"$%<];;A]]I&!
!
S/61/L:! V&! ,-+! R&! U*++&! ;IIQ&! 'S)46/6a! 3/4./31*0-6! ,-+! /d3/4*/-./6! 07!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! 12/! 03/4,1*-J! 12/,14/<! ,! 70.)6! J40)3! *-1/45*/>&'! GZ9! S)46!!
;IIQ:!^/K!Ti!P<X&!
!
S)-+F:! #&:!@&!Z)?2/4e//:! R&!G&! #/d10-:!8&! R&! 840-05061:!@&!U-*J21:! H&!9&!E0>/-:!Z&!
V)-.,-:! V&! #F*-! ,-+!Z&! @&!Z,?,4F&! ;IIT&! 'CD3,.1! 07! 34/03/4,1*5/! K4*/7*-J6! 0-!
03/4,1*-J!400D!+/L,F6<!,!34/L*D*-,4F!4/3041&'!@4.2!#)4J!XB]"XX%<XIQTAXI$;&!
!
SFJ4/-:!R&:!Z&!#003:!@&!_204/LL:! R&!N,)6/L!,-+!O&!He)-Jf5*61&!;IIY&!'@-!/-2,-./+A
4/.05/4F! 34010.0L! *D3405/6! 0)1.0D/! ,71/4! .0L04/.1,L! 4/6/.1*0-! ,L4/,+F! +)4*-J!
12/!7*461!F/,4<!,!6*-JL/A./-1/4!/d3/4*/-./!*-!XQT!.0-6/.)1*5/!3,1*/-16&'!V*6!90L0-!
E/.1)D!P;"P%<Y$TAYTP&!
!
8,11/460-:! [&! #&! ;II$&! '90DD)-*.,1*0-! 614,1/J*/6! 740D! 2*J2A4/L*,K*L*1F!
04J,-*`,1*0-6<!14,-6L,1*0-!*6!2,4+!>04?&'!@--!#)4J!;BP";%<X$IAX$;&!
!
8,11/460-:![&!#&:![&!Z&!E012:!V&!V&!M00+6:!E&!920>!,-+!R&!O&!(0D/6&!;IIB&!'N,-+077!
614,1/J*/6!*-!6/11*-J6!>*12!2*J2!.0-6/f)/-./6!704!7,*L)4/<!L/660-6!704!2/,L12!.,4/!
03/4,1*0-6&'!C-1!R!c),L!N/,L12!9,4/!XQ";%<X;PAX];&!
!
82*336:!H&!Z&!,-+!S&!R&!_20D,6&!;II$&!'_2/!)6/!07!,!+,*LF!J0,L6!62//1!10!*D3405/!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! 12/! 3,/+*,14*.! *-1/-6*5/! .,4/! )-*1&'! C-1/-6*5/! 94*1! 9,4/! S)46!
;]"P%<;QBA;$X&!
!
8*LL:!R&!XY$X&!'_2/!V/L32*!D/120+<!6)K61,-./:!.0-1/d1:!,!.4*1*f)/!,-+!,-!,--01,1/+!
K*KL*0J4,32F&'!#0.*0![.0-!8L,-!#.*!P<P$A$X&!
!
8*-10:! Z&! G&! XYYI&! '(,*-*-J! .003/4,1*0-! ,D0-J! D/DK/46! 07! 2063*1,L! 340e/.1!
1/,D6&'!N063!_03!QT"X%<XPA;X&!
!
80>/LL:! 9&! ;II]&! '_2/! V/L32*! 1/.2-*f)/<! DF126! ,-+! 4/,L*1*/6&'! R! @+5! S)46!
BX"B%<]$QA]T;&!
!
840-05061:! 8&:! #&! G/4/-20L1`:! _&! V04D,-:! 8&! @&! H*36/11:! _&! #*DD0-+6! ,-+! 9&!
N,4,+/-&! ;II]&! 'CD3405*-J! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! 12/! C9\!)6*-J!+,*LF! J0,L6&'! R! 94*1!
9,4/!XT";%<$XA$P&!
!
E/,+/4:!_&!M&:!E&!^L*-:!U&!Z/,4-6!,-+!G&!N&!9)12K/4160-&!;II$&!'C-1/4+*6.*3L*-,4F!
.0DD)-*.,1*0-!*-!12/!*-1/-6*5/!.,4/!)-*1&'!G4!R!@-,/612!YT"]%<]B$A]P;&!
!
E/,60-:!R&!XYY$&!'Z,-,J*-J!O4J,-*6,1*0-,L!@..*+/-16&@L+/46201<!@62J,1/&'!
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E/++F:!Z&!XY$Y&!'_2/!.0-+)*1!D/1,3204A!,!.,6/!07!74,D/!.0-7L*.1!*-!0)4!L,-J),J/!
,K0)1!L,-J),J/'&!9,DK4*+J/&!
!
E*66/4:!V&!_&:!Z&!Z&!E*./:!Z&!H&!#,L*6K)4F:!E&!#*D0-:!(&!V&!R,F!,-+!#&!V&!G/4-6&!'_2/!
301/-1*,L! 704! *D3405/+! 1/,D>04?! 10! 4/+)./! D/+*.,L! /44046! *-! 12/! /D/4J/-.F!
+/3,41D/-1&! _2/! Z/+_/,D6! E/6/,4.2! 90-6041*)D&'! @--! [D/4J! Z/+! XYYY&!
]B"]%<]$]A]T]&!
!
E0J/46:!#&!O&:!R4&:!@&!@&!(,>,-+/:!Z&!U>,,-:!@&!H&!8)030L0:!9&!h00-:!_&!@&!G4/--,-!
,-+! V&! Z&! #1)++/41&! ;IIQ&! '@-,LF6*6! 07! 6)4J*.,L! /44046! *-! .L06/+! D,L34,.1*./!
.L,*D6!,1!B!L*,K*L*1F!*-6)4/46&'!#)4J/4F!XBI"X%<;PA]]&!
!
E)-.*D,-:!M&!G&:!Z&!_&!UL)J/4:!E&!M&!Z044*6:!@&!V&!8,*d:!H&!Z&!M,11/460-!,-+!E&!U&!
M/KK&! ;IIP&! '94*6*6! D,-,J/D/-1! +)4*-J! ,-,/612/6*,<! 12/! +/5/L03D/-1! 07! ,-!
,-,/612/1*.!.4*6*6!D,-,J/D/-1!D,-),L&'!c),L!#,7!N/,L12!9,4/!XB"]%</X&!
!
E)-.*D,-:!M&!G&:!@&!#/LL/-:!E&!U&!M/KK:!R&!@&!M*LL*,D60-:!Z&!9)44*/:!9&!Z04J,-!,-+!
M&!R&!E)66/LL&!XYY]&!'_2/!@)614,L*,-!C-.*+/-1!Z0-*104*-J!#1)+F&![44046:!*-.*+/-16!
,-+!,..*+/-16!*-!,-,/612/1*.!34,.1*./&'!@-,/612!C-1/-6*5/!9,4/!;X"P%<PIQAPXY&!
!
#,L1/4:! E&:! 8&! G4/11L/:! ^&! V&! N0KK6! ,-+! Z&! R&! H,-JD,-&! XYYT&! '90DD)-*.,1*0-!
,D0-J! 2/,L12! 3407/66*0-,L6&! 8004! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! 3)16! 3,1*/-16! ,1! 4*6?&'! GZR!
]X$"$XP]%<;$YA;TI&!
!
#,4*:! @&! G&:! _&! @&! #2/L+0-:! @&! 94,.?-/LL! ,-+! @&! _)4-K)LL&! ;II$&! '#/-6*1*5*1F! 07!
40)1*-/! 6F61/D! 704! 4/3041*-J! 3,1*/-1! 6,7/1F! *-.*+/-16! *-! ,-! SN#! 2063*1,L<!
4/14063/.1*5/!3,1*/-1!.,6/!-01/!4/5*/>&'!GZR!]]B"$PTB%<$Y&!
!
#/5+,L*6:! S&:! V&! ^044/61:! #&! \-+4/:! @&! V,4`*! ,-+! 9&! W*-./-1&! ;IIT&! '@--0F,-./6:!
+*64)31*0-6:! ,-+! *-1/44)31*0-6! *-! 6)4J/4F<! 12/! V*64)31*0-6! *-! #)4J/4F! C-+/d!
"V*#C%&'!M04L+!R!#)4J!];"T%<XQB]AXQPI&!
!
#/5+,L*6:!S&:!@&!S&!N/,L/F!,-+!9&!@&!W*-./-1&!;II$&!'V*614,.1*-J!.0DD)-*.,1*0-6!*-!
12/!03/4,1*-J!12/,14/&'!R![5,L!9L*-!84,.1!X]"]%<]YIA]YB&!
!
#/5+,L*6:!S&:!Z&!HF0-6:!@&!S&!N/,L/F:!#&!\-+4/:!@&!V,4`*!,-+!9&!@&!W*-./-1&!;IIY,&!
'OK6/45,1*0-,L! 1/,D>04?! ,66/66D/-1! 704! 6)4J/4F<! .0-614).1! 5,L*+,1*0-! >*12!
/d3/41!5/46)6!-05*./!4,1/46&'!@--!#)4J!;BY"Q%<XIB$AXIPX&!
!
#/5+,L*6:!S&:!#&!\-+4/:!R&!N/-4F:![&!#F+-/F:!Z&!U0)1,-1e*:!@&!V,4`*!,-+!9&!@&!W*-./-1&!
;IIYK&! 'V/5/L03D/-1:! *-*1*,L! 4/L*,K*L*1F! ,-+! 5,L*+*1F! 1/61*-J! 07! ,-! 0K6/45,1*0-,L!
100L! 704! ,66/66*-J! 1/.2-*.,L! 6?*LL6! 07! 03/4,1*-J! 400D! -)46/6&'! C-1! R! S)46! #1)+&!!
#/3iBQ"Y%<XXT$AY]&!
!
#2,.2,?:! @&! ,-+! #&! E/*6&! ;IIY&! '_2/! *D3,.1! 07! /L/.140-*.! D/+*.,L! 4/.04+6! 0-!
3,1*/-1A+0.104! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! +)4*-J! .0-6)L1,1*0-<! ,! -,44,1*5/! L*1/4,1)4/!
4/5*/>&'!R![5,L!9L*-!84,.1!@)JiXP!"B%<QBXAY&!
!
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#2/4L0.?:! 9&! XYYP&! '_2/! 3,1*/-1! 2,-+05/4<! ,! 61)+F! 07! *16! 704D:! 7)-.1*0-! ,-+!
/77*.*/-.F&'!S)46!#1,-+!Y"P;%<]]A]Q&!
!
#2041/LL:!#&!Z&:!V&!Z&!E0)66/,):!E&!E&!(*LL*/6:!U&! R&!V/5/46!,-+!_&!H&!#*D0-6&!XYYX&!
'O4J,-*`,1*0-,L! ,66/66D/-1! *-! *-1/-6*5/! .,4/! )-*16! "C9\6%<! .0-614).1!
+/5/L03D/-1:!4/L*,K*L*1F:!,-+!5,L*+*1F!07!12/!C9\!-)46/A32F6*.*,-!f)/61*0--,*4/&'!
Z/+!9,4/!;Y"T%<$IYA$;Q&!
!
#*-J2:!N&:![&! R&!_20D,6:!H&!@&!8/1/46/-!,-+!V&!Z&!#1)++/41&!;II$&!'Z/+*.,L!/44046!
*-50L5*-J! 14,*-//6<! ,! 61)+F!07! .L06/+!D,L34,.1*./! .L,*D6! 740D!P! *-6)4/46&'!@4.2!
C-1/4-!Z/+!XQ$"XY%<;I]IA;I]Q&!
!
#D*12:!@&! ^&:! 9&!803/:!V&!(00+>*-!,-+!Z&!Z041&! ;IIP&! '90DD)-*.,1*0-!K/1>//-!
,-/612/6*0L0J*616:! 3,1*/-16! ,-+! 12/! ,-/612/6*,! 1/,D<! ,! +/6.4*31*5/! 61)+F! 07!
*-+).1*0-!,-+!/D/4J/-./&'!9,-!R!@-,/612!P;"Y%<YXPAY;I&!
!
#D*12:!@&!^&:!9&!803/:!V&!(00+>*-!,-+!Z&!Z041&!;IIT&!'C-1/43407/66*0-,L!2,-+05/4!
,-+! 3,1*/-1! 6,7/1F! *-! ,-,/612/6*,<! 0K6/45,1*0-,L! 61)+F! 07! 2,-+05/46! *-! 12/!
4/.05/4F!400D&'!G4!R!@-,/612!XIX"]%<]];A]]$&!
!
#010:! E&! (&:! H&! ^&! 92):! R&! Z&! (0L+D,-:! C&! R&! E,D3*L! ,-+! U&! R&! E)6?*-&! ;IIQ&!
'90DD)-*.,1*0-! *-! .4*1*.,L! .,4/! /-5*40-D/-16<! D0K*L/! 1/L/320-/6! *D3405/!
3,1*/-1!.,4/&'!@-/612!@-,LJ!XI;";%<P]PAPBX&!
!
#140)3:! V&! ^&:! R&! @&! G/4L*-:! #&! 9&!Z0410-:! C&! OL?*-:! (&! V&!M*LL*,D60-:! V&! E/--*/:! V&!
Z02/4:! G&! R&! G/.?/4:! _&! @&! #*3/! ,-+! #&! G&! _2,.?/4&! ;III&! 'Z/1,A,-,LF6*6! 07!
0K6/45,1*0-,L!61)+*/6!*-!/3*+/D*0L0JF<!,!340306,L!704!4/3041*-J&!Z/1,A,-,LF6*6!O7!
OK6/45,1*0-,L! #1)+*/6! *-! [3*+/D*0L0JF! "ZOO#[%! J40)3&'! R@Z@! ;T]"XP%<;IITA
;IX;&!
!
_,77*-+/4:!S&! R&:! C&!9&!Z.Z,-)6:!h&!()L:!E&!9&!E)66/LL!,-+!@&!V,4`*&!XYYT&!'[77/.1!07!
6L//3! +/34*5,1*0-! 0-! 6)4J/0-6a! +/d1/4*1F! 0-! L,3,406.03F! 6*D)L,104&'! H,-./1!
]P;"YX]P%<XXYX&!
!
_20D,6:![&!R&:!V&!Z&!#1)++/41:!N&!E&!G)461*-:![&!R&!O4,5:!_&!g//-,:![&!R&!M*LL*,D6:!U&!Z&!
N0>,4+:!8&!9&!M/*L/4!,-+!_&!@&!G4/--,-&!;III&! 'C-.*+/-./!,-+! 1F3/6!07! ,+5/46/!
/5/-16!,-+!-/JL*J/-1!.,4/!*-!\1,2!,-+!90L04,+0&'!Z/+!9,4/!]T"]%<;QXA;$X&!
!
_20D360-:!@&!(&:!U&!R,.0K:!R&!^)L10-!,-+!9&!E&!Z.(,5*-&!;IIB&!'V0!3061A1,?/!>,4+!
40)-+!340704D,6!*D3405/!.0DD)-*.,1*0-!,-+!*-7L)/-./!f),L*1F!07!3,1*/-1!.,4/b'!
8061J4,+!Z/+!R!TI"YBY%<Q$PAQ$Q&!
!
_0-J:! @&:! 8&! #,*-6K)4F! ,-+! R&! 94,*J&! ;II$&! '90-60L*+,1/+! .4*1/4*,! 704! 4/3041*-J!
f),L*1,1*5/! 4/6/,4.2! "9OE[c%<! ,! ];A*1/D! .2/.?L*61! 704! *-1/45*/>6! ,-+! 70.)6!
J40)36&'!C-1!R!c),L!N/,L12!9,4/!XY"Q%<]BYA]P$&!
!
\-+4/:! #&:! @&! S&! N/,L/F:! @&! V,4`*! ,-+! 9&! @&! W*-./-1&! ;IIQ&! 'OK6/45,1*0-,L!
,66/66D/-1!07!6)4J*.,L!1/,D>04?<!,!7/,6*K*L*1F!61)+F&'!M04L+!R!#)4J!]I"XI%<X$$BA
X$T]&!
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\-+4/:! #&:! S&! #/5+,L*6:! @&! S&! N/,L/F:! @&! V,4`*! ,-+! 9&! @&! W*-./-1&! ;II$&!
'OK6/45,1*0-,L! 1/,D>04?! ,66/66D/-1! 704! 6)4J/4F! "O_@#%<! 4/7*-/D/-1! ,-+!
,33L*.,1*0-!*-!)40L0J*.,L!6)4J/4F&'!M04L+!R!#)4J!]X"$%<X]$]AX]TX&!
!
W,-![,10-:![&!(&:!U&!V&!N045,12:!M&!G&!H0K/4:!@&!R&!E066*-*!,-+!9&!@&!8/LL/J4*-*&!;IIP&!
'@! 4,-+0D*`/+:! .0-140LL/+! 14*,L! /5,L),1*-J! 12/! *D3,.1! 07! ,! .0D3)1/4*`/+!
40)-+*-J!,-+!6*J-A0)1!6F61/D!0-!.0-1*-)*1F!07!.,4/!,-+!4/6*+/-1!>04?!20)46&'!R!
@D!90LL!#)4J!;II"B%<P]TAPBP&!
!
W*-./-1:! 9&! ;II]&! '\-+/461,-+*-J! ,-+! 4/630-+*-J! 10! ,+5/46/! /5/-16&'! S! [-JL! R!
Z/+!]BT"XX%<XIPXAXIPQ&!
!
W*-./-1:! 9&:! U&!Z00412F:! #&! U&! #,4?/4:! @&! 92,-J! ,-+!@&!M&!V,4`*&! ;IIB&! '#F61/D6!
,3340,.2/6! 10! 6)4J*.,L! f),L*1F! ,-+! 6,7/1F<! 740D!.0-./31! 10!D/,6)4/D/-1&'!@--!
#)4J!;]Y"B%<B$PABT;&!
!
W*-./-1:! 9&:! (&! S/,L/! ,-+!Z&!M0L062F-0>F.2&! ;IIX&! '@+5/46/! /5/-16! *-! G4*1*62!
2063*1,L6<!34/L*D*-,4F!4/14063/.1*5/!4/.04+!4/5*/>&'!GZR!];;"$;TP%<PX$APXY&!
!
W*-./-1:!9&:!#&!_,FL04A@+,D6:![&!R&!92,3D,-:!V&!N/>/11:!#&!84*04:!8&!#14,-J/!,-+!@&!
_*``,4+&! ;III&! 'N0>! 10! *-5/61*J,1/! ,-+! ,-,LF6/! .L*-*.,L! *-.*+/-16<! .L*-*.,L! 4*6?!
)-*1! ,-+! ,660.*,1*0-! 07! L*1*J,1*0-! ,-+! 4*6?! D,-,J/D/-1! 34010.0L&'! GZR!
];I"$;]$%<$$$A$TX&!
!
W0L33:!U&!(&!,-+!V&!(4,-+/&!;II]&!'E/6*+/-16a!6)JJ/61*0-6!704!4/+).*-J!/44046!*-!
1/,.2*-J!2063*1,L6&'!S![-JL!R!Z/+!]BT"Y%<TPXATPP&!
!
M,L62:! _&! #&:! #&! V0++6! ,-+! ^&! Z.@4+L/&! ;IIB&! '[5,L),1*0-! 07! 6*D3L/! .4*1/4*,! 10!
34/+*.1! 6)../667)L! >/,-*-J! 740D! D/.2,-*.,L! 5/-1*L,1*0-! *-! *-1/-6*5/! .,4/!
3,1*/-16&'!G4!R!@-,/612!Y;"Q%<$Y]A$YY&!
!
M/K/4:! N&:! Z&! #10.?L*:! Z&! S)KL*-J! ,-+!M&! @&! H,-J/>*1`&! ;II$&! '90DD)-*.,1*0-!
+)4*-J!>,4+!40)-+6!*-!*-1/4-,L!D/+*.*-/&!@-!,-,LF6*6!07!3,1*/-1A-)46/A32F6*.*,-!
*-1/4,.1*0-6!)6*-J!EC@#&'!8,1*/-1![+).!90)-6!Q$"]%<]B]A]BT&!
!
M/K61/4:! R&! H&! ,-+! 9&! (&! 9,0&! ;IIQ&! 'H0>/4*-J! .0DD)-*.,1*0-! K,44*/46! *-!
03/4,1*-J!400D!1/.2-0L0JF&'!N)D!^,.1046!BT"B%<$B$A$PT&!
!
M/24L*AW/*1:!Z&:!R&!G&!E*L/F!,-+!R&!M&!@)61*-&!;IIB&!'@!7,*L)4/!D0+/!/77/.1!,-,LF6*6!
0-!/d14,.04304/,L!.*4.)*16!704!.,4+*03)LD0-,4F!KF3,66&'!R![d14,!904304!_/.2-0L!
]Q"B%<]PXA]P$&!
!
M/*4:!W&!H&!;IIP&!'G/61A34,.1*./!34010.0L6<!34/5/-1*-J!,+5/46/!+4)J!/5/-16&'!S)46!
Z,-,J/!]Q"Y%<;BA]I&!
!
M/6-/6:!U&!@&:!Z&!G&!M,L?/4:!H&!(&!M,L?/4:!#&!V&!N/F6:!H&!M2*1/:!E&!M,44/-!,-+!O&!
[4/D*-&! XYY$&! '90J-*1*5/! 3/4704D,-./! ,-+!D00+! ,71/4! ,!>//?/-+! 0-! .,LL! *-! ,!
6)4J*.,L!)-*1&'!G4!R!#)4J!TB"B%<BY]ABYP&!
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M/61:! V&:! Z&! 90+*6301*! ,-+! _&! (4,2,D&! ;II$&! '_2/! [)403/,-! M04?*-J! _*D/!
V*4/.1*5/!,-+!14,*-*-J!*-!.,4+*01204,.*.!6)4J/4F!*-!12/!\-*1/+!U*-J+0D&'!#)4J/0-!
P";%<TXATPi!f)*`!TP:!X;X&!
!
M/61:! Z&@&! ;IIB&! '[77/.1*5/! _/,D>04?&84,.1*.,L! H/660-6! ^40D! O4J,-*6,1*0-,L!
E/6/,4.2!";-+!/+&%&!H/*./61/4<!G8#!GL,.?>/LL&'!
!
M/11/4-/.?:!_&!G&:!U&!@&!#?*K*-6?*:!_&!H&!E0K/416:!#&!Z&!UL/33*-:!Z&![&!#.240/+/4:!Z&!
[-L0/:! #&! #&! E0)J2:! @&! #&! N)-+1! ,-+! 8&! 9,4,F0-&! ;IIQ&! '\6*-J! 7,*L)4/!D0+/! ,-+!
/77/.16! ,-,LF6*6! 10! 3L,-! *D3L/D/-1,1*0-! 07! 6D,41! *&5&! 3)D3! 1/.2-0L0JF&'! @D! R!
N/,L12!#F61!82,4D!Q]"XQ%<XP;TAXP]T&!
!
M*LL*,D6:!U&!@&:!M&!V&!E06/!,-+!E&!#*D0-&!XYYY&!'_/,D>04?!*-!/D/4J/-.F!D/+*.,L!
6/45*./6&'!@*4!Z/+!R!XT"B%<XBYAXP]&!
!
M*LL*,D6:!E&!(&:!E&!#*L5/4D,-:!9&!#.2>*-+:!R&!G&!^041)-/:!R&!#)1F,?:!U&!V&!N045,12:![&!
(&! W,-![,10-:! (&! @``*/:! R&! E&! 80116:! ]4+:!Z&! G0/2L/4! ,-+!(&! H&! V)--*-J10-&! ;II$&!
'#)4J/0-!*-704D,1*0-!14,-67/4!,-+!.0DD)-*.,1*0-<!7,.1046!,77/.1*-J!f),L*1F!,-+!
/77*.*/-.F!07!*-3,1*/-1!.,4/&'!@--!#)4J!;BP";%<XPYAXQY&!
!
M*L60-:!E&!Z&:!G&!_&!N,44*60-:!E&!M&!(*KK/4+!,-+!R&!V&!N,D*L10-&!XYYY&!'@-!,-,LF6*6!
07!12/!.,)6/6!07!,+5/46/!/5/-16!740D!12/!c),L*1F!*-!@)614,L*,-!N/,L12!9,4/!#1)+F&'!
Z/+!R!@)61!X$I"Y%<BXXABXP&!
!
M*L60-:!E&!Z&:!M&!G&!E)-.*D,-:!E&!M&!(*KK/4+:!G&!_&!N,44*60-:!H&!S/>KF!,-+!R&!V&!
N,D*L10-&! XYYP&! '_2/! c),L*1F! *-! @)614,L*,-! N/,L12! 9,4/! #1)+F&'! Z/+! R! @)61!
XQ]"Y%<BPTAB$X&!
!
M0L77:!@&!Z&:!#&!@&!_,FL04!,-+!R&!^&!Z.9,K/&!;IIB&!'\6*-J!.2/.?L*616!,-+!4/D*-+/46!
*-!.L*-*.,L!3,12>,F6!10!*D3405/!2063*1,L!*-3,1*/-1!.,4/&'!Z/+!R!@)61!XTX"T%<B;TA
B]X&!
!
M4*J21:!#&:! R&!G0>?/11!,-+!U&!G4,F&!XYYQ&!'_2/!.0DD)-*.,1*0-!J,3! *-! 12/! C9\AA,!
3066*KL/!60L)1*0-&'!S)46!94*1!9,4/!X"P%<;BXA;BB&!
!
h/:!U&:!V&!_,FL04!V&!Z.:!R&!9&!U-011:!@&!V/-1!,-+!9&![&!Z,.G/,-&!;II$&!'N,-+05/4!*-!
12/! /D/4J/-.F! +/3,41D/-1<! +/7*.*/-.*/6! ,-+! ,+5/46/! /77/.16&'! [D/4J! Z/+!
@)614,L,6!XY"P%<B]]ABBX&!
!
h0)-J:!(&! R&:!Z&!8&! 92,4-6:! R&!V,L/F:!Z&!(&! ^04K/6:!M&!N/-+/460-!,-+!#&! ^&!U2)4*&!
XYY$&! 'G/61! 34,.1*./6! 704!D,-,J*-J! 6)4J*.,L! 6/45*./6<! 12/! 40L/! 07! .004+*-,1*0-&'!
N/,L12!9,4/!Z,-,J/!E/5!;;"B%<$;ATX&!
!
h0)-J:! E&! R&:! #&! V&! N046L/F! ,-+!Z&! Z.U/--,&! ;III&! '_2/! 301/-1*,L! 40L/! 07! C_! *-!
6)33041*-J!12/!>04?!07!e)-*04!+0.1046&'!R!E!90LL!82F6*.*,-6!H0-+!]B"B%<]QQA]$I&!
!
!
!
!
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h)L/:!#&:!E&!^L*-:!#&!8,1/460-AG40>-:!S&!Z,4,-!,-+!V&!E0>L/F&!;IIQ&!'V/5/L03D/-1!
07! ,! 4,1*-J! 6F61/D! 704! 6)4J/0-6a! -0-A1/.2-*.,L! 6?*LL6&'! Z/+! [+).! BI"XX%<XIYTA
XXIB&!
!
 
!!"#$%"#&' ()*' +' ,' -'
*"%'$.%'&#/0'12'$.%'0$345'
67%&"75'0$&$%48'
! "#$%!&'(!%()(*+! ,'$*!)#$%!%()(*+!-.*)/.01!)..!
)#$%!%()(*+!2&-.*)/.01&'(!#&!
)3%(/)-(!
"..!)#$%!-.*)/.0!%()(*+!
#&-.2+#&4!#&!)3%(/)-(!
(3/9%"'12':&"$#6#:&;$0'<.1'
4%67#;%4':&"$#6#:&$#1;'
"%:1"$%48'
! 5'!$*&(#'&!'6!+*-.#&*!/)(*! 7'.2&(**/%1!8/'8'/(#'&%!'&.0! 52$3*/!'6!8)/(#-#8)&(%!9:'!
+*-.#&*+!8)/(#-#8)(#'&!
/*8'/(*+!
*"%'#;6730#1;'6"#$%"#&'
0:%6#2#%48'
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!
8)8*/!*<4<!)!%(2+0!'6!&'(*%=!&'(!
:2$)&!%23>*-(%!
5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!#&-.2%#'&!
-/#(*/#)!
,'$*!#&-.2%#'&!-/#(*/#)!4#?*&!
32(!&'(!62..!
@2..!#&-.2%#'&!-/#(*/#)!4#?*&!
*"%':&"$#6#:&;$0='
6.&"&6$%"#0$#60'>#?%;8'''
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!
8)8*/!*<4<!)!%(2+0!'6!&'(*%=!&'(!
:2$)&!%23>*-(%!
5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!8)/(#-#8)&(%A!
-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!
,'$*!/*6*/*&-*!('!
8)/(#-#8)&(%A!-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!
32(!&'(!62..!
B)/(#-#8)&(%A!-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!
62..0!/*8'/(*+!
@&0'%$.#6&7'&::"1?&7'
19$&#;%48'
! 5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!*(:#-).!
)88/'?).!
C(:#-).!)88/'?).!!6/'$!
2&&)$*+!3'+0!
"88/'8/#)(*!*(:#-).!)88/'?).!
'3()#&*+!9#(:!)88/'?#&4!3'+0!
&)$*+!#&!8)8*/!
@%"%':1<%"'6&7637&$#1;0'
:%"21"/%48'
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!
8)8*/!
5'!8'9*/!-).-2.)(#'&%!
8*/6'/$*+!
B'9*/!-).-2.)(#'&!+#%-2%%*+1!
)((*$8(*+!
"88/'8/#)(*!8'9*/!
-).-2.)(#'&%!8*/6'/$*+!
*"%'0$&$#0$#60'&::"1:"#&$%8'' ;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!
8)8*/!
5'!%()(#%(#-%1!#&)88/'8/#)(*!
%()(#%(#-%!
,'$*!)88/'8/#)(*!%()(#%(#-%!
32(!&'!>2%(#6#-)(#'&!4#?*&!
,()(#%(#-%!)88/'8/#)(*!9#(:!
>2%(#6#-)(#'&!6'/!2%*<!
@&0'%22%6$'0#A%'"%:1"$%48'' ;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!
8)8*/!
C66*-(!%#D*!&'(!/*8'/(*+! *66*-(!%#D*!/*8'/(*+!6'/!%'$*!
32(!&'(!)..!+)()!
C66*-(!%#D*!/*8'/(*+!6'/!)..!
)88/'8/#)(*!+)()!
*"%'7#/#$&$#1;0'
&6B;1<7%4>%48''
! 5'!.#$#()(#'&%!)-E&'9.*+4*+! ,'$*!32(!&'(!)..!.#$#()(#'&%!
)-E&'9.*+4*+!
F#$#()(#'&%!)-E&'9.*+4*+!
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!
!"#$%"#&' ()*' +' ,' -'
*"%'$.%'&#/0'12'$.%'0$345'67%&"75'
0$&$%48'
! "#$%!&'(!%()(*+! ,'$*!)#$%!%()(*+!-.*)/.01!)..!)#$%!
%()(*+!2&-.*)/.01&'(!#&!)3%(/)-(!
"..!)#$%!-.*)/.0!%()(*+!#&-.2+#&4!#&!
)3%(/)-(!
(3/9%"'12':&"$#6#:&;$0'<.1'
4%67#;%4':&"$#6#:&$#1;'"%:1"$%48'
! 5'!$*&(#'&!'6!+*-.#&*!/)(*! 7'.2&(**/%1!8/'8'/(#'&%!'&.0! 52$3*/!'6!8)/(#-#8)&(%!9:'!+*-.#&*+!
8)/(#-#8)(#'&!/*8'/(*+!
*"%'#;6730#1;'6"#$%"#&'0:%6#2#%48' ;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!8)8*/!*<4<!)!
%(2+0!'6!&'(*%=!&'(!:2$)&!%23>*-(%!
5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!#&-.2%#'&!-/#(*/#)! ,'$*!#&-.2%#'&!-/#(*/#)!4#?*&!32(!&'(!
62..!
@2..!#&-.2%#'&!-/#(*/#)!4#?*&!
*"%':&"$#6#:&;$0='6.&"&6$%"#0$#60'
>#?%;8'''
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!8)8*/!*<4<!)!
%(2+0!'6!&'(*%=!&'(!:2$)&!%23>*-(%!
5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!8)/(#-#8)&(%A!
-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!
,'$*!/*6*/*&-*!('!8)/(#-#8)&(%A!
-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!32(!&'(!62..!
8)/(#-#8)&(%A!-:)/)-(*/#%(#-%!62..0!
/*8'/(*+!
@&0'%$.#6&7'&::"1?&7'19$&#;%48' ! 5'!/*6*/*&-*!('!*(:#-).!)88/'?).! C(:#-).!)88/'?).!!6/'$!2&&)$*+!3'+0! "88/'8/#)(*!*(:#-).!)88/'?).!
'3()#&*+!9#(:!)88/'?#&4!3'+0!&)$*+!
#&!8)8*/!
@&0'$.%'"%0%&"6.%"'$"&#;%4'#;'
61;436$#;>'C3&7#$&$#?%'"%0%&"6.8'
! 5'!(/)#&#&4! B/*?#'2%!(/)#&#&4!1*G8*/#*&-*=!32(!
&'(!%8*-#6#*+!
B/*?#'2%!(/)#&#&41*G8*/#*&-*!
%8*-#6#*+!
D%06"#:$#1;'12'.1<'$.%/%0'
#4%;$#2#%48'
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!8)8*/! 5#.! 5)$*+!(:*'/013/#*6!+*%-/#8(#'&! CG8.)&)(#'&!'6!:'9!(:*$*%1)&).0%#%!
-'&+2-(*+!
@%"%'$.%'2#;4#;>0'/%/9%"'
6.%6B%48''
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!8)8*/! 5'(!-:*-E*+! ;:*-E*+!9#(:!'(:*/%=!32(!&'(!
8)/(#-#8)&(%!
;:*-E*+!9#(:!8)/(#-#8)&(%!
@%"%'$.%'4&$&'&;&750%4'95'/1"%'
$.&;'1;%':%"01;8'
;/#(*/#)!&'(!)88.#-)3.*!('!8)8*/! 5'! B)/(#)..0!-:*-E*+1-:*-E*+!32(!&'(!
#&+*8*&+*&(.0!
H&+*8*&+*&(.0!-:*-E*+!!
E%C3%;6%0'2"1/'1"#>#;&7'D&$&'
#;6734%48'
! 5'! I:*$*%! J2'(*%1?*/3)(#$!
E&$3"&$#1;':1#;$'&6.#%?%48' ! 5'!! K*&(#'&!)3'2(!(:*!%)(2/)(#'&! "2(:'/%!%()(*!-.*)/.0!9:*&!%)(2/)(#'&!
8'#&(!/*)-:*+!
*"%'7#/#$&$#1;0'&6B;1<7%4>%48'' ! 5'!.#$#()(#'&%!)-E&'9.*+4*+! ,'$*!32(!&'(!)..!.#$#()(#'&%!
)-E&'9.*+4*+!
F#$#()(#'&%!)-E&'9.*+4*+!
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Appendix 3C – Quality Assessment for Quantitative Studies 
0- Criteria not met, 1- Criteria partially met, 2- Criteria definitely met, n/a- Criteria not applicable 
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!
Appendix 3D – Quality Assessment for Qualitative Studies 
0- Criteria not met, 1- Criteria partially met, 2- Criteria definitely met, n/a- Criteria not applicable 
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!"#$!%&%'($")*'+,$-#$-'./.)%0$1%.02'+,$-+003$4.540.54/+($.6$7+00*8$9$'+($.6(.)%/+$-'./.)%0$:%.02'+$;*(+$
Appendix 4A – Failure modes in Preoperative Assessment and Optimisation phase 
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Appendix 4B – Failure modes in Preprocedural Teamwork phase 
!
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Appendix 4C – Failure modes in Posoperative Handover phase 
!
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!"#$!%&%'($")*'+,$-#$-'./.)%0$1%.02'+,$-+003$4.540.54/+($.6$7+00*8$9$'+($.6(.)%/+$-'./.)%0$:%.02'+$;*(+$
Appendix 4D – Failure modes in Daily Ward Care phase 
!
!""#$%&'()*!)+$,#-.&#/)01"&2)34&%#)
!
!
"#$%&!
!
'()!*#%+,-.*/01-(-!
23!4+,0#56&,%#+! • 7-,189%-/!%5!#:!;/#!4<=!-$(1>%+?!,#!
• 4+,0#56&(!=)-(9:!
• 4+,0#56&(!$0#@(&,!A!B,1,(!1%=!#:!,/(!
%+,(0C%(;!
• D->!$(0=%--%#+!,#!,1$(!%+,(0C%(;E!
1--60(!1+#+)=%,)!
!
F3!45(+,%:)!$0(-(+,!-)-,(=!! • 4!;#695!9%>(!,#!,19>!,#!)#6!18#6,!
&#==6+%&1,%#+!1+5!%+:#0=1,%#+!:9#;!
$0#&(--!%+!$1,%(+,-!6+5(0?#%+?!=1@#0!
G4!B60?(0)3!4!;#695!-/#;!)#6!,/(!:%?60(!
#:!-60?%&19!&10(!$1,/;1)3!H(!;%99!#+9)!
&#+&(+,01,(!#+!4+,(05%-&%$9%+10)!
&#==6+%&1,%#+3!
• I1+!)#6!?%C(!1+!(J1=$9(!#:!
&#==6+%&1,%#+!:1%960(.%+:#0=1,%#+!
9#--!,/1,!)#6!/1C(!(J$(0%(+&(5!
$(0-#+199)!#0!;%,+(--(5!:%0-,K/1+5!1+5!
,/1,!&16-(5!+(10K=%--.(00#0.15C(0-(!
(C(+,L!
• H/1,!;(0(!,/(!&#+,0%86,#0)!:1&,#0-L!
• H/1,!10(!,/(!$0#89(=-!%+!,/(!:#99#;%+?!
$/1-(-L!
o *0(1--(-=(+,!M!*0($101,%#+!#:!
B60?(0)!
o "/(1,0(!,01+-:(0!M!$0(#$!&/(&>-!
o N1%9)!;105!I10(!
• H/1,!10(!,/(!&16-(-.&#+,0%86,#0)!
:1&,#0-!#:!,/(-(!$0#89(=-L!
• H/1,!10(!,/(!$#,(+,%19!(::(&,!#:!-6&/!
:1%960(-!%+!&#==6+%&1,%#+!1+5!
%+:#0=1,%#+!,01+-:(0!O(?K!5(91)E,(1=!
,(+-%#+E!(00#0-!(,&PL!
!
Q34+:#0=1,%#+!+((5-!1,!(1&/!
$/1-(!
• H/1,!%+:#0=1,%#+!%-!+((5(5!1,!(1&/!
$/1-(3!!
o *0(!A#$!
o *#-,#$!/1+5#C(0!
o N1%9)!H105!R#6+!
 210!
!
 
 
 
 
Q34+:#0=1,%#+!+((5-!1,!(1&/!
$/1-(!
• H/1,!%+:#0=1,%#+!%-!+((5(5!1,!(1&/!
$/1-(3!!
o *0(!A#$!
o *#-,#$!/1+5#C(0!
o N1%9)!H105!R#6+!
!
S3!!*#-,#$!T1+5#C(0!! • H/1,!10(!,/(!$0#89(=-!%+!$#-,#$!
/1+5#C(0!!
• H/#!-/#695!/1+5#C(0!
• H/1,!%+:#0=1,%#+!5#!)#6!+((5!,#!
,01+-:(0L!
• N#!)#6!,/%+>!,/1,!,/(0(!-/#695!8(!1!
/1+5#C(0!&/(&>9%-,!
• 4:!,/(0(!%-!1!/1+5#C(0!&/(&>9%-,E!;/1,!
-/#695!8(!,/(!>()!&#=$#+(+,-!#:!,/1,!
&/(&>9%-,3!
!
U3!4+,(0C(+,%#+-!,#!%=$0#C(!,/(!
$0#&(--!
• G%C(+!,/(!$0#89(=-!,/1,!;(!/1C(!
%5(+,%:%(5!-#!:10E!&1+!)#6!-6??(-,!-#=(!
&/1+?(-!,#!%=$0#C(!,/(!%+:#0=1,%#+!
,01+-:(0!1,!C10%#6-!$/1-(-!
V3!W6(-,%#+-! • D+),/%+?!(9-(!)#6!;#695!9%>(!,#!155L!
• N#!)#6!/1C(!1+)!X6(-,%#+-L!
!
!""#$%&'()*!)+,#-"#,./&0#)!11#112#$/).$%)
3"/&2&1./&-$)4567!8)79#:;<&1/)=>)
!
8?,@&:.<)/#.2) !$.#1/9#/&1/) A?,1&$@)/#.2)
1. "#$%&'()*%#!(+%,) 
a. -&./.#)!0*/)%&1 
b. -(/)!'.2*3(4!0*/)%&1 
c. 5&,6!0*/)%&1! 
d. 744.&61!/)(),/ 
! ! !
2. 80.39!:4%%2!"#;./)*6()*%#/ 
 
! ! !
<= 80.39!3&%//>'()30!
!
! ! !
?= 80.39!/@.3*(4!"#;./)*6()*%#/!!!!!
!!!!!!
! ! !
5. 80.39!A@.3*(4*)1!&.$.&&(4 ! ! !
6. 8%#/.#)!)(9.#B30.39.2 ! ! !
C= 80.39!D5E!+.2!(;(*4(+*4*)1!
!
!
! ! !
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!
 
 
 
 
 
C= 80.39!D5E!+.2!(;(*4(+*4*)1!
!
!
!
!
! ! !
5$B-,2./&-$)6.1;1)
!
! ! !
!!!!!!F=!!!-&./3&*+.!'.2*3()*%#/! ! ! !
!!!!!!G=!!!-&./3&*+.!:%H.4!@&.@(&()*%#! ! ! !
!!!!IJ=!!!5KL!@&%@014(M*/! ! ! !
!!!!II=!!!N(9.!@4(#!$%&!'.2*3(4!3%'%&+*2*)*./! ! ! !
   IO=   7#(./)0.)*3!(#2!A,&6*3(4!).('!3%'',#*3().!H*)0!.(30!
%)0.& 
! ! !
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!""#$%&')*C()+,#",-:#%?,.<)6#.2D-,;).$%):9#:;1)4567!8)79#:;<&1/)E> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. P(&2!#,&/.!0(#2%;.&/!@()*.#)!*#$%&'()*%#!)%!)0.()&.!).(' 
a. Q%)./ 
b. 8%#/.#) 
c. -()*.#)!2.)(*4/ 
d. Q('.!%$!@&%3.2,&. 
 
RSA QT 
2. Surgical team confirms the equipment RSA QT 
3. Theatre team confirms patient identity, name ± site of operation RSA QT 
4. A,&6.%#!(#2!7#(./)0.)*/)!2*/3,//!(#)*3*@().2!@&%+4.'/ RSA QT 
U= L0.()&.!).('!30.39/!)0()!(#)*+*%)*3!0(/!+..#!6*;.#!
 
RSA QT 
6. L0.()&.!).('!30.39/!(+%,)!5KL!@&%@014(M*/!V!.6!>@#.,'()*3!
3%'@&.//*%#W 
RSA QT 
!""#$%&'()*+(,-./-"#01/&2#(31$%-2#0(
456*!7(*8#9:;&./(<= 
INFORMATION TASK 
Transferred to 
RN 
Transferred to 
WN 
Patient specific information   
1. Patient details    
2. Age   
3. Medical History   
4. Allergy status   
5. Diagnosis   
6. Procedure   
      7.   Patient current status   
Anaesthetic Information   
      8. Intraoperative Anaesthetic course and any complications   
      9. Blood transfusion    
    10. Medications given in theatre   
    11. Plan for monitoring (Vitals parameter range and action) 
 
  
    12. Plan for intravenous fluids 
 
  
    13. Plan for pain relief   
    14. Plan for lines. Eg- central venous, arterial   
    15. Postop investigations. Eg- Hb, Cxray   
Surgical Information   
    16. Intraoperative surgical course and any complications   
    17. Blood loss   
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    18. No. of drains & plan   
    19. Plan for nasogastric tube/feeding   
    20. DVT prophylaxis plan   
   21.  Antibiotic Plan   
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